Subjects and actors

Published online: 15 March 2024States and international organisations are by tradition the main legal subjects of international law. In addition, a number of actors can also be identified that display limited features of international legal personality. In recent decades an acknowledgment has grown ever stronger that a range of actors in addition to States and international organisations can perform various regulatory functions. This pluralisation of the conception of international legal actors blurs the conventional distinction between subjects and objects of international law. This chapter in a first step introduces the concepts of legal personality and legal subjectivity to then discuss in more depth a number of actors in international law. These include the traditional as well as more recent or possibly emerging subjects of international law. In addition, the chapter will touch upon actors which even though not possessing formal legal personality play a role in making, interpreting, and enforcing international law

‘Is this a time of beautiful chaos?’: reflecting on international feminist legal methods

This article considers how Margaret Jane Radin’s theory of the feminist double bind can bring conceptual clarity to the difficulties feminisms face in engaging with political and legal institutions of global governance. I draw on her theory to reinitiate a conversation on ideal and nonideal theory, in order to answer the call of key proponents in international legal feminism to reevaluate methodologies in critiquing mainstream institutions. By providing an account of how to navigate the double bind, this article brings conceptual clarity to the tension between resistance and compliance that has been argued to lie at the heart of the feminist project in international law. I demonstrate how this theoretical framework can foster greater pluralist perspectives in feminist engagement of ideal theories to temper the deradicalising and conservative risk of navigating feasibility constrained nonideal strategies

Petulant and contrary: approaches by the Permanent Five members of the Security Council to the concept of ‘Threat to the Peace’ under Article 39 of the UN Charter

As both a political concept and a legal consequence, a determination that a ‘threat to the peace’ exists in a given situation has unparalleled ramifications—including enlivening the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) powers and authorities under Chapter VII, which can in turn provide a foundation for military intervention. But for all of its political context and content, the UNSC’s authority to make this threshold determination regarding the existence of a ‘threat to the peace’ is a legal obligation and does not receive a totally unfettered discretion. Such decisions must, among other requirements, at the very least remain within the limits of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter. Further, the ability to determine whether a ‘threat to the peace’ exists forms the normative cornerstone of the Security Council’s mandate to maintain international peace and security. Situations in which the Security Council has opted to determine that a ‘threat to the peace’ exists are wide-ranging, and have included human rights violations in South Africa during apartheid, refugee concerns, international armed conflict, terrorism, civil war and the defence of democracy. Aside from Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter, a UNSC authorisation under Articles 39‒42 in Chapter VII is the only exception to the prohibition of the use of force provided for in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. To authorise military intervention within a given situation, particularly when using its Article 42 authority, the Security Council must first determine whether that situation constitutes a ‘threat to the peace’ under Article 39 of the Charter. The Charter has long been interpreted as placing few restrictions around how the Security Council arrives at such determinations; indeed, the phrase ‘threat to the peace’ was left intentionally undefined during the drafting of the UN Charter. Commentators have thus hypothesised that the phrase ‘threat to the peace’ is undefinable in nature and that such decisions are fluid, arbitrary and lacking in consistency. This thesis tests this hypothesis by undertaking critical discourse analysis of the Permanent Five’s (P5) justificatory discourse surrounding individual decisions of this nature, and then performing a meta-synthesis of the case studies to demonstrate that each P5 member approaches the question in a very consistent manner, and that each member’s consistent approach shows that they all have a working legal definition of what the phrase ‘threat to the peace’ means in the context of Article 39 of the UN Charter. The flow-on effect of this is that a Security Council-wide definition of ‘threat to the peace’ exists in a middle ground of these five national understandings. This in turn allows for greater levels of predictability when trying to ascertain when the Security Council will choose to act.Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, Law School, 2018