392 research outputs found
Short-Run Implications of Cap-and-Trade versus Baseline-and-Credit Emission Trading Plans: Experimental Evidence
Two approaches to emissions trading are cap-and-trade, in which an aggregate cap on emissions is distributed in the form of allowance permits, and baseline-and-credit, in which firms earn emission reduction credits for emissions below their baselines. Theoretical considerations suggest the long-run equilibria of the two plans will differ if baselines are proportional to output, because a variable baseline is equivalent to an output subsidy. This is in opposition to the prediction that when output capacity is fixed, the short-run equilibria of the two plans will be identical. As a first step towards testing the long-run model, this paper reports on a laboratory experiment designed to test the shortrun prediction. A computerized environment has been created in which subjects representing firms choose emission technologies under fixed output capacity and participate in markets for emission rights and for output. Demand for output is simulated. All decisions are tracked through a double-entry bookkeeping system. Our evidence supports the theoretical prediction that the two trading mechanisms yield similar outcomes, however both exhibit significant deviation from the predicted equilibrium.
Subsidizing Public Inputs
Investment in research and development may (with some probability) lead to reductions in a firm’s production cost. If the production-cost savings associated with successful research and development is freely disseminated to other firms as soon as it is realized, too few resources may be allocated to this input. In such an environment, subsidies to the public input can lead to optimal input use. Four alternative subsidy instruments are considered in this paper. Two are incremental subsidies and the others are conventional level subsidies. One of the incremental subsidies and one of the level subsidies crudely capture characteristics of incentive mechanisms used in the United States and Canada. A laboratory implementation of these instruments generally confirms that incremental subsidies are inferior to level subsidies.
Long-Run Implications of Alternative Emission Trading Plans: An Experiment with Robot Traders
Two approaches to emmisions trading are cap-and-trade, in which an aggragate cap on emmisions is distributed in the form of permits, and baseline-and-credit, in which firms earn credits for emissions below their baselines. Theoretical considerations suggest the long-run equilibria of the two plans will differ if baselines are proportional to output, because a variable baseline is equivalent to an output subsidy. This paper reports on a laboratory environment designed to test this prediction. A computerized environment has been created in which subjects representing firms choose capacity and emission rates and participate in markets for permits or credits and for output. Demand for output is simulated. All decisions are tracked through a double-entry bookkeeping system. The timing of decisions was adjusted to avoid short-run instability. The paper reports the parameterization for an experiment with human traders and results of a simulated experiment using robots.
Implications of Alternative Emission Trading Plans: Experimental Evidence
Two approaches to emissions trading are cap-and-trade, in which an aggregate cap on emissions is distributed in the form of emission allowances and baseline-and-credit, in which firms earn emission reduction credits for emissions below their baselines. Theoretical considerations suggest the long-run equilibria of the two plans will differ if baselines are proportional to output, because a variable baseline is equivalent to an output subsidy. To test this prediction we have developed a computerized environment in which subjects representing firms can adjust both their emission rates (per unit output) and capacity levels. Subjects buy or sell emission rights (allowances or credits) in a sealed bid call auction. The demand for output is simulated. All decisions are tracked through a double-entry bookkeeping system. This environment is to be used to compare short and long run responses to the alternative trading methods. Initial experiments in this environment will alternately hold emission rate and capacity choice constant. We report on six experimental sessions with variable emissions rates but fixed capacity and two pilot sessions with variable capacity but fixed emission rates.
Baseline-and-Credit Emission Permit Trading: Experimental Evidence Under Variable Output Capacity
Two approaches to emissions trading are cap-and-trade, in which an aggregate cap on emissions is distributed in the form of allowance permits, and baseline-and-credit, in which firms earn emission reduction credits for emissions below their baselines. Theoretical considerations suggest the long-run equilibria of the two plans will differ if baselines are proportional to output, because a variable baseline is equivalent to an output subsidy. As a progressive step towards testing the full long-run model, this paper reports on a laboratory experiment designed to test the prediction under fixed emission rates and variable output capacity. A computerized environment has been created in which sub jects representing firms choose output capacities under fixed emission technology and participate in markets for emission rights and for output. Demand for output is simulated. All decisions are tracked through a double-entry bookkeeping system. Our evidence supports the theoretical prediction that aggregate output and emissions are inefficiently high under a baseline-and-credit trading plan compared to a corresponding cap-and-trade plan.
Long-Run Implications of Alternative Emission Trading Plans: An Experiment with Robot Traders
Two approaches to emissions trading are cap-and-trade, in which an aggregate cap on emissions is distributed in the form of permits, and baseline-and-credit, in which firms earn credits for emissions below their baselines. Theoretical considerations suggest the long-run equilibria of the two plans will differ if baselines are proportional to output, because a variable baseline is equivalent to an output subsidy. This paper reports on a laboratory environment designed to test this prediction. A computerized environment has been created in which subjects representing firms choose capacity and emission rates and participate in markets for permits or credits and for output. Demand for output is simulated. All decisions are tracked through a double-entry bookkeeping system. The timing of decisions was adjusted to avoid short-run instability. The paper reports the parameterization for an experiment with human traders and results of a simulated experiment using robots.
Baseline-and-Credit Style Emission Trading Mechanisms: An Experimental Investigation of Economic Inefficiency
Two approaches to emissions trading are cap-and-trade, in which an aggregate cap on emissions is distributed in the form of allowance permits, and baseline-and-credit, in which firms earn emission reduction credits for emissions below their baselines. Theoretical considerations suggest the long-run equilibria of the two plans will differ if baselines are proportional to output, because a variable baseline is equivalent to an output subsidy. This paper reports on a laboratory experiment designed to test the prediction in a laboratory environ- ment in which sub jects representing firms choose emission technologies and output capacities. A computerized environment has been created in which sub jects participate in markets for emission rights and for output. Demand for output is simulated. All decisions are tracked through a double-entry bookkeeping system. Our evidence supports the theoretical prediction that aggregate output and emissions are in- efficiently high under a baseline-and-credit trading plan compared to a corresponding cap-and-trade plan.
Output Sharing Among Groups Exploiting Common Pool Resources
This paper provides an experimental testing ground for an equal output-sharing partnership approach as a common pool resource (CPR) management instrument. It examines the behaviour of resource users in output-sharing partnerships of different sizes, and evaluates the impact of partnership size and the way partners are assigned on effort (extraction) levels. Experimental results are very close to Nash predictions, and confirm that group size significantly affects resource user’s effort supply. The first best solution is achieved, when resource users are privately extracting from the CPR and equally sharing their output with the socially optimal number of partners. The way partners are allocated (randomly or with the same partners over 15 periods) does not significantly affect aggregate effort contributions. Income distribution, however, is more equitable with random allocation of partners than with fixed partners.
- …