How redeployable are patent assets? Evidence from failed startups

Entrepreneurial firms are important sources of patented inventions. Yet little is known about what happens to patents "released" to the market when startups fail. This study provides a first look at the frequency and speed with which patents originating from failed startups are redeployed to new owners, and whether the value of patents is tied to the original venture and team. The evidence is based on 1,766 U.S. patents issued to 285 venture capital-backed startups that disband between 1988 and 2008 in three innovation-intensive sectors: medical devices, semiconductors, and software. At odds with the view that the resale market for patented inventions is illiquid, we find that most patents from these startups are sold, are sold quickly, and remain "alive" through renewal fee payment long after the startups are shuttered. The patents tend to be purchased by other operating companies in the same sector, and retain value beyond the original venture and team. We do find, however, that the patents and people sometimes move jointly to a new organization following the dissolution of the original venture, and explore the conditions under which such co-movement is more likely. The study provides new evidence on a phenomenon-of active markets for buying and selling patents-underexplored in the strategy literature and consequential for both entrepreneurial and established firms.Accepted manuscrip

Patent collateral, investor commitment, and the market for venture lending

This paper investigates the market for lending to technology startups (i.e., venture lending) and examines two mechanisms that may facilitate trade within it: (1) the ‘salability’ of patent collateral; and (2) the credible commitment of existing equity investors. We find that intensified trading in the secondary patent market is strongly related to the annual rate of startup lending, particularly for startups with more redeployable patent assets. Moreover, we show that the credibility of venture capitalist commitments to reinvest in their startups’ next round of financing can be critical for startup debt provision. Utilizing the crash of 2000 as a severe and unexpected capital supply shock for VCs, we show that lenders continue to finance startups with recently funded investors better able to credibly commit to refinance their portfolio companies, but withdraw from otherwise-promising projects that may have needed their funds the most. The findings are consistent with predictions of incomplete contracting and financial intermediation theory.Accepted manuscrip

Don't fence me in : fragmented markets for technology and the patent acquisition strategies of firms

http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/36305/2/b2110799.0001.001.pdfhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/36305/1/b2110799.0001.001.tx

State governments as financiers of technology startups: evidence from Michigan's R&D loan program

State governments in the United States often fund and support technology startups within their borders. Yet little is known about the magnitude with which these place-based policy interventions shift the performance trajectories of entrepreneurial firms. We provide new evidence based on 241 startups that compete for advanced research and technology commercialization loans between 2002 and 2008 through a Michigan-based program. Among applicants with project scores near the threshold required for funding, we find that award recipients are 20 to 30 percent more likely to remain in business four years after the competition relative to similar companies that seek but fail to receive funding. We also find that award receipt stimulates follow-on venture capital (VC) investments in surviving companies. The VC stimulus effect is, however, disproportionately driven by subsets of firms that are very young, relatively inexperienced at external fundraising, or located outside the dominant hub of entrepreneurial activity within the state. This distinctive pattern of heterogeneous effects remains visible for follow-on R&D financing from federal government sources, and for supplemental outcome measures that use news articles to track shifts in financing and business development activities. These findings are consistent with the view that public R&D programs are particularly beneficial when frictions in private resource markets are more severe.Accepted manuscrip

Corporate venture capital and the returns to acquiring portfolio companies

A prominent motive for corporate venture capital (CVC) is the identification of entrepreneurial-firm acquisition opportunities. Consistent with this view, we find that one of every five startups purchased by 61 top corporate investors from 1987 through 2003 is a venture portfolio company of its acquirer. Surprisingly, our analysis reveals that takeovers of portfolio companies destroy significant value for shareholders of acquisitive CVC investors, even though these same investors are "good acquirers" of other entrepreneurial firms. We explore numerous explanations for these puzzling findings, which seem rooted in managerial overconfidence or agency problems at the program level.Corporate venture capital Acquisitions Entrepreneurial finance Governance Overconfidence