A Methodological Investigation of Cost of Carbon Sequestration

Increased attention by policy makers to the threat of global climate change has brought with it considerable attention to the possibility of encouraging the growth of forests as a means of sequestering carbon dioxide. This approach has, in fact, become an explicit element of both U.S. and international climate policies. This paper develops a methodology whereby estimates of the costs of carbon sequestration can be developed on the basis of evidence from observations of landowners' behavior when confronted with the opportunity costs of alternative land uses. The analytical model takes account of silvicultural understanding of the intertemporal linkages between deforestation and carbon emissions, on the one hand and between forestation and carbon sequestration, on the other. The results support the efficacy and potential value of this analytical approach. The paper is intended to be illustrative of how econometric analyses of land use, which already exist for a number of countries, can be used to develop better region-specific estimates of the marginal costs of carbon sequestration.

The Problem of the Commons: Still Unsettled after 100 Years

The problem of the commons is more important to our lives and thus more central to economics than a century ago when Katharine Coman led off the first issue of the American Economic Review. As the U.S. and other economies have grown, the carrying-capacity of the planet - in regard to natural resources and environmental quality — has become a greater concern, particularly for common-property and open-access resources. The focus of this article is on some important, unsettled problems of the commons. Within the realm of natural resources, there are special challenges associated with renewable resources, which are frequently characterized by open access. An important example is the degradation of open-access fisheries. Critical commons problems are also associated with environmental quality. A key contribution of economics has been the development of market-based approaches to environmental protection. These instruments are key to addressing the ultimate commons problem of the twenty-first century - global climate change.Common-Property Resource, Open-Access Resource, Fisheries, Global Climate Change

Economic Analysis of Global Climate Change Policy: A Primer

Global climate change, perhaps even more than other environmental problems , can be addressed successfully only with a solid understanding of its economic dimensions. This paper, prepared as an introduction to the economics section of a forthcoming book from the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, provides a primer for non-economists on how economic analysis can be brought to bear on three broad questions: what will be the benefits of global climate policies; what will be their costs; and how can this information about alternative policies be assimilated in ways that are ultimately most useful for decision makers. Because of the magnitude of the anticipated benefits and costs of addressing the threat of global climate change, its great time horizons, massive uncertainties, and physical and economic irreversibilities, public policy in this area presents significant challenges to economic research. Nevertheless, a firm foundation is provided by the existing literature from nearly three decades of related theoretical and empirical economic analysis.Environment, Technology and Industry, Regulatory Reform, Other Topics

The Problem of the Commons: Still Unsettled After 100 Years

The problem of the commons is more important to our lives and thus more central to economics than a century ago when Katharine Coman led off the first issue of the American Economic Review. As the U.S. and other economies have grown, the carrying-capacity of the planet — in regard to natural resources and environmental quality — has become a greater concern, particularly for common-property and open-access resources. The focus of this article is on some important, unsettled problems of the commons. Within the realm of natural resources, there are special challenges associated with renewable resources, which are frequently characterized by open access.An important example is the degradation of open-access fisheries. Critical commons problems are also associated with environmental quality. A key contribution of economics has been the development of market-based approaches to environmental protection. These instruments are key to addressing the ultimate commons problem of the twenty-first century — global climate change.common-property resource, open-access resource, fisheries, global climate change

Addressing Climate Change with a Comprehensive U.S. Cap-and-Trade System

There is growing impetus for a domestic U.S. climate policy that can provide meaningful reductions in emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. I describe and analyze an up- stream, economy-wide CO2 cap-and-trade system which implements a gradual trajectory of emissions reductions (with inclusion over time of non-CO2 greenhouse gases), and includes mechanisms to reduce cost uncertainty. Initially, half of the allowances are allocated through auction and half through free distribution, with the share being auctioned gradually increasing to 100 percent over 25 years. The system provides for linkage with emission reduction credit projects in other countries, harmonization over time with effective cap-and-trade systems in other countries and regions, and appropriate linkage with actions taken in other countries, in order to establish a level playing field among domestically produced and imported products.Cap-and-Trade System, Carbon Dioxide, Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Global Climate Change, Carbon Taxes

Addressing Climate Change with a Comprehensive U.S. Cap-and-Trade System

There is growing impetus for a domestic U.S. climate policy that can provide meaningful reductions in emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. I describe and analyze an up-stream, economy-wide CO2 cap-and-trade system which implements a gradual trajectory of emissions reductions (with inclusion over time of non-CO2 greenhouse gases), and includes mechanisms to reduce cost uncertainty. Initially, half of the allowances are allocated through auction and half through free distribution, with the share being auctioned gradually increasing to 100 percent over 25 years. The system provides for linkage with emission reduction credit projects in other countries, harmonization over time with effective cap-and-trade systems in other countries and regions, and appropriate linkage with actions taken in other countries, in order to establish a level playing field among domestically produced and imported products.

THESE TWO IMPORTANT VALUES?

Government, Harvard University. Comments may be directed to the authors

The Effect of Allowance Allocations on Cap-and-Trade System Performance

We examine an implication of the "Coase Theorem" which has had an important impact both on environmental economics and on public policy in the environmental domain. Under certain conditions, the market equilibrium in a cap-and-trade system will be cost-effective and independent of the initial allocation of tradable rights. That is, the overall cost of achieving a given aggregate emission reduction will be minimized, and the final allocation of permits will be independent of the initial allocation. We call this the independence property. This property is very important because it allows equity and efficiency concerns to be separated in a relatively straightforward manner. In particular, the property means that the government can establish the overall pollution-reduction goal for a cap-and-trade system by setting the cap, and leave it up to the legislature--such as the U.S. Congress--to construct a constituency in support of the program by allocating the allowances to various interests without affecting either the environmental performance of the system or its aggregate social costs. Our primary objective in this paper is to examine the conditions under which the independence property is likely to hold--both in theory and in practice. A number of factors can call the independence property into question theoretically, including market power, transaction costs, non-cost-minimizing behavior, and conditional allowance allocations. We find that, in practice, there is support for the independence property in some, but not all cap-and-trade applications.