Culture Values Entrepreneurship and Growth

We integrate a social norm which associates status to accumulation of capital and consumption into a simple model of endogenous growth. We show that societies which place a greater weight of cultural values on stock of accumulated capital as opposed to consumption will experience fast growth. Our results are consistent with those obtained by Baumol (1990) in the context of entrepreneurship and by Fershtman and Weiss (1991).Entrepreneurship;Culture Values;Social Status;Growth

Family Capitalism Corporate Governance Theory

Family firms, which are prevalent around the world both for small organizations and large corporations, are usually more performant than other types of firms. This paper draws on altruism and on the theory of incentives contracting to explain why family firms perform better. Assuming that altruism only exists in family firms, we show that the strength of family ties has an impact on the optimal contract only under asymmetric information. Then, we extend the analysis to the principal-agent supervisor setting and prove that the recruitment of family members may be seen as a device against collusion within a three-tier hierarchy.Family Capitalism; Altruism; Family Ties ;Asymmetric Information;Supervisor Agent Principal; Collusion

Family Institution and Filial Attention Contract

In this paper, we examine the pure exchange motive for intergenerational transfers within the family. We consider a model where a selfish parent offers a financial transfer in exchange for the services of the child. Using a Stackelberg game, we study the optimal attention-money contract between the generations. We prove that the amount of gift received may be either positively or negatively related with the child's income. In addition, the relationship between the two variables is non linear and affected by the parent's degree of risk aversion. This nonlinearity, which has been largely neglected to date in empirical analyses, may explain why the exchange transfer motive has received little support in developed countries.Family;Filial Attention; Care;intergenerational Transfers; Incentives

Informal Sector and Taxation

In this paper, we present a model of tax evasion in the presence of imperfect auditing. We show that there is a clear link between the degree of observability associated with a given taxpayer or activity and that taxpayer’s optimal declaration strategy with respect to fiscal agency. We also show that the degree of observability is critical in determining the optimal policies to be followed by the fiscal authorities. Our imperfect monitoring approach provides a new strategy for understanding the informal sector in LDCs, which can be interpreted as that group of economic activities characterized by low observability.Informal sector;information and observability;tax evasion;taxation

Bureaucracy and Corruption Taxation Proof

Using the Principal-Agent-Supervisor paradigm, we examine in this paper how a tax collection agency changes optimal schemes in order to lessen the occurrence of bribery between the tax collector and the taxpayer. The Principal, who maximizes the expected net fiscal revenue, reacts by decreasing tax rates when the supervisor is likely to engage in corrupt transaction with taxpayer. The combat against collusion may explain the greater reliance on indirect taxes than on direct taxes both in developed and developing countriesPrincipal Agent Supervisor;Bureaucracy ;Collusion; Tax evasion

Unionized Labor Market and Regulation of Monopoly

In developing countries, empirical evidence suggests that labor unions entail a positive wage gap for unionized workers, in particular in monopolistic and publicly controlled firms. In this paper, we analyze how the presence of a labor union affects the regulation of a monopoly under asymmetric information. Since part of the informational rent left to the monopolistic firm benefits to the syndicate, we prove that the regulator is induced to lower the rent when the union has a large bargaining power. The net consumers' surplus can either increase or decrease with the firm's bargaining power depending on the firm's efficiency type. JELasymmetric Information ;Labor Union ; Monopolistic Firms ; Regulation Incentives

A Theory of Educational Inequality Family and Agency Costs

In this paper, we examine the consequences of imperfect information on the pattern of transfers from parents to children. Drawing on the theory of mechanism design, we consider a model of family contract with two levels of effort. We prove that equal transfers among children are expected under perfect information, while the second-best contract implies risksharing between the two generations, so that poor families experience higher agency costs..Education; Asymmetric Information; Family Financial Incentives; Inequality

Dualisme Migration et Chômage au Maroc

This paper considers the formation of the urban formal ector wages in the presence of rural migration in a collective bargaining framework. We show in particular that the restoration of full employment in the presence of an informal sector can be implemented through a policy of subsidy depends on the preferences of the union and its bargaining power wage. It also depends on the level of rural sector development

Social Security, Endogenous Fertility and the Optimal Family Size

In this paper we analyzed a model of endogenous fertility in presence of financial market assets and social security pensions. Given the children externality and in the absence of corrective policy, the fertility rate chosen in market economy is too low. Indeed, in his optimal choice of family size, the representative household does not take into account of this children externality which leads to a sub optimal demography. We have shown that an optimal demographic allocation exists and can be implemented through a subvention taxation policy if it is availabl

Unemployment and work sharing in an efficiency wage model

This paper accounts for work sharing and unemployment in an efficiency wage model. The Solow condition holds when working hours are exogenous. Under the assumption of endogeneity and using general forms for the effort and cost functions, we prove that work sharing may have a reducing impact on unemployment.efficiency wage