Towards an Intellectual Property Rights Strategy for Innovation in Europe

On October 13, 2009 the Science and Technology Options Assessment Panel (STOA) together with Knowledge4Innovation/The Lisbon Forum, supported by Technopolis Consulting Group and TNO, organised a half-day workshop entitled ‘Towards an Intellectual Property Rights Strategy for Innovation in Europe’. This workshop was part of the 1st European Innovation Summit at the European Parliament which took place on 13 October and 14 October 2009. It addressed the topics of the evolution and current issues concerning the European Patent System as well as International Protection and Enforcement of IPR (with special consideration of issues pertaining to IP enforcement in the Digital Environment). Conclusions drawn point to the benefits of a comprehensive European IPR strategy, covering a broad range of IP instruments and topics

High-quality patents for emerging science and technology through external actors: community scientific experts and knowledge societies

This article explores one type of administrative mechanism to achieve high-quality patents: Article 115 of the European Patent Convention, which permits the inclusion of third parties to provide input to the prior art search and to communicate relevant information to the examiner in charge. Our empirical research analyzes the field of human genetic inventions. The empirical findings here show that third parties usually participate only after patents have been granted. Between 1999 and 2009, only a limited number of human gene patent cases made use of third-party, pre-grant interventions. There is thus an imbalance between third-party participation in the pre- and post-grant phase of patent prosecution, and we urge for greater participation of knowledge communities in the search and examination process. Europe should create a funnel for participation through advisory bodies and learned societies, which would allow judicious consideration of the search and examination, with a resultant improvement in patent quality

Returns to foreign languages of native workers in the EU

Most papers on returns to languages are concerned with immigrants. We use the European Community Household Panel Survey (ECHP) to infer returns on non-native languages by non-immigrants in nine countries of the European Union. We differ fromthe few other studies that deal with the same problem in three respects. First, we correct for time-dependent measurement errors in self-reporting as suggested by Dustmann and Van Soest and find that the resulting IV estimates are much larger than those obtained by OLS. We also suggest that there is little room for time-persistent errors and heterogeneity, and that therefore our estimates should not suffer from the other usual biases. Secondly, instead of using a dummy for each language, we use the ratio of the population that is not proficient in a language in each country considered. Finally, we estimate instrumental variable quantile regressions to illustrate how returns to languages vary at different points of the distribution of earnings.

Long String Scattering in c = 1 String Theory

We study the scattering of long strings in c = 1 string theory, both in the worldsheet description and in the non-singlet sector of the dual matrix quantum mechanics. From the worldsheet perspective, the scattering amplitudes of long strings are obtained from a decoupling limit of open strings amplitudes on FZZT branes, which we compute by integrating Virasoro conformal blocks along with structure constants of boundary Liouville theory. In particular, we study the tree level amplitudes of (1) a long string decaying by emitting a closed string, and (2) the scattering of a pair of long strings. We show that they are indeed well defined as limits of open string amplitudes, and that our results are in striking numerical agreement with computations in the adjoint and bi-adjoint sectors of the dual matrix model (based on proposals of Maldacena and solutions due to Fidkowski), thereby providing strong evidence of the duality.Comment: 42 pages, 18 figure

The c=1 String Theory S-Matrix Revisited

We revisit the perturbative S-matrix of c=1 string theory from the worldsheet perspective. We clarify the origin of the leg pole factors, the non-analyticity of the string amplitudes, and the validity as well as limitations of earlier computations based on resonance momenta. We compute the tree level 4-point amplitude and the genus one 2-point reflection amplitude by numerically integrating Virasoro conformal blocks with DOZZ structure constants on the sphere and on the torus, with sufficiently generic complex Liouville momenta, and find agreement with known answers from the c=1 matrix model.Comment: 32 pages, 7 figures; footnote and references added, typos correcte

Cosmología y filosofía de la ciencia: Una extraña alianza

Por cosmología entendemos aquí lo que usualmente se acepta como cosmología científica, esto es, una activa confluencia de disciplinas científicas, principalmente la astronomía clásica y la astrofísica, la física, desde las teorías de gravitación hasta las partículas elementales, y un conjunto de principios y criterios que son necesarios para tratar con el universo como un todo

OPTIMAL PRICING AND GRANT POLICIES FOR MUSEUMS

Considering two potential sources of income (public grants and ticket revenues),we have defined a theoretical model where the public agency is the principal and the manager of the museum is the agent. This model allows us to design the optimal contract between both sides and thus to establish the optimal values of grants, ticket prices, budget and effort applied by the manager. Furthermore, we have found a theoretical reason to explain the inelastic pricing strategy that has been found in some of the empirical research on cultural and sports economics. The main conclusion is that the optimal contract allows a Pareto optimum solution in prices that does not change if we introduce moral hazard into this relationship. This solution allows us to conclude that the public agency should regulate ticket prices in accordance with the social valuation. However, public grants and museum budgets would be affected by the existence of this problem, moving the equilibrium away from the Pareto optimum situation. In this case, even with a risk averse manager and a risk neutral public agency, grants and budgets will depend on results because higher budgets related to good results provide the main incentives to increase the manager’s level of effort. Although the focus of this paper is on museum administration, the model that we have developed can be easily generalized and applied to other institutions, such as schools, sport facilities or NGOs, which are able to raise funds directly from private (e. g. ticket revenues or membership fees) or public sources (e.g. public grants).cultural economics, grants, public prices, museums, principal- agent model