Wage inequality in a frictional labor market

Wage inequality in the United States has grown substantially in the past two decades. Standard supply-demand analysis in the empirics of inequality (e.g.Katz and Murphy (1992)) indicates that we may attribute some of this trend to an outward shift in the demand for high skilled labor. In this paper we examine a simple static channel in which the wage premium for skill may grow -increased firm entry. We consider a model of wage dispersion where there are two types of workers and homogeneous firms must set wages and preferences for what type of worker they would like to hire. We find that both the wage differential and the demand for high skill workers can increase with the proportion of high skill workers -these high skill workers therefore 'create' their own demand without exogenous factors. In addition, within group wage inequality can increase in step with the between group wage inequality. Simulations of the model are provided in order to compare the findings with empirical results.Wage posting, wage inequality, search

Fatalism and Savings

We examine the impact of fatalism, the belief that one has little or no control over future events, on the decision of whether or not to save. We develop a model that predicts that fatalism decreases savings for moderately risk averse individuals, increases savings for highly risk averse individuals, and otherwise has no impact. Furthermore, fatalism decreases effort in learning about savings and investment options. We use data from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) and find general support for the theoretical predictions of the model. The results are robust to the inclusion of a number of additional control variables.fatalism, savings, risk aversion

Selling to consumers with endogenous types

For many goods (such as experience goods or addictive goods), consumers’ preferences may change over time. In this paper, we examine a monopolist’s optimal pricing schedule when current consumption can affect a consumer’s valuation in the future and valuations are unobservable. We assume that consumers are anonymous, i.e. the monopolist can’t observe a consumer’s past consumption history. For myopic consumers, the optimal consumption schedule is distorted upwards, involving substantial discounts for low valuation types. This pushes low types into higher valuations, from which rents can be extracted. For forward looking consumers, there may be a further upward distortion of consumption due to a reversal of the adverse selection effect; low valuation consumers now have a strong interest in consumption in order to increase their valuations. Firms will find it profitable to educate consumers and encourage forward looking behavior.Endogenous types, experience goods, addictive goods, price discrimination

Interviews and adverse selection

Interviewing in professional labor markets is a costly process for firms. Moreover, poor screening can have a persistent negative impact on firms’ bottom lines and candidates’ careers. In a simple dynamic model where firms can pay a cost to interview applicants who have private information about their own ability, potentially large inefficiencies arise from information-based unemployment, where able workers are rejected by firms because of their lack of offers in previous interviews. This effect may make the market less efficient than random matching. We show that the first best can be achieved using either a mechanism with transfers or one without transfers.Decentralized Labor Markets, Professional Labor Markets, Asymmetric Information, Interview costs, Matching

Did the 2001 Tax Rebate Stimulate Spending? Evidence from Taxpayer Surveys

In 2001, many households received rebate checks as advanced payments of the benefit of the new, 10 percent federal income tax bracket. A survey conducted at the time the rebates were mailed finds that few households said that the rebate led them mostly to increase spending. A follow-up survey in 2002, as well as a similar survey conducted after the attacks of 9/11, also indicates low spending rates. This paper investigates the robustness of these survey responses and assesses whether such surveys are useful for policy evaluation. It also draws lessons from the surveys for macroeconomic analysis of the tax rebate.