A minority game with bounded recall.

This paper studies a repeated minority game with public signals, symmetric bounded recall, and pure strategies. We investigate both public and private equilibria of the game with fixed recall size. We first show how public equilibria in such a repeated game can be represented as colored subgraphs of a de Bruijn graph. Then we prove that the set of public equilibrium payoffs with bounded recall converges to the set of uniform equilibrium payoffs as the size of the recall increases. We also show that private equilibria behave badly: A private equilibrium payoff with bounded recall need not be a uniform equilibrium payoff.folk theorem; de Bruijn sequence; imperfect monitoring; uniform equilibrium; public equilibrium; private equilibrium;

Probabilistic Reliability and Privacy of Communication Using Multicast in General Neighbor Networks

This paper studies reliability and security of information transmission in networks. We consider the framework of Franklin and Wright (J. Cryptol. 13(1):9–30, 2000): multicast communication and byzantine adversary. Franklin and Wright studied particular neighbor graphs with neighbor-disjoint paths. The aim of the present work is to drop this assumption and to give necessary and sufficient conditions on the neighbor graph allowing reliable and secure information transmission.ou

Playing off-line games with bounded rationality

We study a two-person zero-sum game where players simultaneously choose sequences of actions, and the overall payo is the average of a one-shot payo over the joint sequence. We consider the maxmin value of the game played in pure strategies by boundedly rational players and model bounded rationality by introducing complexity limitations. First we dene the complexity of a sequence by its smallest period (a non-periodic sequence being of innite complexity) and study the maxmin of the game where player 1 is restricted to strategies with complexity at most n and player 2 is restricted to strategies with complexity at most m. We study the asymptotics of this value and a complete characterization in the matching pennies case. We extend the analysis of matching pennies to strategies with bounded recall.We study a two-person zero-sum game where players simultaneously choose sequences of actions, and the overall payo is the average of a one-shot payo over the joint sequence. We consider the maxmin value of the game played in pure strategies by boundedly rational players and model bounded rationality by introducing complexity limitations. First we dene the complexity of a sequence by its smallest period (a non-periodic sequence being of innite complexity) and study the maxmin of the game where player 1 is restricted to strategies with complexity at most n and player 2 is restricted to strategies with complexity at most m. We study the asymptotics of this value and a complete characterization in the matching pennies case. We extend the analysis of matching pennies to strategies with bounded recall.Refereed Working Papers / of international relevanc

Monitoring of marine environment and shellfish health protection

Shellfish farming is a major economic activity in the European Union, France being one of the main producing countries. Regulations were introduced to meet society’s current expectations in terms of food safety at the fishing, farming and harvesting stages, as well as during processing and marketing. Toxic algae, pathogens or pollutants may contaminate shellfish products during production and harvesting, partly because of the particular environmental conditions in which these animals are grown. Monitoring programmes were thus developed to detect the presence of biological and chemical contaminants in coastal waters and in shellfish, and to monitor the food safety of the latter.Les mollusques sont à la base d'une activité économique importante au sein de l'Union Européenne, la France étant un des premiers pays producteurs. La conchyliculture doit répondre aujourd'hui aux attentes de la société en termes de sécurité alimentaire. Des réglementations ont ainsi été établies, tant au niveau des étapes primaires de pêche, d'élevage ou de récolte des mollusques, que lors de la transformation et de la commercialisation. Au cours des étapes de production et de récolte, une contamination des coquillages (toxines algales, agents infectieux ou polluants) peut survenir du fait, notamment, des conditions environnementales auxquelles sont confrontés les animaux. Des réseaux de surveillance ont ainsi été développés afin de détecter la présence de contaminants biologiques et chimiques dans les eaux littorales et les coquillages et d'assurer le suivi de la qualité sanitaire de ces derniers

Viruses infecting marine molluscs: increased mortality outbreaks and herpes viruses

Although viruses have been associated with mortality outbreaks in different mollusc species, little information is available on their exact affiliation and taxonomic position. Herpes viruses have attracted particular attention because of their economic and ecological impact on both farmed and wild marine molluscs over the past 20 years. Investigations based on molecular approaches have been carried out on the herpes virus infecting Pacific oysters in France. Molecular and ultra-structural data were used to classify the virus under the name ostreid herpesvirus 1 (OsHV-1), as the first known species in the family Malacoherpesviridae. Since 2008, massive mortality outbreaks were reported in several Crassostrea gigas oyster farms in France, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. The outbreaks were attributed to adverse environmental conditions associated with a particular variant of OsHV-1, called OsHV-1 μVar.Bien que des épisodes de mortalité associés à la détection de virus aient été rapportés chez différentes espèces de mollusques, peu d'informations sont aujourd'hui disponibles concernant l'affiliation exacte de ces virus et leur position taxinomique. Parmi les virus infectant les coquillages, les herpèsvirus ont fait l'objet d'une attention particulière du fait de leurs impacts économiques et écologiques sur les animaux en élevage et sauvages. Des recherches par des approches de biologie moléculaire ont été menées en France sur le virus infectant les huîtres creuses, Crassostrea gigas. Sur la base des données moléculaires et ultra-structurales, ce virus a été classé, sous le nom d'ostreid herpesvirus 1 (OsHV-1), comme première espèce virale de la famille Malacoherpesviridae. Depuis 2008, des épisodes de surmortalité ont été rapportés dans différentes régions de production des huîtres creuses C. gigas, en France, en Irlande et au Royaume Uni. Ils ont été attribués à des conditions environnementales défavorables associées à la découverte d'un variant génotypique viral particulier, appelé OsHV-1 μVar

A Minority Game with Bounded Recall

International audienceThis paper studies a repeated minority game with public signals, symmetric bounded recall and pure strategies. We investigate both public and private equilibria of the game with fixed recall size. We first show how public equilibria in such repeated games can be represented as colored sub-graphs of a de Bruijn graphs. Then we prove that the set of public equilibrium payoffs with bounded recall converges to the set of uniform equilibrium payoffs as the size of the recall increases. We also show that private equilibria behave badly: a private equilibrium payoff with bounded recall need not be a uniform equilibrium payoff