Third Party Access pricing to the network, secondary capacity market and economic optimum : the case of natural gas

The gas deregulation process implies crucial choices concerning access to transportation networks. These choices deal with the nature, the structure and the level of access fees. This paper proposes an evaluation of different systems implemented both in Europe and North America, in relation to normative pricing references. The rules according to which shippers can buy or sell capacity represent another kind of choice that Regulators have to make. This paper proposes a simple model which demonstrates that secondary market prices should not be subject to a cap and emphasizes the need of a 'use-it-or-lose-it' rule on this market.DEREGLEMENTATION; INVESTISSEMENT; OPTION REELLE; FINANCEMENT OPTIMAL; PRIX DE REVIENT; ELECTRICITE

Les enjeux du transport pour le gaz et l'électricité : la fixation des charges d'accès

ATR ; GAZ NATUREL ; ELECTRICITE

Deep neural networks for inverse problems in mesoscopic physics: Characterization of the disorder configuration from quantum transport properties

We present a machine learning approach that allows to characterize the disorder potential of a two-dimensional electronic system from its quantum transport properties. Numerically simulated transport data for a large number of disorder configurations is used for the training of artificial neural networks. We show that the trained networks are able to recognize details of the disorder potential of an unknown sample from its transport properties, and that they can even reconstruct the complete potential landscape seen by the electrons.Comment: 12 pages, 11 figure

Industry concentration and strategic trade policy in successive oligopoly

We study a policy game between exporting and importing countries in vertically linked industries. In a successive international Cournot oligopoly, we analyse incentives for using tax instruments strategically to shift rents vertically, between exporting and importing countries, and horizontally, between exporting countries. We show that the equilibrium outcome depends crucially on the relative degree of competitiveness in the upstream and downstream parts of the industry. With respect to national welfare, a more competitive upstream industry may benefit an exporting (upstream) country and harm an importing (downstream) country. On the other hand, a more competitive downstream industry may harm exporting countries.Financial support from the Norwegian Research Council, through the PETROPOL research programme, is gratefully acknowledged. The paper has been greatly improved by the suggestions of two anonymous referees. We also thank Hisashi Hokari and Frode Meland for valuable comments and suggestions