Does Social Insurance Help Secure Property Rights?

This paper develops a simple model to show how social insurance affects the desire to revolt against property rights. It then tests for the effect of social insurance on revolt by introducing a panel data set derived from surveys across 200,000 randomly sampled individuals from the 1970s to the 1990s. After controlling for the personal characteristics of respondents, country fixed effects, year dummies, as well as country-specific time trends, fewer people are found to support revolt when the generosity of either the elderly person's social security or unemployment benefits increases. A one standard deviation change in either variable explains approximately one standard deviation of the proportion of people supporting revolt, measured across the countries and years in the sample. The personal characteristic with the largest effect on reducing revolutionary support is being religious.Social Insrance, Property Rights, Revolt.

Stefania evansi

Number of Pages: 3Integrative BiologyGeological Science

Culture, beliefs and economic performance

Beliefs are one component of culture. Data from the World Values Survey is available on a subset of beliefs concerning (broadly) meritocracy and poverty that appear relevant for economics. We document how they vary as well as their distribution across countries. We then correlate these measures of beliefs with economic growth and compare them with institutional and geographical determinants of income. A strong negative relationship is found between leftist economic beliefs and growth but little evidence is found of a relationship with respect to non-economic beliefs. Finally, we briefly discuss some causal effects on beliefs. The evidence suggests that higher country risk and more dependence on natural resources shifts nations to a more leftist set of economic beliefs. Overall the evidence supports the view that cultural specificities may explain why certain institutions cannot be transplanted between nations with different cultural histories and underlines the limit to policy activism

The Role of Freedom, Growth and Religion in the Taste for Revolution

A fundamental question about the determinants of civil conflict is the relative importance of political freedoms versus economic development. This paper takes a new approach to provide an answer by using micro-data based on surveys of revolutionary tastes of 130,000 people living in 61 nations between 1981 and 1997. Controlling for personal characteristics, country and year fixed effects, more freedom and economic growth both reduce revolutionary support. Losing one level of freedom, equivalent to a shift from the US to Turkey, increases support for revolt by 4 percentage points. To reduce support by the same amount requires adding 14 percentage points onto the GDP growth rate. Being Muslim in a free country has no effect on the probability of supporting revolt compared to a non-religious person. However being Muslim in a country that is not free increases it by 13 percentage points. Being Christian in a free country decreases the chance of supporting revolt by 4 percentage points, compared to a non-religious person, and in a not-free country by 1 percentage point.revolution, freedom, development, growth, religion

Informal family insurance and the design of the welfare state

We study the problem of unemployment benefit provision when the family is also a provider of social insurance. As a benchmark, a simple model is presented where risksharing motives govern intra-family transfers and more generous unemployment benefits, provided by the State, crowd out family risk-sharing arrangements one-forone. The model is then extended to capture the idea that the State has an advantage vis-a-vis the family in the provision of insurance because it can tax individuals, whereas the family must rely on self-enforcing agreements. In this case, the effect of State transfers on intra-family transfers is found to be more than one-for-one. Thus, somewhat perversely, both informal transfers and total insurance transfers to the unemployed fall as the State's generosity increases. This does not imply that the optimal Welfare State is zero. Our results still hold when families are assumed to be better than the State at monitoring the job search activities of the unemployed. --Self-enforcing contracts,Optimal welfare generosity

The determination of unemployment benefits

While much empirical research has been done on the labour market consequences of unemployment benefits, there is remarkably little evidence on the forces determining benefits. The paper presents a simple model where workers desire insurance against the possibility of unemployment and unemployment benefits increase the unemployment rate. We then conduct, what we believe, is one of the first empirical analyses of the determinants of the parameters of the unemployment benefit system. Using OECD data for 1971-1989, controlling for year and country fixed effects, and controlling for the political colour of the government, we find evidence suggesting that benefits fall when the unemployment rate is high. This is consistent with the tax-effect described in Wright (1986) and Atkinson (1990). There is weaker evidence that benefits increase with positive changes in the unemployment rate, which may be proxying for the inflow rate and could be called an insurance effect. --endogenous unemployment benefits,unemployment,politics

The Role of Freedom, Growth and Religion in the Taste for Revolution

A fundamental issue for economists is what determines civil conflict. One unsettled question is the relative importance of political freedoms versus economic development. This paper takes a new approach to provide an answer by using micro-data based on surveys of revolutionary preferences of 130,000 people living in 61 nations between 1980 and 1997. Controlling for personal characteristics, country and year fixed effects, more freedom and economic growth both reduce revolutionary support. Losing one level of freedom, equivalent to a shift from the US to Turkey, increases support for revolt by 4 percentage points. To reduce support by the same amount requires adding 14 percentage points on to the GDP growth rate. Being Muslim in a free country has no effect on the probability of supporting revolt compared to a non-religious person. However, being Muslim in a country that is not free increases it by 13 percentage points. Being Christian in a free country decreases the chance of supporting revolt by 4 percentage points, compared to a non-religious person, and in a not-free country by 1 percentage point.Conflict, freedom, development, growth, religion.

The consequences of labour market flexibility: Panel evidence based on survey data

We introduce a new data set on hiring and firing restrictions for 21 OECD countries for the period 1984-90. The data are based on surveys of business people in the countries covered, so the indices we use are subjective in nature. Controlling for country and time fixed effects, and using dynamic panel data techniques, we find evidence that increasing the flexibility of the labor market increases both the employment rate and the rate of participation in the labor force. A conservative estimate suggests that if France were to make its labor markets as flexible as those in the US, its employment rate would increase 1.6 percentage points, or 14% of the employment gap between the two countries. The estimated effects are larger in the female than in the male labor market, although both groups seem to have similar long run coefficients. There is also some evidence that more flexibility leads to lower unemployment rates and to lower rates of long-term unemployment. The analysis of inflows and vacancies present some inconsistencies, although there is some evidence that the correlation between inflows and the business cycle is stronger in more flexible labor markets (again this is stronger for females). We also find some evidence consistent with the hypothesis that inflexible labor markets produce “jobless recoveries” and introduce more unemployment persistence. --Job security provisions,subjective data,employment,unemployment

Partisan social happiness

We use data on the subjective well-being of more than a quarter of a million people living in the OECD over the period 1975-92 to study the behavior of partisan social happiness functions. Controlling for personal characteristics of the respondents, year and country fixed effects and country specific time trends, we find that the data describe social happiness functions for left-wing and right-wing individuals where inflation and unemployment enter negatively. We use these functions to test the root assumption of partisan business cycle models where leftwing individuals care more about unemployment relative to inflation than rightwingers (e.g. Alesina (1987)). Bootstrap confidence intervals suggest that up to 90 per cent of the time the evidence is consistent with this assumption. We also find that left-wingers like increases in government consumption more than rightwingers, that the latter have become more concerned with inflation over time and that the poor (rich) behave differently from the left (right). Finally, we find that individuals declare themselves to be happier when the party they support is in power, even after controlling for economic variables. Our findings are hard to explain using median voter models but are to be expected in a partisan world. --Median voter,partisan business cycles,subjective well-being

Why Doesn't Capitalism Flow to Poor Countries?

macroeconomics, international, capitalism, regulation, poor countries