Common Holdings and Strategic Manager Compensation. The Case of an Asymmetric Triopoly

We study an asymmetric triopoly in a heterogeneous product market where quantity decisions are delegated to managers. The two biggest firms are commonly owned by shareholders such as index funds while the smallest firm is owned by independent shareholders. Under such a common holding owner structure, the owners have an incentive to coordinate when designing their manager compensation schemes. This coordination leads to a reallocation of production and induces a redistribution of profits. The trade volume in the market is reduced so that shareholder coordination is detrimental to consumer surplus as well as welfare

Spillover Effects and R&D-Cooperations - The Influence of Market Structure

This paper examines empirically the role of market structure for the influence of spill-over effects on R&D-cooperations. The results of a microeconometric analysis, based on firm data on innovation, let in general presume that with intensified competition also the influence of spillovers on R&D-cooperation increases. However, competition seems to induce firms to search for effective firm-specific appropriation facilities first. Spillovers that are sufficiently high such that the internalisation effect from R&D-cooperation more than outweighs the competitive effect from research, only arise whenever firms are not able to protect their research results through any appropriation facility. Additionally, there is some evidence that spillover effects may even hinder firms from cooperating in R&D when there is intensive competition on the research stage

Die Buchpreisbindung in einem sich ändernden Marktumfeld: Sondergutachten 80

Sondergutachten der Monopolkommission gemäß § 44 Abs. 1 Satz 4 GWB

Zusammenschlussvorhaben der E.ON AG mit der Gelsenberg AG und der E.ON AG mit der Bergemann GmbH

ergänzendes Sondergutachte