A Tribute to George Perry and William Brainard

macroeconomics, George Perry, William Brainard, BPEA, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Brookings Panel on Economic Activity

The Aftermath of the 1992 ERM Breakup: Was There a Macroeconomic Free Lunch?

This paper examines the macroeconomic aftermath of the 1992 breakdown of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). The economic performance of six leaver' nations is compared with five stayer' nations that maintained a roughly fixed parity with the Deutsche Mark. Recent writing about post-1992, which I call the conventional wisdom,' reports that a surprising miracle occurred the leaver nations are alleged to have enjoyed a burst of real growth and a decline in unemployment, all without any evidence of extra inflation. The results in this paper turn the conventional wisdom on its head. While the leaver nations experienced an acceleration of nominal GDP growth relative to the stayers, fully 80 percent of this spilled over into extra inflation, leaving only 20 percent remaining for extra real GDP growth. Virtually 100 percent of the nominal exchange rate depreciation passed through into higher import prices, and extra inflation would have been even more pronounced if it were not for quiescent wage rates, which the paper attributes to high unemployment. The absence of any significant stimulus to real output growth is attributed to fiscal tightening under pressure from the Maastricht criteria, which offset nearly all of the stimulus coming from the improved current account of the leaver nations.

U.S. Inflation, Labor's Share, and the Natural Rate of Unemployment

The Phillips curve was init-ally formulated as a relationship between the rate of change and unemployment, yet what matters for stabilization policy is the rate of inflation, not the rate of wage change. This paper provides new estimates of Phillips curves for both prices and wages extending over the full 1954-87 period and several sub-periods. The most striking result in the paper is that wage changes do not contribute statistically to the explanation of inflation. Deviations in the growth of labor cost from the path of inflation cause changes in labor's income share, and changes in the profit share in the opposite direction, but do not feed back to the inflation rate. Additional findings are that the U.S. natural unemployment is still 6 percent, with no decline in the 1980s in response to the reversal of the demographic shifts that had raised the natural rate in the 1960s and 1970s. The U. S. inflation process is stable, with no evidence of structural shifts over the 1954-87 period. But the wage process is not stable: low rates of wage change in 1981-87 cannot be accurately predicted by wage equations estimated through 1980. Rather than representing a "new regime," wage behavior in the 1980s is the outcome of a longer-term process. The 1980s have witnessed a substantial decline in labor's income share that partly reverses the even larger increase in labor's share that occurred between 1965 and 1978.

The Boskin Commission Report: A Retrospective One Decade Later

This paper provides a retrospective on the 1996 Boskin Commission Report, Toward a More Accurate Measure of the Cost of Living, and its famous estimate that the CPI in 1995-96 was upward biased by 1.1 percent per year. The paper summarizes the report's methods, findings, and recommendations, and then reviews the criticisms that appeared soon after the Report was issued. Post-Boskin changes in the CPI are summarized and assessed, as is recent research on related issues. The paper sharply distinguishes two questions. First, with what we know now, what should the Commission have concluded about CPI bias in 1995-96? Second, what is the bias now after the many improvements introduced into the CPI since the Commission's Report? About the first question, my own recent research on apparel and rental housing indicates a substantial downward bias in the CPI over much of the twentieth century, diminishing in size after 1985. Incorporating these findings into the Boskin matrix would reduce its 0.6 percent annual upward bias due to quality change and new products to a smaller 0.4 percent bias. However, this is more than offset by the stunning discrepancy over 2000-06 in the chain-weighted C-CPI-U compared to the traditional CPI-U, indicating that the Commission greatly understated the magnitude of upper-level substitution bias. This retrospective evaluation suggests that the Boskin bias estimate for 1995-96 should have been 1.2 to 1.3 percent, not 1.1 percent. Current upward bias in the CPI is estimated to have declined from the revised 1.2-1.3 percent in the Boskin era to about 0.8 percent today. Yet the Boskin report, like most contemporary studies of quality change, failed to place sufficient value on the value of new products and on increased longevity. Allowing for these, today's bias is at least 1.0 percent per year or perhaps even higher.