2 research outputs found
Differential Fault Attack on Rasta and FiLIP-DSM
In this paper we propose Differential Fault Attack (DFA) on two Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) friendly stream ciphers Rasta and . Design criteria of Rasta rely on affine layers and nonlinear layers, whereas relies on permutations and a nonlinear fil- ter function. Here we show that the secret key of these two ciphers can be recovered by injecting only 1 bit fault in the initial state. Our DFA on full round (# rounds = 6) Rasta with 219 block size requires only one block (i.e., 219 bits) of normal and faulty keystream bits. In the case of our DFA on FiLIP-430 (one instance of ), we need 30000 normal and faulty keystream bits
Differential Fault Attack on Rasta and
In this paper we propose Differential Fault Attack (DFA) on two Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) friendly stream ciphers Rasta and . Design criteria of Rasta rely on affine layers and nonlinear layers, whereas relies on permutations and a nonlinear fil- ter function. Here we show that the secret key of these two ciphers can be recovered by injecting only 1 bit fault in the initial state. Our DFA on full round (# rounds = 6) Rasta with 219 block size requires only one block (i.e., 219 bits) of normal and faulty keystream bits. In the case of our DFA on FiLIP-430 (one instance of ), we need 30000 normal and faulty keystream bits