Die Rolle des Internets und sozialer Medien für Radikalisierung und Deradikalisierung

Welche Rolle spielen die Mög­lich­keiten des Inter­nets bei der Ra­di­ka­li­sierung von In­di­vi­duen und Gruppen? Dieser Re­port liefert eine Über­sicht über die be­ste­hende For­schung. Er geht der Frage nach, wie und warum ex­tre­mis­tische Or­ga­ni­sa­tionen und In­di­vi­duen das Inter­net ver­wenden. Darüber hinaus dis­ku­tiert er Mög­lich­keiten (und Grenzen), wie On­line-Ex­tre­mis­mus wirk­sam ent­ge­gen­ge­treten werden kann. Es zeigt sich unter anderem, dass die Nutz­ung von In­ter­net­an­ge­boten durch ex­tre­mis­tische Gruppen oft­mals eher laien­haft und her­kömm­lich ist. Dies sollte auch bei der Ent­wick­lung von Gegen­maß­nahmen be­achtet werden. Reine On­line-Gegen­maß­nahmen stoßen an Grenzen, da Off­line- und On­line-Ra­di­ka­li­sierung auf das engste ver­schränkt sind und nicht ge­trennt be­trachtet werden können. Um der Struk­tur und den Nutzungs­ge­wohn­heiten des Inter­nets ge­recht zu werden, be­darf es einer engen Inter­aktion zwischen öffent­lichen und privaten Ak­teuren in der Stra­te­gie­ent­wick­lung. Der öffent­liche Sek­tor sollte hier An­reize setzen und muss die Kon­se­quenzen von kritischen Maß­nahmen im Bereich der Zen­sur gründ­licher als bis­her ab­wägen

Imitators or Innovators? Comparing Salafi-Jihadist and White Supremacist Attack Planning in the United States

As the threat from white supremacist and Salafi-jihadist extremists to the United States grew in prominence in recent years, the two movements have become the subjects of several comparative studies. These works frequently focus on contrasting their methods of radicalization, recruitment, use of digital communications technologies, and connections to transnational extremist movements, but only a handful concern their methods of planning attacks on American soil. This report seeks to add to this emerging literature by examining what, if any, relationships there are between the tactics and targets chosen by white supremacist and Salafi-jihadist terrorists in America. In doing so, it will also contribute to our understanding of how, and indeed if, modern terrorists in America are learning from each other or from the current American counterterrorism posture. This report finds that: ● Jihadist and white supremacist attack planners in the U.S. selected different targets for their attacks. Jihadists tended towards attacking “hard targets” (for instance, military bases and law enforcement facilities) and devising plots to assassinate individuals. White supremacists erred towards “soft targets,” especially religious institutions and houses of worship. ● Jihadists were more likely than white supremacists to consider multiple targets for their attacks. ● The tactics of jihadists and white supremacists were relatively similar in frequency to one another. Both movements’ attack plotters relied heavily on plots involving firearms and explosives, but also experimented with non-conventional means such as vehicle rammings, arson, and train derailments. ● Despite some evidence of ideological cross-pollination, particularly in the form of manifestos and instructional material, evidence of direct learning between jihadist and white supremacist attack planners in the U.S. is limited. ● Independent innovation in the face of U.S. domestic counterterrorism approaches is a more likely explanation for similarities in targets and tactics between white supremacists and jihadists than cross-group tactical imitatio

Maintaining the Movement: ISIS Outreach to Westerners in the Post-Caliphate Era

Since the fall of the Caliphate, the activities and overall threat posed by Western jihadists has undoubtedly diminished.1 A recent study released by the Program on Extremism, for example, demonstrated a steady decline in jihadist activity in the United States (U.S.) since 2020. In this three-year period, only twenty-nine Americans have been charged, compared to eighty-two in the previous three years.2 Similarly, Europe has experienced a steady annual reduction in jihadist arrests from 718 in 2016 to 260 in 2021.3 This is the second period since 9/11 where there has been a marked decline in the ability to radicalize and mobilize people to support the jihadi movement or conduct attacks in the West.4 Whether or not the cycle of (relative) success and decline will repeat itself depends on a number of factors, some of which are harder to predict than others. What is clear for now is that there remains a pool of committed Western jihadists who are working to keep the movement alive in the U.S. and Europe in hope that future opportunities for mass mobilization may arise. This report investigates how Western jihadists and efforts to radicalize Westerners have adapted to the post-Caliphate reality and the current downward trajectory and complements the Program’s recent quantitative analysis of the Islamic State (IS) threat in the U.S. Some Western jihadi strategies have remained the same, such as the calls to conduct lone actor attacks in the West. However, there have been some marked shifts in strategic communications. For instance, in some cases the discourse about Muslim grievances resembles those that were prevalent during the previous lull in Western jihadist activity, such as a refocusing on Muslim prisoners in the West. The report opens with an overview of how Western jihadists have responded to the online post-Caliphate world in which many of the online platforms popular among jihadists have become increasingly proactive in removing jihadist accounts and content. Here, there is evidence of a reversion to an earlier, pre-Caliphate, era of online jihadism in which much activity and file sharing took place on forums rather than mainstream social media platforms. Following this, the study introduces the ideologues and propaganda that currently define the state of jihadism in the West. One key development has been recent releases from prison, or removal of communication restrictions, of influential ideologues such as Ahmad Musa Jibril and Anjem Choudary. Finally, the report addresses how jihadist output aimed at Westerners, produced by sympathizers and official jihadist group media wings, has responded to the fall of the Caliphate. This section will analyze the discourse around new or re-emerging themes in the jihadist media, focusing on two prevalent issues – the fight to release imprisoned jihadists, and the response and narrative around the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Islamist Homophobia in the West: From Rhetoric to Violence

Executive Summary The global LGBTQIA+ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer/questioning, intersex and asexual/aromantic/agender) community has historically been subjected to hateful rhetoric, discriminatory practices and acts of violence. In the West, this animosity has traditionally mostly originated from a heterogeneous array of actors that can broadly be identified with the far-right. And while in recent years the LBGTQIA+ community has received rights and a degree of acceptance largely unthinkable only a few decades ago, episodes of intolerance and violence are still very much present. Recently, for example, in June 2022, authorities detained 31 members of a white nationalist group called Patriot Front who were allegedly about to attack the Pride in the Park event in Coeur d\u27Alene, Idaho.1 If animosity against the LGBTQIA+ community from right wing circles is a well-known and fairly uncontested topic, less so is that originating from Islamist milieus.2 Yet, an abundance of evidence indicates that, over the last few decades, hateful rhetoric and occasional acts of violence against the LGBTQIA+ community in the United States and virtually all other Western countries have increasingly come from Islamist actors. Both in the Muslim world and in the West, mainstream Islamists, such as those from Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist backgrounds, depict homosexuality as a perversion and a grave sin. Islamist anti-LGBTQIA+ rhetoric takes different angles. At times, it focuses on warning the Muslim community about engaging in homosexual acts, evoking the divine punishments that await those who do so. In line with some Christian fundamentalists, natural events such as hurricanes and earthquakes or diseases like AIDS are also painted as divine punishments against homosexuality. A substantial part of the messaging also views homosexuality and gay rights as a Western plot devised to pervert and weaken Muslims. This report documents several instances of preachers and top-ranking officials linked to prominent Islamist organizations in the U.S. and Europe, several of whom are engaged as partners by Western governments and civil society, that espouse such views. Most Islamists agree that punishment of homosexuals is the responsibility of God, and not of ordinary Muslims. Nevertheless, it is not uncommon for Islamist preachers to speak about homosexuals with extremely hateful characterizations and invoke brutal punishments against them, contributing to a hate-filled atmosphere which can influence individuals with more immediate violent intentions. Jihadist groups adopt even more extreme positions on homosexuality and justify killing those who engage in it. The Islamic State has been particularly ruthless in its persecution of homosexuals, enacting theatrical executions of individuals it accused of being gay and broadcasting them when it controlled territory in Syria and Iraq. Like antisemitism, anti-Shi’a sectarianism, and views on blasphemy and/or apostasy, homophobia is a bridge issue linking Western non-violent Islamists and their jihadist counterparts. Despite their disagreements about the precise conditions for applying the death penalty against LGBTQIA+ individuals, which remains a matter of great dispute between the factions, an emerging consensus connects Islamists of all stripes, particularly in the West. First, Islamists and jihadists alike view homosexuality--active or passive--as a grave sin, entailing some form of divine retribution. Second, figures on both sides have expressed their views that the promotion of “LGBTQIA+ ideology” is part of a grand conspiracy by Western countries to dissuade Muslims from living out their faith, and that calamities that befall Western countries are a result of divine judgement against them. Lastly, certain prominent Islamists concur with the jihadist viewpoint that, in an ideal Islamic state, the death penalty should be enforced against homosexuals. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that in recent years the LGBTQIA+ community in the West has suffered a series of terrorist attacks perpetrated by individuals inspired by Islamist and/or jihadist ideology. Successful attacks against LGBTQIA+ targets were carried out in Orlando, Florida (2016, 49 killed), Dresden, Germany (2020, 1 killed), and Oslo, Norway (2022, 2 killed); other attacks were foiled in France, the Netherlands, the U.S. and the UK. In order to provide a general overview of these dynamics, this report will first outline the main Islamist viewpoints on homosexuality. It will then provide examples of how Western-based Islamist actors have framed the issue, examine the views and actions of jihadist groups like the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, and finally conclude with an analysis of terrorist attacks perpetrated or planned by individuals motivated by Islamist/jihadist ideology against LGBTQIA+ targets in the West

The Age of Incoherence? Understanding Mixed and Unclear Ideology Extremism

In May 2019, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) issued an intelligence bulletin that included one of the first official acknowledgments of what they and other similar agencies in the West identified as an emerging violent extremist threat. It warned that “anti-government, identity based, and fringe political conspiracy theories” were playing an increasing role in motivating domestic extremists to commit criminal, sometimes violent, acts. Since then, officials have also noted the emergence of individuals acting based on “salad bar ideology” extremism, a term used in 2020 by FBI Director Christopher Wray to describe the nature of some of the recent violent extremist threats. Their ideologies, according to Director Wray, “are kind of a jumble…a mixture of ideologies that don’t fit together.” He went on to say that some extremists “take a mish mash of different kinds of ideologies often that don’t fit coherently together, and sometimes are even in tension with each other, and mix them with some kind of personal grievance,” to justify their attack. Director Wray concluded that “it’s more about the violence than it is about the ideology.” In the years since the FBI’s warning, other Western countries have expressed similar concerns about this evolution of the terrorist threat. In the United Kingdom (U.K.), the government’s Channel project has seen a spike in referrals of individuals classified as having a “mixed, unstable or unclear ideology” since 2020. This category now represents the majority of referrals, and includes individuals who “show an interest in multiple extremist ideologies at the same time” or who “switch from one ideology to another over time.” New Zealand has also begun to identify this as a policy concern, noting in its 2021 counterterrorism strategy that “violent extremism is an evolving threat, driven by increasingly complex and convoluted ideologies.

ANTISEMITISM AS AN UNDERLYING PRECURSOR TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN AMERICAN FAR-RIGHT AND ISLAMIST CONTEXTS

Executive Summary Antisemitism is pervasive throughout several categories of American extremist movements, both violent and non-violent. American extremists incorporate antisemitic tropes and narratives in every level of their worldviews, using them to help construct “us/them” dichotomies and wide-sweeping conspiracies that are essential to their movements. During the past several decades, the American extremist movements that have been among the most violent—specifically, far-right and jihadist groups—have used antisemitism to target Jewish people, Jewish houses of worship, Jewish community institutions, and Americans supporting the Jewish state of Israel. Antisemitism, as a belief and world-structuring theory, can at times serve as a gateway issue for individuals into further radicalization to violent extremism. Non-violent and violent iterations of the same extremist milieus often share antisemitic views as central elements of their belief system, and thus antisemitism constitutes a linkage between activist and violent extremist segments of the same movement. Several case studies of violent American extremists, representing far-right and jihadist movements respectively, demonstrate that antisemitism can be an integral part of American extremists’ progression through the radicalization process and in justifying terrorist attacks. Based on this report’s finding that antisemitism is foundational to multiple violent extremist movements in the United States, counter-extremism practitioners and scholars may consider incorporating antisemitism as a diagnostic factor for extremist radicalization. o While there is no single profile of an American extremist, antisemitism has long been widespread among American extremist movements of multiple persuasions, acting as a least common denominator between extremist groups. o Antisemitic beliefs often serve as a key entry point for individuals to radicalize, join extremist groups, and progress into violent mobilization. o By using promotion of antisemitism as a factor in identifying key influencers and ideologues in extremist movements, Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programming can isolate key nodes in extremist groups and debunk the narratives they promote without engaging in theological debates. Studying the role of antisemitism in extremist groups can assist scholars in identifying common themes between different types of extremism, as well as between non-violent and violent strands of the same extremist movements. This can improve analysis on the broader relationships between and within extremist groups

RISE OF THE REACTIONARIES: COMPARING THE IDEOLOGIES OF SALAFI-JIHADISM AND WHITE SUPREMACIST EXTREMISM

Executive Summary Salafi-jihadism and right-wing white supremacist extremism are two of the most visible, active, and threatening violent extremist movements operating in the West today, responsible for dozens of attacks throughout North America and Western Europe. With the increased threat of white supremacist terrorism in the West have also come questions about its relationship to jihadist terrorism. This study provides an assessment of the ideological similarities between the two movements, concluding that they share key traits and political outlooks, some of which have become increasingly widespread over recent years in the Western world and beyond. Firstly, these forms of extremism are the most violent iterations of their respective movements. Jihadists are the ideological fringe of the wider Islamist movement, while white supremacist extremists emerge from more mainstream, right-wing white identity and supremacist politics. They are both reactionary political movements. They treat any form of social or political progress, reform, or liberalization with great suspicion, viewing these chiefly as a threat to their respective ‘in-groups’. In this sense, jihadists too are extreme right-wing actors even if they are rarely referred to in such terms. Both movements share a similar underlying diagnosis for the ills of their respective societies, placing blame primarily on the forces of liberal progress, pluralism, and tolerance. Connected to this are white supremacist and jihadist constructions of chauvinist and hyper-masculine collective identities and their dehumanization of ‘out-groups’. Both movements have developed a strong, historically grounded collective identity coupled with a sense of superiority and a requirement that the in-group view those on the outside as both inferior and inherently threatening. While these identities differ in their content, there are similarities in their underlying structure. What is on offer in both cases is not only a strong sense of identity and belonging which is rooted in a glorious past, but also new meaning derived from seeing oneself as a historic project to save or cure humanity. Thus, while the term ‘supremacist’ is generally reserved for the extreme right in popular discourse, it too is an accurate description of how jihadists view their position in the world. As both movements share an ultra-conservative reactionary outlook, they also hold similar views on the traditional gender roles of men and women in society. Both movements rely heavily on reinforcing these roles, with a particular interest in supposedly recapturing ‘true’ masculinity through hyper-masculine portrayals of their most heroic members. Jihadists and white supremacist extremists also share similar ways of thinking about the threats they perceive their respective in-groups as facing. In both cases, the threat is viewed as a wide-ranging conspiracy which seeks to annihilate them. For jihadists, Muslims face a “war on Islam,” while white supremacist extremists warn of a “white genocide” or “great replacement” of white populations. While different in context and language, the content of both conspiracy theories is similar, including the virulent antisemitism which undergirds them. Both existential threat conspiracy narratives are also concerned with the preservation of purity, which is seen as under threat due to the deliberate actions of the enemy. These extremist movements have also made significant efforts to prove both the legitimacy and necessity of violence for the protection of their in-group and its interests. Both seek to either take part in, or be the catalyst of, a violent conflict, be it a race or holy war. Not only must fighting be used to save and protect those under threat, but it also serves as a means to a glorious end in which humanity will live in peace and prosperity Thus, through their activism and acts of terrorism, they both hope to achieve the establishment of utopian societies in which their in-group reigns supreme at the cost of most, if not all, others. Due to their reactionary tendencies, they also share a belief that the blueprint for this idealized society can be found in a past civilization or society that was destroyed or dismantled at the hands of nefarious forces pursuing a conspiracy to weaken and subjugate them. The imagined white ethnostate and the Islamic state to which the movements are respectively committed are, in most cases, totalitarian in nature. In order to function as intended, both require strict control over many aspects of citizens’ lives to maintain both the order and purity they desir