Public goods’ attractiveness and migrations

The aim of this paper is to develop a dynamic model of migrations, in which migration is driven by size asymmetries between countries and by the relative preferences of consumers between private consumption and consumption of public goods. The dynamic trajectories heavily depend on the degree of attractiveness for public goods We show that monotone migrations require sufficiently strong preferences for public goods, and can only be sustained from the small to the large countries. We identify the threshold value of the public goods’ intensity of preferences guaranteeing the survival of the small country. For weaker preference intensities, oscillating migrations may arise, but they finally converge to situation where both countries are of equal size.migration, public goods, income tax.

Public goods’ attractiveness and migrations

The aim of this paper is to develop a dynamic model of migrations, in which migration is driven by size asymmetries between countries and by the relative preferences of consumers between private consumption and consumption of public goods. The dynamic trajectories heavily depend on the degree of attractiveness for public goods. We show that monotone migrations require sufficiently strong preferences for public goods, and can only be sustained from the small of the large countries. We identify the threshold value of the public goods’ intensity of preferences guaranteeing the survival of the small country. For weaker preference intensities, oscillating migrations may rise, but they finally converge to situation where both countries are of equal sizeMigration; public goods; income tax

Migrations, public goods and taxes

This paper examines how and why people migrate between two regions with asymmetric size. The agglomeration force comes from the scale economies in the provision of local public goods, whereas the dispersion force comes from congestion in consumption of public goods. Public goods considered resemble club goods (or public goods with congestion) and people are heterogeneous in their migration costs. We find that the large countries can be destination of migrants for sufficiently high provision of public goods, even when the large country taxes too much. The high provision of public good offsets the congestion effect. While, the small country can be the destination of migrants for two reasons. Firstly, when public good supply is intermediate, people move to avoid congestion in the large country and to benefit from low taxation in the small one. Finally, when the provision of public goods is low, people move towards the small countries just to avoid congestion

Public goods' attractiveness and migrations

The aim of this paper is to develop a dynamic model of migrations, in which migration is driven by size asymmetries between countries and by the relative preferences of consumers between private consumption and consumption of public goods. The dynamic tra jectories heavily depend on the degree of attractiveness for public goods We show that monotone migrations require sufficiently strong preferences for public goods, and can only be sustained from the small to the large countries. We identify the threshold value of the public goods’ intensity of preferences guaranteeing the survival of the small country. For weaker preference intensities, oscillating migrations may arise, but they finally converge to situation where both countries are of equal size

Public goods’ attractiveness and migrations

The aim of this paper is to develop a dynamic model of migra- tions, in which migration is driven by size asymmetries between coun- tries and by the relative preferences of consumers between private consumption and consumption of public goods. The dynamic trajec- tories heavily depend on the degree of attractiveness for public goods We show that monotone migrations require sufficiently strong pref- erences for public goods, and can only be sustained from the small to the large countries. We identify the threshold value of the public goods' intensity of preferences guaranteeing the survival of the small country. For weaker preference intensities, oscillating migrations may arise, but they finally converge to situation where both countries are of equal size.