Jeux de dialogue : formalisation, gestion, terminaison et succès

http://www.di.unipi.it/~morge/publis/morge04agental.pdfInternational audienceDans cet article, nous présentons un modèle formel pour les dialogues argumentatifs entre agents. La notion de jeu de dialogue est formalisée à l'aide d'un ensemble de règles de séquençage décrivant les réponses possibles à un message. Nous proposons ici un jeu de demande d'information et un jeu de persuasion. La terminaison de tels dialogues est garantie dans tout les cas de figure. A l'inverse, certaines hypothèses sur la situation informationnelle initiale des participants sont nécessaires pour garantir que les buts de ces dialogues sont atteints

Practical Application of Matchmaking Problem: Trainee Allocation for Teachers

International audienceIn this paper, we tackle a complex real-world problem: trainee allocation for primary school teachers in a French teaching Academy. This complex real-world problem can be reduced into the well- known Hospitals / Residents (HR) problem. However, the most difficult part consists of generating the preference lists according to the real con- straints, priorities and wishes. Additionally, we adapt the Swing method to the HR problem and we apply it to this real-world problem in order to balance the different objectives. In this way, the Swing method decreases the management cost of the operation

A dialogue game for agent resolving conflicts by verbal means

http://www.win.tue.nl/~evink/lcmas-2004-esslli.pdfInternational audienceWe present in this paper a formal framework for argumentation- based dialogues between agents. These latter manage the dialogues with the help of three components: an argumentative component to generate arguments, a social component to interprete arguments, and a conventional component to manage the sequence of coherent moves. We formalize the notion of dialogue-game to address the gap between individual moves and the extended sequence of coherent moves that arise between agents. The moves are not associated with an intention, however the dialogues have a goal

Practical Application of Matchmaking Problem : Trainee Allocation for Teachers

In this paper, we tackle a complex real-world problem: trainee allocation for primary school teachers in a French teaching Academy. In this real-world problem, the most difficult part consists of generating the preference lists according to the constraints, priorities and wishes in order to reduce this problem into the well-known Hospitals / Residents (HR) problem. Additionally, when we apply the existing algorithm for solving this problem we favorite one community or another. In this paper, we adapt the Swing method to the HR problem and we apply it to this real-world problem in order to balance the different objectives. In this way, the Swing method decreases the management cost of the operation

Bilateral negotiation of a meeting point in a maze

International audienceNegotiation between agents aims at reaching an agreement in which the conflicting interests of agents are accommodated. In this paper, we present a concrete negotiation scenario where two agents are situated in a maze and the negotiation outcome is a cell where they will meet. Based on their individual preferences (a minimal distance from their location computed from their partial knowledge of the environment), we propose a negotiation protocol which allows agents to submit more than two proposals at the same time and a conciliatory strategy. Formally, we prove that the agreement reached by such a negotiation process is Pareto- optimal and a compromise, i.e. a solution which minimizes the maximum effort for one agent. Moreover, the path between the two agents emerges from the repeated negotiations in our experiments

Réduire l'arbitraire par la négociation quitte à concéder

National audienceConflicts are first-class citizen in Multi-Agents Systems and negotiation allows to handle these conflicts. We consider here the decision of agents having partial preferences since some alternatives are equivalent or incomparable. In order to evaluate the alternatives, we refine here the Pareto-optimality criteria by defining two kinds of compromise. We propose in this paper a negotiation game, i.e. a protocol and two strategies~: a conciliatory one and a temporizing one. Finally, we prove that the first one is social optimal while the second one is self-interested. Our experiments show that the temporizing strategy is dominant in very restrictive conditions and the number of agreements is smaller than the outcomes of a single agent decision and so less arbitrary.Les oppositions sont intrinsèques aux systèmes multi-agents (SMA) et la négociation est un processus permettant de résoudre ces conflits. Nous nous intéressons ici à la négociation bilatérale mono-attribut. Elle consiste en un échange d'offres pour résoudre un problème de décision collective où les préférences sont partielles, certaines alternatives étant incomparables ou équivalentes. Afin d'évaluer les alternatives du point de vue de la société d'agents, nous raffinons ici le critère de Pareto-optimalité en définissant deux types de compromis. Nous proposons dans cet article un jeu de négociation bilatérale, c'est-à-dire un protocole et deux stratégies qui s'appuient sur des concessions : l'une conciliante et l'autre temporisatrice. Finalement, nous montrons que la première est meilleure socialement et la seconde meilleure individuellement. Nos expériences montrent que temporiser est une stratégie dominante dans un nombre très restreint de situations. De plus, nous observons que le résultat de la négociation est plus restreint que celui d'une décision mono-agent et donc réduit l'arbitraire de la décision