Transport Infrastructure Investment and Demand Uncertainty

In transportation planning there can be long lead times to adapt capacity. This paper addresses two questions. First, in a one mode world (say rail or road), what is the optimal capacity choice when faced with uncertain demand, long lead times and congestion. Using a simple analytical model it is shown that when demand is inelastic, it is socially optimal to invest more than if only the expected level of demand is taken into account. In this case it may be beneficial to overinvest in capacity because congestion costs are a convex function of relative use. This result holds with or without optimal tolling. The second question deals with two competing modes and where only one mode has long lead times for capacity while the other has flexible capacity. This is typical for the competition between High Speed Rail and air for the medium distance trips (500 to 1000 km), or for the competition between inland waterways and trucks for freight. We find that overinvestment is less justified because the substitute mode can more easily absorb the high demand outcomes.transport infrastructure, uncertainty, investments

The Oosterweel junction revisited.

This paper assesses the Oosterweel junction, a new tunnel under the river Scheldt, that aims to alleviate the congestion on the existing tunnels and on the Ring of Antwerp. The paper uses data from existing studies of the same project to calibrate a simple network model (MOLINO-II). The model is then used to compare alternatives with and without the new tunnel. The alternatives include different combinations of tolls and bans on trucks. The study concludes that the first priority is not to build new capacity but to remove the pricing distortions on the existing capacity. The alternatives that include a pricing reform are the only ones that generate a positive net benefit, almost all scenarios that include the new tunnel have a negative net benefit.

The European road pricing game: how to enforce optimal pricing in high-transit countries under asymmetric information.

A federal government tries to force local governments to implement welfare optimal tolling and investment. Welfare optimal tolling requires charging for marginal external costs. Local governments have an incentive to charge more than the marginal social cost whenever there is transit traffic. We analyse the pricing and investment issue in an asymmetric information setting where the local governments have better information than the federal government. The case of air pollution and of congestion are discussed.

Transport infrastructure investment and demand uncertainty.

In transportation planning there can be long lead times to adapt capacity. This paper addresses two questions. First, in a one mode world (say rail or road), what is the optimal capacity choice when faced with uncertain demand, long lead times and congestion. Using a simple analytical model it is shown that when demand is inelastic, it is socially optimal to invest more than if only the expected level of demand is taken into account. In this case it may be beneficial to overinvest in capacity because congestion costs are a convex function of relative use. This result holds with or without optimal tolling. The second question deals with two competing modes and where only one mode has long lead times for capacity while the other has flexible capacity. This is typical for the competition between High Speed Rail and air for the medium distance trips (500 to 1000 km), or for the competition between inland waterways and trucks for freight. We find that overinvestment is less justified because the substitute mode can more easily absorb the high demand outcomes.Transport infrastructure; Uncertainty; Investments;

Network development under a strict self-financing constraint

This paper offers a stylized model in which an agency is in charge of investing in road capacity and maintain it but cannot use the capital market so that the only sources of funds are the toll revenues. We call this the strict self-financing constraint in opposition to the traditional self financing constraint where implicitly 100% of the investment needs can be financed by loans. Two stylised problems are analysed: the one link problem and the problem of two parallel links with one link untolled. The numerical illustrations show the cost of the strict self-financing constraint as a function of the importance of the initial infrastructure stock, the rate of growth of demand, the price elasticity of demand and the flexibility in the pricing instruments.Cost-benefit analysis, road tolling, self-financing, infrastructure investments, congestion, bottleneck model.

Network development under a strict self-financing constraint.

This paper offers a stylized model in which an agency is in charge of investing in road capacity and maintain it but cannot use the capital market so that the only sources of funds are the toll revenues. We call this the strict self-financing constraint in opposition to the traditional self financing constraint where implicitly 100% of the investment needs can be financed by loans. Two stylised problems are analysed: the one link problem and the problem of two parallel links with one link untolled. The numerical illustrations show the cost of the strict self-financing constraint as a function of the importance of the initial infrastructure stock, the rate of growth of demand, the price elasticity of demand and the flexibility in the pricing instruments.Cost-benefit analysis; Road tolling; Self-financing; Infrastructure investments; ongestion; Bottleneck model;

A cost-benefit analysis of tunnel investment and tolling alternatives in Antwerp

This paper presents and illustrates a comprehensive and operational model for assessing transport pricing and investment policies and regulatory regimes. The approach encompasses intra-modal as well as inter-modal competition, and could be used either by private operators or by the legislator for the purpose of evaluating market conduct. The model combines elements of contract theory, public economics, political economy, transportation economics and game theory. It incorporates a CES-based discrete-choice framework in which user charges and infrastructure investments are endogenously determined for two competing alternatives (air, rail or two parallel roads) that may be used for transportation of passengers and/or freight. The model includes separate modules for demand, supply, equilibrium and the regulatory framework. The demand module for passenger transport features a CES decision tree with three levels: choice between transport and consumption of a composite commodity, choice between peak and off-peak periods, and choice between the two transport alternatives. Elasticities of substitution at each level are parametrically given. Passengers can be segmented into classes that differ with respect to their travel preferences, incomes and costs of travel time. The demand module for freight transport also features three levels. The first level encompasses choice between transport and other production inputs, and the second and third levels are the same as for passenger transport. Freight transport can be segmented into local and transit traffic. The supply module specifies for each transport alternative travel time as a function of traffic volume and a rule for infrastructure maintenance. Operating, maintenance and investment costs are allowed to depend on the contractual form. Given the demand and supply functions, the equilibrium module computes a fixed-point solution in terms of prices and levels of congestion. Finally, the exogenous regulatory framework stipulates for each alternative the objective functions of the operators and infrastructure managers (public or private objectives), the nature of competition, procurement policies, the cost of capital, and the source and use of transport tax revenues. Possible market structures include: no tolls (free access), exogenous tolls, marginal social cost pricing, private duopoly and mixed oligopoly. Public decisions can be made either by local or central governments that may attach different welfare-distributional weights to agents (e.g. low-income vs. high-income passengers, or local vs. transit freight traffic) as well as different weights to air pollution and other (non-congestion) external transport costs. Primary outputs from the model are equilibrium prices, transport volumes, travel times, cost efficiency of operations, toll revenues and financial balances, travellers’ surplus and social welfare. In the final section of the paper the methodology is illustrated with an example of competition in the market for long-distance passenger travel between high-speed rail and air. A simple procedure allows the calibration of the parameters when aggregate data are available. The model is used to evaluate policies (pricing, investment, taxes, inter alia).

A cost-benefit analysis of tunnel investment and tolling alternatives in Antwerp

A proposal has been made to build a new tunnel under the Scheldt river near the centre of Antwerp in order to relieve traffic congestion on the ring road and in an existing tunnel. The new tunnel is expected to cost more than €1 billion, and tolls have been suggested to help finance construction and to manage demand. This paper conducts a preliminary cost-benefit analysis of a new tunnel and three alternative tolling schemes, and compares them with a do-nothing scenario and an option to toll the existing tunnel without building a new one. The analysis is performed using a model that was recently developed as part of the European-Union funded REVENUE project. The two tunnels are treated as imperfect substitutes, and a multi-year accounting framework is adopted that accounts for emissions, accidents and noise externalities, road damage, revenues accruing to the national and regional governments from existing transport user charges, and the salvage value of the new tunnel. With the base-case parameter values it is found that building the tunnel is worthwhile with all three tolling regimes and yields a higher benefit than not building the tunnel and tolling the old one. Nevertheless, the net benefit from building the tunnel differs appreciably between tolling regimes, and it is sensitive to the value assumed for the marginal cost of public funds.infrastructure investment, route choice, congestion, tolls

Do the selected Trans European transport investments pass the Cost Benefit test?

This paper assesses the economic justification for the selection of priority projects defined under the auspices of the Trans-European transport network. In analyzing the current list of 30 priority projects, we apply three different transport models to undertake a cost-benefit comparison. We find that many projects do not pass the cost-benefit test and only a few of the economically justifiable projects would need European subsidies to make them happen. Two remedies are proposed to minimize the inefficiencies in future project selection. The first remedy obliges each member state or group of states to perform a cost-benefit analysis (followed by a peer review) and to make the results public prior to ranking priority projects. The second remedy would require federal funding to be available only for projects with important spillovers to other countries, in order to avoid pork barrel behaviour.transport infrastructure, cost benefit analysis, Europe Union