The Ecological and Civil Mainsprings of Property: An Experimental Economic History of Whalers’ Rules of Capture

This paper uses a laboratory experiment to probe the proposition that property emerges anarchically out of social custom. We test the hypothesis that whalers in the 18th and 19th century developed rules of conduct that minimized the sum of the transaction and production costs of capturing their prey, the primary implication being that different ecological conditions lead to different rules of capture. Holding everything else constant, we find that simply imposing two different types of prey is insufficient to observe two different rules of capture. Another factor is essential, namely that the members of the community are civil-minded.property rights, endogenous rules, whaling, experimental economics

An Experimental Economic History of Whalers’ Rules of Capture

This paper uses a laboratory experiment to probe the proposition that property emerges anarchically out of social custom. We test the hypothesis that whalers in the 18th and 19th century developed rules of conduct that minimized the sum of the transaction and production costs of capturing their prey, the primary implication being that different ecological conditions lead to different rules of capture. Holding everything else constant, we find that simply imposing two different types of prey is insufficient to observe two different rules of capture. Another factor is essential, namely that the members of the community are civil-minded

The Ecological and Civil Mainsprings of Property: An Experimental Economic History of Whalers’ Rules of Capture

This article uses a laboratory experiment to probe the proposition that property emerges anarchically out of social custom. We test the hypothesis that whalers in the 18th and 19th centuries developed rules of conduct that minimized the sum of the transaction and production costs of capturing their prey, the primary implication being that different ecological conditions led to different rules of capture. Ceteris paribus, we find that simply imposing two different types of prey is insufficient to observe two different rules of capture. Another factor is essential, namely, as Samuel Pufendorf theorized over 300 years ago, that the members of the community are civil minded

An Experimental Analysis Of the Demand For Payday Loans

The payday loan industry is one of the fastest growing segments of the consumer financial services market in the United States. We design an environment similar to the one that payday loan customers face and then conduct a laboratory experiment to examine what effect, if any, the existence of payday loans has on individuals\u27 abilities to manage and to survive financial setbacks. Our primary objective is to examine whether access to payday loans improves or worsens the likelihood of financial survival in our experiment. We also test the degree to which people\u27s use of payday loans affects their ability to survive financially. We find that payday loans help the subjects to absorb expenditure shocks and therefore survive financially. However, subjects whose demand for payday loans exceeds a certain threshold level are at a greater risk than a corresponding subject in the treatment in which payday loans do not exist

Identification and Inference in First-Price Auctions with Collusion

This dissertation develops a method to detect collusion and estimate its effect on the seller's revenue in first-price auctions with independent, private valuations. The challenge is that collusion may be difficult to detect because colluders can use a simple and costless strategy to make their bids appear competitive. If the econometrician observes an exogenous shifter of the level of competition in the auction in addition to the winning bids, a statistical test for collusion by a given bidder can be formulated as a test of independence between the exogenous shifter and the valuations that rationalize its bids under the null hypothesis that it is not colluding. Simulations confirm this test performs well even when colluders attempt to disguise their behavior. I then adopt a multiple hypothesis testing framework to simultaneously test for collusion bidder by bidder. By controlling the probability of making one or more type I errors, the set of rejected hypotheses serves as a lower confidence bound on the set of colluders. To produce a lower confidence bound on the cost of collusion, I use consistent estimates of the bidders' valuation distributions to numerically solve for the seller's expected revenues in auctions with and without collusion. To provide an example of this identification strategy, I use exogenous variation in the reserve prices at British Columbia's timber auctions to estimate the extent of collusion in the years preceding a lumber trade dispute between the United States and Canada

Justice and Fairness in the Dictator Game

This paper uses a laboratory experiment to examine the question of whether justice and fairness are different motivational forces in the dictator game. “Justice ” and “fairness” are often used interchangeably because their meanings and usages are so closely linked despite their distinct connotations. Using four different treatments, our experimental design investigates the subtle differences between the two social concepts to explicate generosity in the dictator game. The results indicate that justice, not fairness, legitimizes property rights in the dictator game