Repatriation Taxes, Repatriation Strategies and Multinational Financial Policy

Several investment-repatriation strategies are added to the standard model of a multinational in which an affiliate is located in a low-tax country and is limited to two alternatives: repatriating taxable dividends to the parent or investing in its own real operations. In our model, affiliates can invest in passive assets, which the parent can borrow against, or in related affiliates which can be used as vehicles for tax-favored repatriations. We show analytically how the availability of alternative strategies can effect real investment throughout the worldwide corporation. We use firm level data for U.S. multinationals to test for the importance of alternative strategies. The evidence is generally consistent with the theory, particularly the strategies using related affiliates.

The Three Parties in the Race to the Bottom: Host Governments, Home Governments and Multinational Companies

Most studies of tax competition and the race to the bottom focus on potential host countries competing for mobile capital, neglecting the role of corporate tax planning and of home governments that facilitate this planning. This neglect in part reflects the narrow view frequently taken of the policy instruments that countries have available in tax competition. But high-tax host governments can, for example, permit income to be shifted out to tax havens as a way of attracting mobile companies. Home countries will cooperate in this shift if their companies’ gain is greater than any reduction in the domestic tax base. We use various types of U.S. data, including firm level tax files, to identify the role of the three parties (host governments, home governments and MNCs) in the evolution of tax burdens on U.S. companies abroad from 1992 to 2002. This period is of particular interest because the United States introduced regulations in 1997 that greatly simplified the use of more aggressive tax planning techniques. The evidence indicates that from 1992 to 1998 the decline in effective tax rates on U.S. companies was driven largely by host governments defending their market share. But after 1998, tax avoidance behavior seems much more important. One indication is that effective tax rates on U.S. companies had a much weaker link with local statutory tax rates. After 1997, the new regulations motivated a very large growth in intercompany payments and a parallel growth of holding company income abroad. We attempt to estimate how many of these payments were deductible in the host country, and conclude that by 2002 the companies were saving about $7.0 billion per year by using the more aggressive planning strategies. This amounts to about 4 percent of companies’ foreign direct investment income and about 15 percent of their foreign tax burden.

The Effects of U.S. Tax Policy on the Income Repatriation Patterns of U.S. Multinational Corporations

U.S. corporations owe taxes to the U.S. Treasury on income earned both inside and outside American borders. This paper examines the incentives created by the U.S. tax system for the legal avoidance of taxes on foreign source income. Using data from 1986 corporate tax returns, we investigate the extent to which U.S. corporations structure and coordinate remittances of income from their foreign subsidiaries to reduce their U.S. and foreign tax liabilities. In contrast to previous work in this area, our estimates of the tax consequences of income remittances from foreign subsidiaries to parent corporations explicitly take into account the ability to use foreign tax credits generated from one source of foreign income to offset the U.S. tax liability generated by other sources of foreign income, withholding tax rates on income remittances, variations in source country corporate income tax systems, and dynamic aspects of the U.S. tax system. Our findings indicate that U.S. multinationals are able to take advantage of the U.S. tax system to avoid paying much U.S. tax on their foreign source income.

The Effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on the Location of Assets in Financial Services Firms

This paper examines the effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on the international location decisions of U.S. financial services firms. The Act included rule changes that made it substantially more difficult for U.S. firms to defer U.S. taxes on overseas financial services income held in low-tax jurisdictions. These same rule changes were not applied to other forms of income; in particular, income generated from active manufacturing operations was still eligible for deferral after the Act. We use information from the tax returns of U.S. corporations to examine how local taxes affect the allocation of assets held abroad. We find that, before the Act, the location of assets in financial subsidiaries was responsive to differences in host country tax rates across jurisdictions. However, after the Act, differences in host country tax rates no longer explain the distribution of assets held in financial services subsidiaries abroad. In contrast, we find that assets held in manufacturing subsidiaries have become more sensitive to variations in tax rates. Our results suggest that the tightening of the anti-deferral provisions applicable to financial services companies has been successful in neutralizing the effect of host country income taxes on investment location decisions.

The Significance of Tax Law Asymmetries: An Empirical Investigation

This study uses tax return data for U.S. nonfinancial corporations for the period 1971-82 to estimate the importance of restrictions on the ability of firms to use tax credits and to obtain refunds for tax losses. Our results suggest that the incidence of such unused tax benefits increased substantially during the early 1980s, though we do not find these increases attributable to increased investment incentives during that period. Using estimates of a three-state (taxable, not taxable, partially taxable) transition probability model, we calculate the effective tax rates on various types of investments undertaken by firms differing with respect to tax status. We confirm previous findings about the marginal tax rate on interest payments, and that it is important to distinguish current tax payments from marginal tax rates in estimating the incentive to invest.

Do Repatriation Taxes Matter? Evidence from the Tax Returns of U.S. Multinationals

An open question in the literature on the taxation of multinational corporations is whether repatriation taxes influence whether the profits of foreign subsidiaries are repatriated or reinvested abroad. Theoretical models suggest that dividend remittances should not be influenced by repatriation taxes. The results of recent empirical work indicate that dividend remittances are sensitive to repatriation taxes. This paper investigates whether the empirical evidence can be reconciled with the theoretical results by recognizing that repatriation taxes on dividends may vary over time and provide firms with an incentive to time repatriations so that they occur in years when repatriation tax rates are relatively low. We use information about cross-country differences in tax rates to separately estimate the influence of permanent tax changes, as would occur due to changes in statutory tax rates, and transitory tax changes on dividend repatriations. Our data contains U.S. tax return information for a large sample of U.S. corporations and their foreign subsidiaries. We find that the permanent tax price effect is significantly different from the transitory price effect and is not significantly different from zero, while the transitory tax price effect is negative and significant. This suggests that repatriation taxes do affect dividend repatriation behavior but only to the extent that they vary over time. Previous empirical work has apparently measured the effect of timing behavior.