4 research outputs found

    The Confusion of Is and Ought in Game Theoretic Contexts

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    This paper explores the distinction between normative and positive theoretical statements in a game theoretic context from a Bayesian perspective. Normative and positive theoretical statements are often confused in decision making research. The confusion results from some unique epistemological and methodological problems associated with cognitive behavior as an object for scientific inquiry. The confusion persists because of poor model validation procedures which are themselves further complicated by the confusion. The confusion greatly impedes the development of more useful prescriptions for and predictions of human decision behavior. From a Bayesian perspective which acknowledges the importance of incomplete information and imperfect theories of behavior, the confusion is unnecessary

    Reply to Professor Harsanyi

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    Response to HARSANYI, J. C., "Subjective Probability and the Theory of Games: Comments on Kadane and Larkey's Paper," Management Science Vol. 28, No. 2 (Feb., 1982

    Subjective Probability and the Theory of Games

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    This paper explores some of the consequences of adopting a modern subjective view of probability for game theory. The consequences are substantial. The subjective view of probability clarifies the important distinction between normative and positive theorizing about behavior in games, a distinction that is often lost in the search for "solution concepts" which largely characterizes game theory since the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern. Many of the distinctions that appear important in conventional game theory (two-person versus n-person, zero-sum versus variable sum) appear unimportant in the subjective formulation. Other distinctions, such as single play versus repetitive-play games, appear to be more important in the subjective formulation than in the conventional formulation

    Adjusting GPA to Reflect Course Difficulty

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    The computation of Graduate Point Average (GPA) incorrectly assumes that grades are comparable across courses and instructors. GPA overstates the performance of students who elect an "easier" course of study relative to those who choose a more "difficult" course of study. This paper proposes a method of adjusting GPA and applies it to data from one cohort of undergraduates at Carnegie Mellon University. Adjusted GPAs are more highly correlated with students’ high school Grade Point Average and with SAT scores than are the raw GPAs or GPAs adjusted using a prominent alternative method, Item Response Theory. A survey of students finds that the new methods’ estimates of relative course difficulty are consistent with students’ perceptions of relative course difficulty
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