Allokationseffekte rechtlich-institutioneller Regelungen der Meeresnutzung

In dieser Studie werden ordnungspolitische Alternativen der Meeresnutzung bewertet. Der Schwerpunkt liegt dabei auf den Allokationsaspekten der auf der UN-Seerechtskonferenz erwogenen Regelungen der marinen Ressourcennutzung. Fischerei und Tiefseebergbau werden davon am stärksten betroffen. Die Analysen führen zu dem Schluß, daß das Regelkonzept der Seerechtskonferenz Allokationseffizienz nicht gewährleisten kann. Ausgehend von allokationstheoretischen Erwägungen und der Theorie der property rights werden zunächst ordnungspolitische Rahmenbedingungen für effiziente marine Ressourcennutzung entwickelt. Dabei zeigt sich, daß effiziente Fischbewirtschaftung einen internationalen Regelungsansatz verlangt, der zur fiskalischen Korrektur externer Effekte eine gebietlich extensive Schaffung von Hoheitsrechten verlangt. Hingegen müßte die Regelung der Rohstoffnutzung in der Tiefssee auf eine Abgrenzung der Schürfrechte und Vorbeugungsmaßnahmen für mögliche, aber nicht wahrscheinliche negative Umwelteinflüsse beschränkt sein. Der dafür ausreichende institutionelle Aufwand wäre minimal. Mit diesen Referenzschemata werden die Regelkonzepte verglichen, die von einer Mehrheit der Staaten auf der UN-Seerechtskonferenz gefordert werden. Da effiziente Nutzung der lebenden marinen Ressourcen unter dem früher geltenden Prinzip der Freiheit der Meere weitgehend unmöglich ist, enthält das neue Fischereirecht durchaus einen hoffnungsvollen Aspekt, weil es mit der Einführung von 200-Meilen-Zonen steuerliche Hoheitsrechte schafft. Die neue Lösung bleibt dennoch mangelhaft, weil sie Hoheitsrechte nach nationalen Gesichtspunkten parzelliert und den Inhalt der Hoheitsrechte nicht auf effizienzfordernde Maßnahmen (Besteuerung) beschränkt. Zur Regelung der Ressourcennutzung in der Tiefsee folgt der Entwurf der Seerechtskonferenz den ordnungspolitischen Vorstellungen einer Neuen Welt Wirtschaftsordnung. Die Bestimmungen des vorgesehenen Zugangs- und Produktionsdirigismus schließen Allokationseffizienz aus, wenn sie nicht gar einen zukünftigen Tiefseebergbau von vornherein verhindern

Ocean fishing: Economic efficiency and the law of the sea

The legitimation of the freedom of fishing as the principle guaranteeing open, i.e., unconstrained and non-priced access to the oceans' living resources was in great part based on the premise that these resources are inexhaustible, that their use does not diminish their value. These observations were central to Hugo Grotius' writings on the freedom of fishing. ... all that which has been so constituted by nature that although serving some one person it still suffices for the common use of all other persons, is today and ought in perpetuity to remain in the same condition as when it was first created by nature. And, to reaffirms: For by using, the sea itself is not at all impaired, and it needs no cultivation to bear fruit. Therefore, the sea deservedly remained common. For three centuries following the writings of Grotius, open access to fisheries continued to be the practical solution even though the presumption of inexhaustibility grew doubtful. Open access, as it turns out,, was practical, not because ocean resources were free goods lacking any degree of scarcity, but because the benefits to be gained from limiting access and extending jurisdiction over the oceans did not justify the costs of establishing and enforcing an exclusive access system. First; rudimentary fishing techniques had, through the relation of cost to price, lir.ited harvesting to levels which air not seriously affect the stocks' reproductive potentials, thus making then appear inexhaustible. Second^ enforcement of exclusive jurisdiction;, if at all technically feasible, would have entailed disproportionate costs. Such costs have played a major role in the historical development of the Law of the Sea. A prime example is the seaward extension of the territorial sea to three miles, which, as is often said, corresponded to the range of a cannon

A supply and demand model of bilateral trade in a multicountry framework

This study develops a practical supply and demand model of bilateral trade flows. The model is constructed in two tiers. First, aggregate import demand and aggregate export supply are determined from aggregate economic relations that contain real income (output) and relative prices. Second, bilateral import demand and bilateral export supply are determined from theory-based allocation relations. By differentiating import prices from export prices, the analysis incorporates international transportation costs and tariffs. The result is a simultaneous system that determines bilateral trade flows and bilateral prices given country incomes, domestic price levels and international transmission factors. The model in dynamic form is estimated from a panel of bilateral trade flows for five major OECD countries (United States, Japan, France, West Germany, United Kingdom) for the years 1958-1971. The model has many applications, e.g. in the analyses of the impacts on trade flows of differential economic growth rates and tariff policies. These policy aspects figure prominently in the current discussions among the major OECD countries.

A supply and demand model of bilateral trade in a multicountry framework

This study develops a practical supply and demand model of bilateral trade flows. The model is constructed in two tiers. First, aggregate import demand and aggregate export supply are determined from aggregate economic relations that contain real income (output) and relative prices. Second, bilateral import demand and bilateral export supply are determined from theory-based allocation relations. By differentiating import prices from export prices, the analysis incorporates international transportation costs and tariffs. The result is a simultaneous system that determines bilateral trade flows and bilateral prices given country incomes, domestic price levels and international transmission factors. The model in dynamic form is estimated from a panel of bilateral trade flows for five major OECD countries (United States, Japan, France, West Germany, United Kingdom) for the years 1958-1971. The model has many applications, e.g. in the analyses of the impacts on trade flows of differential economic growth rates and tariff policies. These policy aspects figure prominently in the current discussions among the major OECD countries