An Administrative Stopgap for Migrants from the Northern Triangle

From 2011–2014, the United States Department of Homeland Security recorded an extraordinary increase in the number of unaccompanied children arriving at the southern border from Central America’s “Northern Triangle”—the area made up of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. In fact, in fiscal year 2014, United States Customs and Border Protection apprehended over 50,000 unaccompanied children from the Northern Triangle. That is thirteen times more than just three years earlier. This Article examines the intersecting humanitarian and legal crises facing these children and offers an administrative solution to the problem. The children are fleeing a genuine humanitarian crisis—a region overrun by violent gangs that regularly target young people for recruitment. Once in the United States, these children face their own legal crisis. Indeed, they must confront numerous procedural and substantive hurdles, trying to avoid removal. As a result, many of the children are at serious risk of being deported and subsequently killed by the very gangs that they fled. Given this situation, the Article argues that President Obama’s administration should provide temporary humanitarian protection to these migrants by exercising its congressionally delegated power to designate El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras as new “temporary protected status” countries. Under this proposal, the United States would provide a temporary safe haven to nationals of these three countries until the horrific gang violence in the Northern Triangle subsides

Loss of Parental Consortium: Why Kentucky Should \u3cem\u3eRe\u3c/em\u3e-Recognize the Claim Outside the Wrongful Death Context

The term consortium has been defined as [t]he benefits that one person . . . is entitled to receive from another, including companionship, cooperation, affection, aid, [and] financial support. Under Kentucky law, [e]ither a wife or husband may recover damages against a third person for loss of consortium, resulting from a negligent or wrongful act of such third person.” Furthermore, [in] a wrongful death action in which the decedent was a minor child, the surviving parent, or parents, may recover for loss of affection and companionship that would have been derived from such child during its minority…” In Giuliani v. Guiler, the Supreme Court of Kentucky added to this list of consortium claims, recognizing a minor child\u27s claim for loss of parental consortium. Part I of this Note reviews Kentucky\u27s history of loss of parental consortium claims. Part II examines the Kentucky Supreme Court\u27s decision in Giuliani, and Part III analyzes the Lambert v. Franklin Real Estate Co. court\u27s narrow reading of Giuliani. Part IV discusses the aspects of the Giuliani decision that the Kentucky Court of Appeals failed to consider in Lambert. Part V reflects on these considerations, evaluating persuasive authority and policy considerations which point toward recognizing loss of parental consortium claims outside the wrongful death context. Part VI briefly considers why the law has yet to change, before concluding that the Kentucky Supreme Court should allow a minor child to bring a loss of parental consortium claim even if his or her parent is only severely injured

A Framework for Judicial Review and Remand in Immigration Law

This Article breaks new ground at the intersection of administrative law and immigration law. One of the more important questions in both fields is whether a reviewing court should resolve a legal issue in the first instance or remand that issue to the agency. This Article advances the novel claim that courts should use the modem framework for judicial review of agency statutory interpretations to inform their resolution of this remand question. Then, using this framework, the Article identifies when remand is and is not appropriate in immigration cases. This critical analysis, which urges a departure from conventional academic wisdom, has significant implications for the larger theoretical debate over formalism and functionalism in administrative law