Dominant party rule and legislative leadership in authoritarian regimes

Abstract Authoritarian dominant parties are said to ensure elite loyalty by providing elites with regularized opportunities for career advancement. This article uses data on the distribution of leadership posts in Russia's regional legislatures (1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005)(2006)(2007)(2008)(2009)(2010) to conduct the first systematic test of this proposition. Loyalty to the nascent hegemonic party, United Russia, is shown to be important in determining a legislator's chances of being promoted to a leadership position. These findings generate insight into how authoritarian institutions help maintain regime stability and provide a clearer picture of how Russia's ruling party works

Elite Defection under Autocracy: Evidence from Russia

These are the datasets and replication files for Elite Defections Under Autocracy

Sub-national appointments in authoritarian regimes: Evidence from Russian gubernatorial appointments

Elections are among the most important and least understood institutions in contemporary authoritarian regimes. Theoretically, electoral authoritarian regimes should have an informational advantage that makes them more robust than other types of authoritarian regimes, but much empirical evidence suggests otherwise. In this article we offer a new perspective on why this might be the case. Specifically, we consider how authoritarian elections influence a ruler's choices in making cadre appointments. We argue that the imperative of winning authoritarian elections forces authoritarian leaders to prioritize the appointment of politically loyal cadres, who can help the regime win elections. This choice often comes at the expense of appointing officials who are competent at making good public policy and promoting economic development, factors that may contribute to long-term regime stability. We test this theory using an original dataset of gubernatorial appointments in one leading contemporary authoritarian regime, Russia

Replication Data for: Vote Brokers, Clientelist Appeals, and Voter Turnout: Evidence from Russia and Venezuela

These files provide full replication for the main text and the supplementary appendix

Replication Data for: Hitting Them With Carrots: Voter Intimidation and Vote Buying in Russia

Contains R data and .do file to replication figures and tables in the paper and Appendix. One Stata .dta and .do file is used for one table in the appendix