Democracy and Reforms

Empirical evidence on the relationship between democracy and economic reforms is scarce, limited to few reforms and countries and for few years. This paper studies the impact of democracy on the adoption of economic reforms using a new dataset on reforms in the financial, capital, public, and banking sectors, product and labor markets, agriculture, and trade for 150 countries over the period 1960-2004. Democracy has a positive and significant impact on the adoption of economic reforms but there is no evidence that economic reforms foster democracy. Our results are robust to the inclusion of a large variety of controls and estimation strategies.economic liberalization, transition, political economy

Monetary transmission in low income countries

This paper reviews the monetary transmission mechanism in low income countries (LICs). We use monetary transmission in advanced and emerging markets as a benchmark to identify aspects of the transmission mechanism that may operate differently in LICs. In particular, we focus on the effects of financial market structure on monetary transmission. The weak institutional framework prevalent in LICs drastically reduces the role of securities markets and increases the cost of bank lending to private firms. Coupled with imperfect competition in the banking sector, this means that banks with chronically high excess reserves invest in domestic public bonds or (when possible) in foreign bonds. With the financial system not intermediating funds properly, the traditional monetary transmission channels (interest rate, bank lending, and asset price) are impaired. The exchange rate channel, on the other hand, tends to be undermined by central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market. These conclusions are supported by review of the institutional frameworks, statistical analysis, and previous literature.monetary policy, exchange rate, interest rate, banks, credit, institutions

Democracy and Reforms: Evidence from a New Dataset

Empirical evidence on the relationship between democracy and economic reforms is limited to few reforms, countries, and years. This paper studies the impact of democracy on the adoption of economic reforms using a new dataset on reforms in the financial, capital and banking sectors, product markets, agriculture, and trade for 150 countries over the period 1960-2004. Democracy has a positive and significant impact on the adoption of economic reforms but there is no evidence that economic reforms foster democracy. Our results are robust to the inclusion of a large variety of controls and estimation strategies.

Do Interest Groups affect US Immigration Policy?

While anecdotal evidence suggests that interest groups play a key role in shaping immigration policy, there is no systematic empirical analysis of this issue. In this paper, we construct an industry-level dataset for the United States, by combining information on the number of temporary work visas with data on lobbying activity associated with immigration. We find robust evidence that both pro- and anti-immigration interest groups play a statistically significant and economically relevant role in shaping migration across sectors. Barriers to migration are lower in sectors in which business interest groups incur larger lobby expenditures and higher in sectors where labor unions are more important.Immigration, Immigration Policy, Interest Groups, Political Economy

Do Interest Groups Affects US Immigration Policy?

While anecdotal evidence suggests that interest groups play a key role in shaping immigration policy, there is no systematic empirical analysis of this issue. In this paper, we construct an industry-level dataset for the United States, by combining information on the number of temporary work visas with data on lobbying activity associated with immigration. We find robust evidence that both pro- and anti-immigration interest groups play a statistically significant and economically relevant role in shaping migration across sectors. Barriers to migration are lower in sectors in which business interest groups incur larger lobby expenditures and higher in sectors where labor unions are more important.Immigration, Immigration Policy, Interest Groups, Political Economy

The Power of Political Voice: Women's Political Representation and Crime in India

Using state-level variation in the timing of political reforms, we find that an increase in female representation in local government induces a large and significant rise in documented crimes against women in India. Our evidence suggests that this increase is good news, as it is driven primarily by greater reporting rather than greater incidence of such crimes. In contrast, we find no increase in crimes against men or gender-neutral crimes. We also examine the effectiveness of alternative forms of political representation: large scale membership of women in local councils affects crime against them more than their presence in higher level leadership positions.crime; women’s empowerment; minority representation; voice

Three's company: Wall Street, Capitol Hill, and K Street

This paper explores the link between the political influence of the financial industry and financial regulation in the run-up to the global financial crisis. We construct a detailed database documenting the lobbying activities, campaign contributions, and political connections of the financial industry from 1999 to 2006 in the United States. We find evidence that spending on lobbying by the financial industry and network connections between lobbyists and the legislators were positively linked to the probability of a legislator changing positions in favor of deregulation. The evidence also suggests that hiring connected lobbyists who had worked for legislators in the past enhanced this link

Dilute stuffing in the pyrochlore iridate Eu2Ir2O7Eu_2Ir_2O_7

The pyrochlore Eu$_2$Ir$_2$O$_7$ has recently attracted significant attention as a candidate Weyl semimetal. The previous reports on this compound unanimously show a thermally induced metal to insulator (MI) transition, concomitant with antiferromagnetic (AFM) long-range ordering of the Ir-moments below T$_\textit{N} \sim$120 K. However, there are contradictory reports concerning the slope d$\rho/$dT of the resistivity plots ($\rho$) in the "metallic" state above the metal-insulator (MI) transition, and the value of $\rho$ in the insulating state, both of which show significant sample dependence. Here, we explore this issue by investigating six different Eu$_2$Ir$_2$O$_7$ samples with slightly varying Eu:Ir ratio. High-resolution synchrotron powder diffraction are done to probe minor variations in the cell parameters of the various Eu$_2$Ir$_2$O$_7$ samples investigated here. Specific heat (C$_p$) and magnetic susceptibility of all the samples showed long-range antiferromagnetic ordering upon cooling below T$_\textit{N} \sim$120 K. The transitions are, however, found to be smeared out for the off-stoichiometric samples. We show that the sign of d$\rho/$dT above the metal-insulator (MI) transition is highly sensitive to the unit cell length, which, in turn, depends on the level of Eu-stuffing at the Ir-site. Samples with composition close to the ideal stoichiometry (Eu : Ir $=$ 1) showed a change of sign of d$\rho/$dT from negative to positive upon cooling below a certain temperature T $^*$ $>$ T$_\textit{MI}$. With increasing Eu-stuffing T$^*$ decreased until a negative d$\rho/$dT persisted without any sign change down to T$_\textit{MI}$.Comment: 12 pages, 7 figure

The Dynamics of Firm Lobbying

We study the determinants of the dynamics of firm lobbying behavior using a panel data set covering 1998-2006. Our data exhibit three striking facts: (i) few firms lobby, (ii) lobbying status is strongly associated with firm size, and (iii) lobbying status is highly persistent over time. Estimating a model of a firm's decision to engage in lobbying, we find significant evidence that up-front costs associated with entering the political process help explain all three facts. We then exploit a natural experiment in the expiration in legislation surrounding the H-1B visa cap for high-skilled immigrant workers to study how these costs affect firms' responses to policy changes. We find that companies primarily adjusted on the intensive margin: the firms that began to lobby for immigration were those who were sensitive to H-1B policy changes and who were already advocating for other issues, rather than firms that became involved in lobbying anew. For a firm already lobbying, the response is determined by the importance of the issue to the firm's business rather than the scale of the firm's prior lobbying efforts. These results support the existence of significant barriers to entry in the lobbying process.