The Law Court\u27s Proper Application of Miranda in State v. Bragg: A Matter-of-Fact Communication to the Defendant Regarding Evidence Against Him Will Not Typically Constitute Interrogation

In State v. Bragg, Tammy Bragg was convicted of a Class D crime for operating under the influence (OUI) at the completion of a jury trial, and was ordered to pay a fine of $800 and her license was suspended for ninety days. During her trial, Bragg submitted a motion to suppress statements she made in the police officer’s vehicle and the police station on the grounds that she was not read her Miranda warnings prior to making the statements. The Superior Court denied her motion, however, concluding that Miranda warnings were not necessary in the officer’s vehicle because her statements were not made while “in custody.” In addition, the warnings were unnecessary at the police station when the officer informed Bragg that the intoxilyzer test confirmed that “her blood alcohol content (BAC) was .13%. . . . . and that the presumptive statements were not in response to “the functional equivalent of a question.” On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, was not as to rule for the first time in Maine whether a police officer’s statements to the defendant regarding evidence against her “was the functional equivalent of the direct questioning and reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response,” requiring a Miranda warning. The Law Court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress statement made by Bragg in the cruiser, and those made at the police station on the grounds that the officer’s statement informing Bragg of the intoxilyzer results were merely “a matter-of-fact communication of the evidence,” which was not “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating reponse.” In coming to its conclusion, the Law Court held that Bragg was entitled to information regarding her BAC level upon request, and even though she did not request it, “the officer’s simple statement relating that information” would not trigger a Miranda warning. This Note considers whether the unanimous majority in Bragg properly concluded that criminal defendants who are only informed of evidence against them are not entitled to a Miranda warning. This Note begins in Part II with a brief history and overview of the purposes of the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, and how Maine has determined when the warnings should be applied, particularly in the context of statements made by law enforcement officers that rise to the level of a “functional equivalent of a question.” In Part III, this Note determines how Bragg will likely pose obstacles for defendants in attempting to bring suppression motions regarding statements made in response to evidence presented against them by law enforcement. In Part IV, this Note proposes that Bragg is consistent with other jurisdictions and the purposes of Miranda, and quite clearly demonstrates that criminal defendants in Maine will be limited in arguing that they were entitled to a Miranda warning after being told of truthful evidence against them. Finally, in Part V, this Note concludes by arguing that courts should rely on Bragg in similar cases, as long as it is done on a case-by-case basis

The Law Court\u27s Proper Application of Miranda in State v. Bragg: A Matter-of-Fact Communication to the Defendant Regarding Evidence Against Him Will Not Typically Constitute Interrogation

In State v. Bragg, Tammy Bragg was convicted of a Class D crime for operating under the influence (OUI) at the completion of a jury trial, and was ordered to pay a fine of $800 and her license was suspended for ninety days. During her trial, Bragg submitted a motion to suppress statements she made in the police officer’s vehicle and the police station on the grounds that she was not read her Miranda warnings prior to making the statements. The Superior Court denied her motion, however, concluding that Miranda warnings were not necessary in the officer’s vehicle because her statements were not made while “in custody.” In addition, the warnings were unnecessary at the police station when the officer informed Bragg that the intoxilyzer test confirmed that “her blood alcohol content (BAC) was .13%. . . . . and that the presumptive statements were not in response to “the functional equivalent of a question.” On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, was not as to rule for the first time in Maine whether a police officer’s statements to the defendant regarding evidence against her “was the functional equivalent of the direct questioning and reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response,” requiring a Miranda warning. The Law Court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress statement made by Bragg in the cruiser, and those made at the police station on the grounds that the officer’s statement informing Bragg of the intoxilyzer results were merely “a matter-of-fact communication of the evidence,” which was not “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating reponse.” In coming to its conclusion, the Law Court held that Bragg was entitled to information regarding her BAC level upon request, and even though she did not request it, “the officer’s simple statement relating that information” would not trigger a Miranda warning. This Note considers whether the unanimous majority in Bragg properly concluded that criminal defendants who are only informed of evidence against them are not entitled to a Miranda warning. This Note begins in Part II with a brief history and overview of the purposes of the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, and how Maine has determined when the warnings should be applied, particularly in the context of statements made by law enforcement officers that rise to the level of a “functional equivalent of a question.” In Part III, this Note determines how Bragg will likely pose obstacles for defendants in attempting to bring suppression motions regarding statements made in response to evidence presented against them by law enforcement. In Part IV, this Note proposes that Bragg is consistent with other jurisdictions and the purposes of Miranda, and quite clearly demonstrates that criminal defendants in Maine will be limited in arguing that they were entitled to a Miranda warning after being told of truthful evidence against them. Finally, in Part V, this Note concludes by arguing that courts should rely on Bragg in similar cases, as long as it is done on a case-by-case basis

Fuhrmann v. Staples Office Superstore East, Inc.: A Split in the Law Court as to the Definition of Employer Demonstrates the Need for Legislative Action to Amend the Maine Human Rights Act in Order to Protect Maine Employees

In Fuhrmann v. Staples Office Superstore East, Inc., Jamie Fuhrmann submitted a complaint to the Maine Human Rights Commission (Commission) against her former employer, Staples Office Superstore East, Inc. (Staples), and four of her individual supervisors. After the Commission granted her right to sue, she filed a complaint in court alleging whistleblower retaliation under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA) and the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA), as well as sex discrimination under the MHRA. The Superior Court granted Staples’ motion for summary judgment on all counts, and granted the four supervisors’ motions to dismiss on the grounds that individual supervisor liability is not permitted under either the WPA or MHRA. On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, vacated the grant of summary judgment as to Fuhrmann’s whistleblower claim on the grounds that there was enough evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to why Staples refused to accommodate Fuhrmann’s work schedule. In addition, the Law Court was asked to rule for the first time “whether the MHRA and the WPA provide for individual liability of supervisory employees.” Although the Commission interpreted the MHRA as allowing for “individual supervisor liability for employment discrimination” and argued that the Law Court should hold that the WPA does as well, the Law Court ruled in a 4-3 decision that neither the WPA nor the MHRA provides for individual supervisor liability in employment discrimination claims, and thereby affirmed the supervisors’ motions to dismiss. This Note considers whether the majority in Fuhrmann properly concluded that individual supervisor liability is nonexistent under the WPA and MHRA, or if the Law Court should have interpreted the language of the MHRA to provide for such liability and give deference to the Commission’s reasonable interpretation, as the dissent argues

Fuhrmann v. Staples Office Superstore East, Inc.: A Split in the Law Court as to the Definition of Employer Demonstrates the Need for Legislative Action to Amend the Maine Human Rights Act in Order to Protect Maine Employees

In Fuhrmann v. Staples Office Superstore East, Inc., Jamie Fuhrmann submitted a complaint to the Maine Human Rights Commission (Commission) against her former employer, Staples Office Superstore East, Inc. (Staples), and four of her individual supervisors. After the Commission granted her right to sue, she filed a complaint in court alleging whistleblower retaliation under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA) and the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA), as well as sex discrimination under the MHRA. The Superior Court granted Staples’ motion for summary judgment on all counts, and granted the four supervisors’ motions to dismiss on the grounds that individual supervisor liability is not permitted under either the WPA or MHRA. On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, vacated the grant of summary judgment as to Fuhrmann’s whistleblower claim on the grounds that there was enough evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to why Staples refused to accommodate Fuhrmann’s work schedule. In addition, the Law Court was asked to rule for the first time “whether the MHRA and the WPA provide for individual liability of supervisory employees.” Although the Commission interpreted the MHRA as allowing for “individual supervisor liability for employment discrimination” and argued that the Law Court should hold that the WPA does as well, the Law Court ruled in a 4-3 decision that neither the WPA nor the MHRA provides for individual supervisor liability in employment discrimination claims, and thereby affirmed the supervisors’ motions to dismiss. This Note considers whether the majority in Fuhrmann properly concluded that individual supervisor liability is nonexistent under the WPA and MHRA, or if the Law Court should have interpreted the language of the MHRA to provide for such liability and give deference to the Commission’s reasonable interpretation, as the dissent argues

A Compact Microchip-Based Atomic Clock Based on Ultracold Trapped Rb Atoms

We propose a compact atomic clock based on ultracold Rb atoms that are magnetically trapped near the surface of an atom microchip. An interrogation scheme that combines electromagnetically-induced transparency (EIT) with Ramsey's method of separated oscillatory fields can achieve atomic shot-noise level performance of 10^{-13}/sqrt(tau) for 10^6 atoms. The EIT signal can be detected with a heterodyne technique that provides noiseless gain; with this technique the optical phase shift of a 100 pW probe beam can be detected at the photon shot-noise level. Numerical calculations of the density matrix equations are used to identify realistic operating parameters at which AC Stark shifts are eliminated. By considering fluctuations in these parameters, we estimate that AC Stark shifts can be canceled to a level better than 2*10^{-14}. An overview of the apparatus is presented with estimates of duty cycle and power consumption.Comment: 15 pages, 11 figures, 5 table

Annular reflectors for an FEL resonator

A resonator configuration suitable for a high-power, annular-mode FEL is discussed. The resonator is a four-element linear resonator with grazing-incidence reflectors. Cylindrically symmetric, paraboloid grazing incidence reflectors are used in order to take full advantage of the azimuthal polarization of the annular mode.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/26060/1/0000134.pd

On Hirschman and log-Sobolev inequalities in mu-deformed Segal-Bargmann analysis

We consider a deformation of Segal-Bargmann space and its transform. We study L^p properties of this transform and obtain entropy-entropy inequalities (Hirschman) and entropy-energy inequalities (log-Sobolev) that generalize the corresponding known results in the undeformed theory.Comment: 42 pages, 3 figure

Discovering study-specific gene regulatory networks

This article has been made available through the Brunel Open Access Publishing Fund.Microarrays are commonly used in biology because of their ability to simultaneously measure thousands of genes under different conditions. Due to their structure, typically containing a high amount of variables but far fewer samples, scalable network analysis techniques are often employed. In particular, consensus approaches have been recently used that combine multiple microarray studies in order to find networks that are more robust. The purpose of this paper, however, is to combine multiple microarray studies to automatically identify subnetworks that are distinctive to specific experimental conditions rather than common to them all. To better understand key regulatory mechanisms and how they change under different conditions, we derive unique networks from multiple independent networks built using glasso which goes beyond standard correlations. This involves calculating cluster prediction accuracies to detect the most predictive genes for a specific set of conditions. We differentiate between accuracies calculated using cross-validation within a selected cluster of studies (the intra prediction accuracy) and those calculated on a set of independent studies belonging to different study clusters (inter prediction accuracy). Finally, we compare our method's results to related state-of-the art techniques. We explore how the proposed pipeline performs on both synthetic data and real data (wheat and Fusarium). Our results show that subnetworks can be identified reliably that are specific to subsets of studies and that these networks reflect key mechanisms that are fundamental to the experimental conditions in each of those subsets

Imagining Gendered Adulthood

In this article, the authors draw on two qualitative, longitudinal studies of young people’s transitions to adulthood and how they construct these transitions over time in social, cultural and material terms. The authors focus on the hopes, anxieties and imagined futures of young women. They discuss the individualization thesis, and the contradiction for female individualization between expectations of equality and the reality of inequality between the genders. The debate is moved beyond ‘pitiful girls’ and ‘can-do girls’ by exploring how young women in the UK and Finland anticipate and try to avoid being locked into the lives of adult women