Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Finalistic Convergence or Liason Dangereuses?

Non-Refereed Working Papers / of national relevance onl

Single-Firm Conduct: A Discipline in Search of Itself (Try with Google?)

The American way: some remarks. The Google case: a test in real-time. Yet another culture clash, or a simpler joint confusion? Exploitation v. exclusion: planning the match. Some conclusions (and a modest proposal).The American way: some remarks. The Google case: a test in real-time. Yet another culture clash, or a simpler joint confusion? Exploitation v. exclusion: planning the match. Some conclusions (and a modest proposal).Non-Refereed Working Papers / of national relevance onl

The European Commission's Case Against Microsoft: Fool Monti Kills Bill?

Refereed Working Papers / of international relevanc

A "Geografia Social" de Sílvio Romero

Introduzindo uma discussão No início do século XX trava-se intensa polêmica entre geógrafos e sociólogos para a delimitação de seus campos disciplinares. Na opinião de Lucien FEBVRE (1925), a ambição dos morfologos sociais em constituir sua ciência reforçava a crítica aos geógrafos, acusando-os de serem ambiciosos, exclusivistas no objetivo proposto de estudar todas as influencias exercidas sobre a vida social, objetivo que, para estes, excederiam as forças de uma só ciência. Na análise do au..

Contract Adaptation under Legal Constraints

Abstract This paper shows theoretically that automobile distribution contracts can be seen as efficient responses to the manufacturers' obligation to offer non-discriminatory terms to dealers. This legal rule may prevent the parties from adapting contracts to new contingencies even when performance is ex post verifiable, as manufacturers may be unable to reach advantageous bargains with heterogeneous dealers using one-size-fits-all instruments. To circumvent the law and improve adaptation, manufacturers amend contracts informally, efficiently tailoring them to dealers' characteristics. Moreover, to make future informal amendments self-enforcing, contracts assign authority to manufacturers ex ante when the dealers are strongly averse to change, so manufacturers may be tempted to renege, ex post, on the large bonuses necessary to make them accept the amendments voluntarily. The model can be extended to employment, franchising and, more generally, to all contracts linking a central party to a set of parties with inferior bargaining power, where anti-discrimination rules may apply