Measurement of the W Mass at LEP2

The mass of the W boson has been measured by the LEP collaborations from the data recorded during the LEP2 programme at e+ e- centre of mass energies from 161 to 209 GeV, giving the result : mw = 80.450 +/- 0.039 GeV/c^2. This paper discusses the measurements of the W Mass from direct reconstruction of the invariant mass of the WW decay products, particular emphasis is placed on the evaluation of systematic errors. Results on the direct measurement of the W width are also presented.Comment: Contribution to XXXVIIth Moriond Electroweak Conference, March 2002. 6 pages, 3 figures This version with typos correcte

Alignment procedure of the LHCb Vertex Detector

LHCb is one of the four main experiments of the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) project, which will start at CERN in 2008. The experiment is primarily dedicated to B-Physics and hence requires precise vertex reconstruction. The silicon vertex locator (VELO) has a single hit precision of better than 10 micron and is used both off-line and in the trigger. These requirements place strict constraints on its alignment. Additional challenges for the alignment arise from the detector being retracted between each fill of the LHC and from its unique circular disc r/phi strip geometry. This paper describes the track based software alignment procedure developed for the VELO. The procedure is primarily based on a non-iterative method using a matrix inversion technique. The procedure is demonstrated with simulated events to be fast, robust and to achieve a suitable alignment precision.Comment: accepted for publication in NIM

LHCb VELO software alignment, Part III: the alignment of the relative sensor positions

The LHCb Vertex Locator contains 42 silicon sensor modules. Each module has two silicon sensors. A method for determining the relative alignment of the silicon sensors within each module from data is presented. The software implementation details are discussed. Monte-Carlo simulation studies are described that demonstrate an alignment precision of 1.3 micron is obtained in the sensor plane

Finiteness in N=1 SYM Theories

I present a criterion for all-order finiteness in N=1 SYM theories. Three applications are given; they yield all-order finite N=1 SYM models with global symmetries of the superpotential.Comment: 3 pages, plain LaTex, no figure

Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions

Descending price auctions are adopted for goods that must be sold quickly and in private values environments, for instance in flower, fish, and tobacco auctions. In this paper, we introduce ex post efficient descending auctions for two environments: multiple non-identical items and buyers with unit-demand valuations; and multiple identical items and buyers with non-increasing marginal values. Our auctions are designed using the notion of universal competitive equilibrium (UCE) prices and they terminate with UCE prices, from which the Vickrey payments can be determined. For the unit-demand setting, our auction maintains linear and anonymous prices. For the homogeneous items setting, our auction maintains a single price and adopts Ausubel's notion of "clinching" to compute the final payments dynamically. The auctions support truthful bidding in an ex post Nash equilibrium and terminate with an ex post efficient allocation. In simulation, we illustrate the speed and elicitation advantages of these auctions over their ascending price counterparts.

Simplicity-Expressiveness Tradeoffs in Mechanism Design

A fundamental result in mechanism design theory, the so-called revelation principle, asserts that for many questions concerning the existence of mechanisms with a given outcome one can restrict attention to truthful direct revelation-mechanisms. In practice, however, many mechanism use a restricted message space. This motivates the study of the tradeoffs involved in choosing simplified mechanisms, which can sometimes bring benefits in precluding bad or promoting good equilibria, and other times impose costs on welfare and revenue. We study the simplicity-expressiveness tradeoff in two representative settings, sponsored search auctions and combinatorial auctions, each being a canonical example for complete information and incomplete information analysis, respectively. We observe that the amount of information available to the agents plays an important role for the tradeoff between simplicity and expressiveness