European Disunion? Social and Economic Divergence in Europe, and their Political Consequences

The principal component of a European social model was considered to be convergence of social outcomes toward the top. However, the latest economic and social trends are no longer characterized by a steady narrowing of the gap between the more and lesser advanced countries. While all European countries were affected by the economic crisis of 2008 and a coordinated response was put into place in 2009, since 2010, we see a growing divergence between two groups of countries in Europe. The first group, mainly in the North of Europe, concentrated around Germany, Austria, the Nordic countries, along with certain Eastern European countries having close economic ties to Germany, has steadily emerged from the crisis and resumed a positive economic and social path. The second group, however, comprised mainly of the Southern and Eastern periphery, remains stuck in negative economic and social situations following the crisis. This chapter demonstrates the initial economic convergence, followed by a stark divergence in certain economic and social outcomes after the crisis of 2008. It reviews the various explanations for these divergences. Finally, it considers the political outcomes of this economic and social dualization. We argue that despite the seemingly uniform rise of populist anti-EU challengers across Europe, these challengers differ significantly in the grievances they raise. Radical right parties are dominant in the center, while radical left parties outperform the radical right in the periphery, a dynamic that constitutes a second, political, dualization of Europe.DOI : ..

New Social Risks, Social Policies, and Dualization in the Contemporary Welfare State

In recent years, much attention has been given in the welfare state literature to the presence of new social risks in postindustrial political economies and the growing divide between those deemed to be insiders and outsiders. In fact, the term new social risks arguably signifies one of the defining areas of contemporary research on welfare state adaptations in advanced affluent democracies. In this dissertation, I examine how the various worlds of welfare provision---specifically, social policy tools---affect the well-being of new social risk groups, and whether we are indeed witnessing an emergence of labor market and welfare state outsiders. I investigate the determinants of outsiderness expressed as single parent income, child poverty rate, and youth unemployment. I analyze the effects of social policies on the likelihood of being poor among low-skilled populations. I find that social policies such as active and passive labor market policies, family policies, and government daycare spending are effective at combating new social risks. Employment protection legislation may impede low-skilled young people from escaping poverty. Lastly, this dissertation considers the case of Germany and probes the extent to which a divide between labor market insiders and outsiders has cemented there over time, whether the welfare state (via taxes and transfers) exacerbates or ameliorates this dualism, and indeed, whether labor market dualization---an individual-level phenomenon---translates into dualization of the welfare state---a phenomenon that is necessarily measured at the household levelDoctor of Philosoph

Outsiderness, Social Class, and Votes in the 2014 European Elections

Votes have for a long time been considered to be structured by class conflict. However, in the 2014 European elections, vote does not seem to be significantly structured by traditional class. Instead, contemporary European societies face the melting down of the traditional working class and an increasing dualism between labour market “insiders” and “outsiders”. How do these socio-economic changes translate into politics? Building on the emerging literature on outsiderness and a survey conducted after the European elections of 2014, this article shows that traditional class divides have a limited electoral impact and that the insider-outsider divide tends to have only “negative” effects, decreasing voting turnout as well as support for the major right wing parties. The best predictor of voting behaviour is the subjective assessment by the respondents of their social position and its upward or downward trajectory.Les votes ont longtemps été considérés comme structurés par les conflits de classe. Toutefois, lors des élections européennes de 2014, le vote ne semble pas significativement structuré par les classes sociales. Les sociétés post-industrielles sont au contraire confrontées au déclin de la classe ouvrière traditionnelle et au dualisme croissant sur le marché du travail entre individus protégés (insiders) et individus exposés (outsiders). Comment ces changements socio-économiques se traduisent-ils dans le champ politique ? À partir de la littérature émergente sur la précarité et des données d’un sondage conduit après les élections européennes de 2014, cet article montre que les clivages de classe traditionnels ont un impact limité sur les comportements électoraux et que la distinction entre insiders et outsiders a surtout des effets négatifs, accroissant l’abstention et diminuant le soutien aux grands partis de droite. Le meilleur facteur explicatif des votes est l’évaluation subjective par les répondants de leur position sociale et de sa trajectoire ascendante ou descendante

Blank and Not Blue: Outsiders at the Ballot Box

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Outsiders at the ballot box: operationalizations and political consequences of the insider–outsider dualism

Recently, developed economies have witnessed an emerging dualism between the so-called labor market ‘insiders and outsiders’—two groups facing divergent levels of employment security and prospects. Those on the ‘inside’ occupy stable jobs, while those on the ‘outside’ confront increased levels of social and economic risks. There are, however, various prominent, but divergent, operationalizations of the insider–outsider phenomenon. While some scholars opt for indicators rooted in current labor market status of individuals, others prefer to consider occupational class groups as bases of the insider–outsider divide. As these operationalizations of outsiderness capture different profiles of outsiders, we test the extent to which they lead to consistent or inconsistent conclusions about electoral behavior. The article yields two consistent findings that are robust across all the operationalizations: that outsiders are less likely to vote for major right parties than are insiders, and that outsiders are more likely to abstain from voting. Additionally, we find that occupation-based outsiders tend to support radical right parties, while status-based outsiders rather opt for radical left parties—a finding supported by the association between social risk and authoritarian preferences. We test our expectations using multinomial logit models estimating vote choice on the first five waves of the European Social Survey from 2002 to 2010 across western Europe

The Dual Dualization of Europe: Economic Convergence, Divergence, and their Political Consequences

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The Dual Dualization of Europe:Economic Convergence, Divergence, and their Political Consequences

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Outsiderness, Social Class, and Votes in the 2014 European Elections

Votes have for a long time been considered to be structured by class conflict. However, in the 2014 European elections, vote does not seem to be significantly structured by traditional class. Instead, contemporary European societies face the melting down of the traditional working class and an increasing dualism between labour market “insiders” and “outsiders”. How do these socio-economic changes translate into politics? Building on the emerging literature on outsiderness and a survey conducted after the European elections of 2014, this article shows that traditional class divides have a limited electoral impact and that the insider-outsider divide tends to have only “negative” effects, decreasing voting turnout as well as support for the major right wing parties. The best predictor of voting behaviour is the subjective assessment by the respondents of their social position and its upward or downward trajectory.Les votes ont longtemps été considérés comme structurés par les conflits de classe. Toutefois, lors des élections européennes de 2014, le vote ne semble pas significativement structuré par les classes sociales. Les sociétés post-industrielles sont au contraire confrontées au déclin de la classe ouvrière traditionnelle et au dualisme croissant sur le marché du travail entre individus protégés (insiders) et individus exposés (outsiders). Comment ces changements socio-économiques se traduisent-ils dans le champ politique ? À partir de la littérature émergente sur la précarité et des données d’un sondage conduit après les élections européennes de 2014, cet article montre que les clivages de classe traditionnels ont un impact limité sur les comportements électoraux et que la distinction entre insiders et outsiders a surtout des effets négatifs, accroissant l’abstention et diminuant le soutien aux grands partis de droite. Le meilleur facteur explicatif des votes est l’évaluation subjective par les répondants de leur position sociale et de sa trajectoire ascendante ou descendante

The Dualization of Europe

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