Inequality and Sequence of Economic Liberalization and Democratization

Some recent empirical studies found positive effects of economic liberalization on democratization. Based on these findings, this paper explains why the sequence of economic liberalization and democratization is related to the effects of the two reforms on economic performance. Since economic liberalization increases the probability of democratization and democratization leads to income redistribution, in an economy with large inequality between the elite and the poor, the elite do not implement economic liberalization, and democratization occurs first. In such an economy, the effects of economic liberalization and democratization are lower because of distortions caused by large-scale income redistribution.

INEQUALITY AND SEQUENCE OF ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION

Some recent empirical studies found positive effects of economic liberalization on democratization. Based on these findings, this paper explains why the sequence of economic liberalization and democratization is related to the effects of the two reforms on economic performance. Since economic liberalization increases the probability of democratization and democratization leads to income redistribution, in an economy with large inequality between the elite and the poor, the elite do not implement economic liberalization, and democratization occurs first. In such an economy, the effects of economic liberalization and democratization are lower because of distortions caused by large-scale income redistribution.Economic Liberalization, Democratization, Income Distribution, Dictatorship

Colonial Experience and Postcolonial Underdevelopment in Africa

IIn this paper, we analyze the connection between the history of colonial rule and postcolonial development in Africa. We focus on the fact that many African colonies were governed by indirect rule. Under indirect rule, indigenous people are divided into two groups: a privileged ruling group and an unprivileged ruled group. Our model assumes that the ruled group cannot observe how their deprived resources are divided between the metropolitan ruler and the ruling group. In this economy, a large level of exploitation by the metropolitan ruler yields distrust among indigenous groups and creates a negative effect on postcolonial economic and political development.Africa, colonialism, indirect rule, colonial legacies, ethnic conflict

Political Structure as a Legacy of Indirect Colonial Rule: Bargaining between National Governments and Rural Elites in Africa

Alliances between national governments and rural elites are observed in postcolonial Africa. Governments rely on rural elites to control rural regions, guaranteeing them a degree of authority and revenue in return. This paper provides a model to analyze the forging of such alliances. Without cooperation between the national government and rural elite, the power of the two competing authorities to compel farmers' obedience determines the revenue of the government extracted from cash crop production. Hence, with a powerful rural elite, the national government has a weak bargaining position and agrees to a large transfer to the rural elite. Furthermore, the government's capacity to compel rural residents' obedience is endogenously determined by the level of cash crop production and the power of rural elites. Because indirect colonial rule is a significant source of the elite control over residents in rural areas, cross-regional variations in colonial policies lead to various forms of postcolonial alliances between African national governments and rural elites

Political Structure as a Legacy of Indirect Colonial Rule: Bargaining between National Governments and Rural Elites in Africa

Alliances between national governments and rural elites are observed in post-colonial Africa. In such alliances, the national governments preserve rural-elite authority formed during the colonial era and cede their resources and prerogatives to the rural elites. This paper develops a model of bargaining between a national government and a rural elite, in which the bargaining power of the national government is endogenously explained by the ability of the rural elite to compel obedience from rural residents. Since indirect colonial rule is a significant source of the rural-elite control over residents, the result implies that cross-regional variations in colonial policies lead to variations in the feature of post-colonial alliances between African national governments and rural elites

Political Structure as a Legacy of Indirect Colonial Rule: Bargaining between National Governments and Rural Elites in Africa

Alliances between national governments and rural elites are observed in postcolonial Africa. Governments rely on rural elites to control rural regions, guaranteeing them a degree of authority and revenue in return. This paper provides a model to analyze the forging of such alliances. Without cooperation between the national government and rural elite, the power of the two competing authorities to compel farmers' obedience determines the revenue of the government extracted from cash crop production. Hence, with a powerful rural elite, the national government has a weak bargaining position and agrees to a large transfer to the rural elite. Furthermore, the government's capacity to compel rural residents' obedience is endogenously determined by the level of cash crop production and the power of rural elites. Because indirect colonial rule is a significant source of the elite control over residents in rural areas, cross-regional variations in colonial policies lead to various forms of postcolonial alliances between African national governments and rural elites

Inequality and Economic Development:The Role of Corruption

This paper presents a model where income inequality negatively affects economic growth through corruption by politicians. While politicians pursue corruption rents that reduce the provision of public goods and sacrifice citizen's welfare, they are also concerned about the political support of citizens to maintain their political power. When inequality among citizens is large, political support is less sensitive to corruption. Therefore, large inequality increases corruption and impedes economic growth. Since corruption is more prevalent in poor countries than rich ones, our argument is consistent with the evidence that shows a negative relationship between inequality and growth in poor countries.Corruption, Income Inequality, Economic Growth

Pacemaker implantation via femoral vein and successful arrhythmia management in an elderly patient with Fontan circulation: a case report

Background The frequency of arrhythmias increases after the Fontan operation over time; atrial tachycardia (AT) and sinus node dysfunction (SND) are frequently observed. Case summary Our patient was 63-year-old woman who underwent a lateral tunnel Fontan operation for double outlet right ventricle at age 36. She experienced paroxysmal AT for 1 year, and antiarrhythmic medication was not feasible due to symptomatic SND. Computed tomography revealed a 45 mm-sized thrombus in the high right atrium (RA). The patient had three coexisting conditions: paroxysmal AT, symptomatic SND, and the right atrial thrombus, for which total cavopulmonary connection conversion and epicardial pacemaker implantation (PMI) would have been effective; however, given her age and comorbidities, surgical treatment was considered high risk. Catheter ablation was avoided because of the right atrial thrombus. Finally, a transvenous pacemaker was implanted via the right femoral vein to avoid the right atrial thrombus and severe venous tortuosity from the left subclavian vein to the RA. After PMI, the patient was prescribed amiodarone and bisoprolol for AT suppression. Atrial tachycardia occurred once in the third month after discharge. We increased the dose of amiodarone, and she has been tachycardia-free. Discussion Transvenous PMI must be considered in cases where open thoracic surgery or catheter ablation cannot be performed. This is the first report of transvenous PMI via the right femoral vein and successful AT and SND management in an elderly Fontan patient

α-Synuclein Transgenic Drosophila As a Model of Parkinson's Disease and Related Synucleinopathies

α-Synuclein (α-Syn) is a major component of protein inclusions known as Lewy bodies, which are hallmarks of synucleinopathies such as Parkinson's disease (PD). The α-Syn gene is one of the familial PD-causing genes and is also associated with an increased risk of sporadic PD. Numerous studies using α-Syn expressing transgenic animals have indicated that α-Syn plays a critical role in the common pathogenesis of synucleinopathies. Drosophila melanogaster has several advantages for modeling human neurodegenerative diseases and is widely used for studying their pathomechanisms and therapies. In fact, Drosophila models expressing α-Syn have already been established and proven to replicate several features of human PD. In this paper, we review the current research on synucleinopathies using α-Syn Drosophila models and, moreover, explore the possibilities of these models for comprehensive genetic analyses and large-scale drug screening towards elucidating the molecular pathogenesis and developing therapies for synucleinopathies

Within-group heterogeneity and civil war

This paper provides a bargaining model of conflict in which the government offers a transfer to an opposition group to avoid civil war. Members of the opposition are heterogeneous in income and ideology, and heterogeneity generates disagreement about whether to accept the government's offer. We assume the probability that government's offer avoids conflict increases continuously with the number of opposition group members who agree to accept it. When the within-group heterogeneity is large, the number of members receptive to the government's offer is less responsive to an increase in transfer level. In this situation, the government must raise its transfer substantially to attract support among the opposition. As peace becomes more costly for the government, negotiations are likely to break down