5 research outputs found
Report on the NGS3 Working Group on Safeguards by Design For Aqueous Reprocessing Plants
The objective of the Working Group on SBD for Aqueous Reprocessing Facilities was to provide recommendations, for facility operators and designers, which would aid in the coordination and integration of nuclear material accountancy and the safeguards requirements of all concerned parties - operators, state/regional authorities, and the IAEA. The recommendations, which are to be provided to the IAEA, are intended to assist in optimizing facility design and operating parameters to ensure the safeguardability of the facility while minimizing impact on the operations. The one day Working Group session addressed a wide range of design and operating topics
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Enabling International Safeguards Research and Development in the United States
Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is the lead laboratory in nuclear energy research and development within the U.S. Department of Energy national laboratory complex. INL is tasked with the advancement of nuclear energy research and development, and leadership in the renaissance of nuclear power globally. INL scientists have been central to the assessment of needs and the integration of technical programs aimed at the world-wide growth of nuclear power. One of the grand challenges of the nuclear energy resurgence is nuclear nonproliferation. Nonproliferation technology development is key to meeting this challenge. The needed advances in nonproliferation technologies are being made more difficult by the growing gap between increasing demands for nuclear materials to support technology development, and reduced availability of these materials. The gap is caused by the reduction, consolidation and more stringent lockdown of nuclear materials, made necessary by heightened and evolving security concerns, in the face of increased demand for materials to support technology development. Ironically, the increased demand for materials for technology development is made necessary by these same security concerns. The situation will continue to worsen if safeguards and security budgets remain limited for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and many member states, while growth in global nuclear energy becomes a reality. Effective U.S. leadership in the closing of this gap is vital to homeland security and global stability. INL has taken positive steps, described in this paper, to close this gap by reestablishing a viable base for the development, testing and demonstration of safeguards and security technologies. Key attributes of this technology development base are (1) the availability of a wide variety of special nuclear materials in forms that allow for enhanced accessibility; (2) ease of access by U.S. government, national laboratory, industry and academic institution researchers; (3) openness to and ease of access by international users working through U.S. government sponsoring agencies; and (4) the availability of requisite infrastructure to support research, testing and demonstration. While there is still work to do in closing the gap between material accessibility and demand, the steps taken by INL to date begin to address this important challenge
Opportunities for Process Monitoring Techniques at Delayed Access Facilities
Except for specific cases where the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) maintains a continuous presence at a facility (such as the Japanese Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant), there is always a period of time or delay between the moment a State is notified or aware of an upcoming inspection, and the time the inspector actually enters the material balance area or facility. Termed by the authors as “delayed access,” this period of time between inspection notice and inspector entrance to a facility poses a concern. Delayed access also has the potential to reduce the effectiveness of measures applied as part of the Safeguards Approach for a facility (such as short-notice inspections). This report investigates the feasibility of using process monitoring to address safeguards challenges posed by delayed access at a subset of facility types
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Transducer Signal Noise Analysis for Sensor Authentication
The abstract is being passed through STIMS for submision to the conference. International safeguards organizations charged with promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy employ unattended and remote monitoring systems supplemented with onsite inspections to ensure nuclear materials are not diverted for weaponization purposes. These systems are left unattended for periods of several months between inspections. During these periods physical security means are the main deterrent used to detect intentional monitoring system tampering. The information gathering components are locked in secure and sealed rooms. The sensor components (i.e. neutron and gamma detectors) are located throughout the plant in unsecure areas where sensor tampering could take place during the periods between inspections. Sensor tampering could allow the diversion of nuclear materials from the accepted and intended use to uses not consistent with the peaceful use of nuclear energy. A method and an apparatus is presented that address the detection of sensor tampering during the periods between inspections. It was developed at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) for the Department of Energy (DOE) in support of the IAEA. The method is based on the detailed analysis of the sensor noise floor after the sensor signal is removed. The apparatus consists of a 2.1” x 2.6” electronic circuit board containing all signal conditioning and processing components and a laptop computer running an application that acquires and stores the analysis results between inspection periods. The sensors do not require any modification and are remotely located in their normal high radiation zones. The apparatus interfaces with the sensor signal conductors using a simple pass through connector at the normal sensor electronics interface package located in the already secure and sealed rooms. The apparatus does not require hardening against the effects of radiation due to its location. Presented is the apparatus design, the analysis method, and the test results as applied to tamper detection using three HE3 neutron sensors and two gamma sensors designed and built for safeguards monitoring
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The International Safeguards Technology Base: How is the Patient Doing? An Exploration of Effective Metrics
The term “Technology Base” is commonly used but what does it mean? Is there a common understanding of the components that comprise a technology base? Does a formal process exist to assess the health of a given technology base? These are important questions the relevance of which is even more pressing given the USDOE/NNSA initiatives to strengthen the safeguards technology base through investments in research & development and human capital development. Accordingly, the authors will establish a high-level framework to define and understand what comprises a technology base. Potential goal-driven metrics to assess the health of a technology base will also be explored, such as linear demographics and resource availability, in the hope that they can be used to better understand and improve the health of the U.S. safeguards technology base. Finally, through the identification of such metrics, the authors will offer suggestions and highlight choices for addressing potential shortfalls