The return of the Kurdish question: on the situation of the Kurds in Iraq, Syria and Turkey

For decades, the roughly twenty-nine million Kurds living in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria were regarded primarily as a threat to the territorial integrity of those states and thus to the stability of the Middle East. Today the region is marked by state collapse, rampant terrorism, and signs of unravelling in the established system of states. These developments have brought about fundamental changes in the position of the Kurds and the role they play in regional politics. (author's abstract

Ever further from the West: why Ankara looks to Moscow

A bloody coup attempt, the government responding by dismantling the state of law and an unending series of terror attacks have turned Turkey into a different country. In foreign policy, Ankara’s rapprochement with Moscow raises the question of whether the West can still consider Turkey a reliable partner. Officially, the country continues to be a candidate for membership of the European Union. However, for some time now the talk has been more of the dangers that an unstable and anti-Western Turkey creates for the EU than of how Brussels might influence Turkish politics. NATO too is concerned about Turkey. Will it remain in the Western camp? Can it recover domestically? What sort of future do the more recent developments in foreign and domestic policy predict for Turkey? (author's abstract

Turkey shifts the focus of its foreign policy: from Syria to the eastern Mediterranean and Libya

On 27 November 2019, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared that Turkey had concluded a treaty on military assistance and cooperation with the government of Fayez al-Sarraj in Libya. The agreement permits the deployment of Turkish troops into the civil-war-torn country. The announcement was met with almost unanimous criticism in Western Europe. The indignation grew even greater when it became known that Turkey was controlling and financing the smuggling of Islamic Syrian fighters into Libya. Reports of a dominant influence of the Muslim Brotherhood on the Libyan gov­ern­ment seemed to complete the picture of a strongly Islamist-motivated Turkish policy. However, Turkey's engagement in Libya is not driven by ideology, but rather by stra­tegic considerations and economic interests. Ankara is thus reacting to its isolation in the eastern Mediterranean, where the dispute over the distribution of gas resources is intensifying. At the same time, Turkey is drawing lessons from the war in Syria. An­kara has lost this war, but through its engagement in Syria, it has been able to estab­lish a conflictual - but viable - working relationship with Russia. The bottom line is that Turkey’s commitment to Libya is a shift in the focus of its foreign policy from the Middle East to the Mediterranean, a shift that will present entirely new challenges to Europe, the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (author's abstract

Erdoğans "New Turkey": restoring the authoritarian state in the name of democracy

"European and American commentators warn that Turkey is drifting back into authoritarianism, citing excessive police violence against demonstrators, restrictions on freedom of the press and internet, government interference in the judiciary, purges in the bureaucracy, and an anti-European policy shift. They note with astonishment that former prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was able to win the presidency on an increased share of the vote despite credible accusations of corruption, strife within the conservative camp and foreign policy failures. Erdoğan himself speaks of the 'New Turkey' having succeeded the old, authoritarian Kemalist republic and brought forth a progressive democracy. How broad is support for Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) across society? What can be expected of the new government? How fundamental is the reconstruction of the political system, and what does the it mean for the future of democracy? How can and should Europe respond?" (author's abstract

Is the Fethullah Gülen movement overstretching itself? A Turkish religious community as a national and international player

"The movement led by the preacher Fethullah Gülen is regarded as the fastest-growing religious trend within Turkish Islam. This accounts also for citizens and denizens with Turkish backgrounds in Western European countries, including Germany, where approximately 300 organisations close to Gülen operate 24 state-approved private schools and around 150 extracurricular tuition centres. Against the background of the diaspora, Gülen's philosophy of adopting modern knowledge, modes of action and attitudes, climbing the social ladder and thus making an effective contribution to social moral reform assumes a new dimension. For one thing, in contrast to Turkey, personal social advancement cannot be linked with the undertaking regarding the conquest of the state. For another, and again in contrast to Turkey, to concentrate on the preservation of one's traditional religious (Muslim) and national (Turkish) identity does not automatically create harmony with the majority of the population, but is indeed at least partially opposed to the same. As a result, the Turkish-Muslim diaspora is under pressure to develop a new understanding of religious and national identity compatible with attitudes prevailing in European societies. For the movement's supporters, this is just as much a prerequisite for their individual advancement as the reconciliation of their religious world view with its scientific equivalent. Gülen's prompt that service to society constitutes a significant form of a lifestyle justifiable in the eyes of God could prove to be the key to resolving the principal conflict of interest between Islam and the West both within the European diaspora and in the USA, repeatedly emphasised by him with insistence in his early writings." (author's abstract

Turkey as partner of the EU in the refugee crisis: Ankara's problems and interests

Rarely has a resolution by the European Union heads of state and government been criticised from such diverse perspectives and positions of vested interest as the EU's agreements with the Turkish government of 29th November 2015 regarding the alleviation of the refugee crisis. Eastern European states, human rights organisations, a European public critical of Turkey and Turkish intellectuals are united in their skeptical rejection of Brussels' policies. They take the view that the EU's financial and political concessions to Turkey have overstepped the mark. By contrast, the situation in Turkey has barely played any part in the discussion to date. Little interest has been shown in the financial means at Turkey’s disposal in order to fulfil these tasks, in the political cost which would arise for the government as a result of steps taken in the above-mentioned direction and in the major upheaval in Turkish asylum and aliens policy which is inevitably associated with the agreements. Also lacking is speculation on why Turkey is prepared to cooperate with the European Union at all, how it could have been persuaded to participate in such a collaboration initially and on which mutual objectives and interests a cooperation of this nature could be based. (author's abstract

Turkey in Afghanistan: a successful stakeholder, but a difficult partner

The global increase in Islamist violence, state disintegration in Asia and Africa and the resulting influx of refugees to Europe are forcing the international community to intensify its focus on the promotion of peace in crisis regions and on social reconstruction. It may be useful to draw on the experiences in Afghanistan when responding to future challenges. Here, particular attention should be paid to Turkey, whose strategy and approach differ from those of other states, and whose involvement in Afghanistan is generally deemed successful. Simultaneously, the experiences gathered in Afghanistan also permit assertions to be made regarding Turkey as a partner in terms of security cooperation - a highly topical issue. (Autorenreferat

Erdoğan als Bauherr in Nordzypern: sein Besuch in der "Türkischen Republik Nordzypern" zementiert die Wende in der türkischen Zypernpolitik und verstärkt die Isolation Ankaras

Vor seiner Reise in den türkisch besetzten Norden der Insel am 20. Juli 2021 kündigte der türkische Staatspräsident Recep Tayyip Erdoğan eine "frohe Botschaft" für die nur von der Türkei anerkannte Türkische Republik Nordzypern (TRNZ) an. Spekula­tio­nen schossen ins Kraut, der Präsident werde zum 47. Jahrestag der türkischen Invasion verkünden, Aserbaidschan, Pakistan oder Kirgistan stünden bereit, diplomatische Beziehungen mit der TRNZ aufzunehmen. Doch Erdoğan gab lediglich den Bau eines pompösen Präsidentenpalastes bekannt, der einem künftigen, unabhängigen "Zyperntürkischen Staat" angemessen sein soll. Noch schreckt der türkische Präsident also davor zurück, seinen Worten von der internationalen Anerkennung der TRNZ Taten folgen zu lassen. Doch der Besuch zeigt, dass Ankara auf die endgültige Teilung der Insel hinarbeitet - und außerdem, dass in Nordzypern einzig und allein Erdoğan das Sagen hat. (Autorenreferat

Staat und Islam in der Türkei

'Ist die Türkei wirklich ein 'islamischer Großstaat', der seinem Wesen nach keinen Platz in der Europäischen Union hat? Dominiert 'der Islam' Politik und Gesellschaft der Türkei in einer Art und Weise, dass diese einfach nicht 'europäisch' werden können? In der Studie wird, ausgehend von der historischen Entwicklung, das aktuelle Verhältnis von Staat und Islam in der Türkei untersucht. Unter Zurückweisung eines unveränderlichen Wesens 'des Islam' und seines Verhältnisses zur Politik wird in einer historisch-strukturellen Analyse gezeigt, wie die islamische Religion nach europäischen Vorbildern in den Dienst der türkischen Staatsraison und des Aufbaus einer republikanischen Nation (nation building) gestellt wird. Der so entstandene türkische Laizismus ist gekennzeichnet durch eine strikte staatliche Kontrolle des öffentlichen religiösen Lebens, einschließlich einer von einer staatliche Einrichtung verfügten 'korrekten' Interpretation der Religionsinhalte, und dadurch, dass jegliche Form von 'freier' Religionsausübung als existentielle Bedrohung für die Republik wahrgenommen wird. Erst unter der AKP-Regierung von Ministerpräsident Recep Tayyip Erdogan beginnt sich das offizielle Religionsverständnis zu wandeln: Laizismus wird im europäischen Sinn als echte Trennung von Staat und Islam gesehen; Islam wird zwar als eine mögliche ethische Grundlage, nicht aber als Handlungsanleitung für Politik verstanden und ein pluralistisches Verständnis von Religionsfreiheit beginnt zu keimen. So gesehen ist zwar die aktuelle Situation von Staat und Islam immer noch durch ein in den meisten EU-Ländern bereits weitgehend überwundenes Verhältnis gekennzeichnet, aber im Prozess ihrer Säkularisierung ist die Türkei 'verspätetes Europa' und nicht 'aktueller Orient'.' (Autorenreferat

Türkei: per Wahl zur Instabilität?; das so positiv aufgenommene Ergebnis der Parlamentswahlen birgt auch viele Risiken

"Der Ausgang der türkischen Parlamentswahlen wurde in Europa und den USA, aber auch in der liberalen Öffentlichkeit des Landes selbst mit großer Genugtuung aufgenommen. Die Wählerinnen und Wähler, so der Tenor, hätten die Pläne von Staatspräsident Erdogan durchkreuzt, ein Präsidialsystem sui generis zu errichten, mit dem er faktisch zum Alleinherrscher geworden wäre. Die türkische Gesellschaft habe ihre liberalen Reflexe aktiviert, und das Ergebnis sei ein Sieg der Demokratie. Als Beleg dafür gilt vor allem der Erfolg der prokurdischen HDP, die überraschend den Sprung ins Parlament schaffte. In den Augen vieler Beobachterinnen und Beobachter ist mit dieser Partei, die einen radikaldemokratischen Diskurs etabliert habe und Gruppen jeglicher kultureller Identität sowie Frauen einbeziehe, eine echte Alternative zur nationalistischen und staatsfixierten Politik aller anderen Parteien entstanden. Angesichts der Ängste vor einer Autokratie Erdogans ist es verständlich, dass die positiven Aspekte der Wahl hervorgehoben werden. Tatsächlich hat die Bevölkerung dem geplanten Präsidialsystem eine klare Absage erteilt. Doch wie eine genauere Analyse der Ergebnisse zeigt, gibt es darüber hinaus wenig Grund, von einer Stärkung der demokratischen Kultur in der Türkei zu sprechen." (Autorenreferat