Testing the Framework of Other-Regarding Preferences

We assess the empirical validity of the overall theoretical framework of other-regarding preferences by focusing on those preference axioms that are common to all the prominent theories of outcome-based other-regarding preferences. This common set of preference axioms leads to a testable implication: the strict preference ranking of self over a finite number of alternatives lying on any straight line in the space of material payoffs to self and other will be single-peaked. The extent of single-peakedness varies from a high of 79% to a low of 54% across our treatments that are based on dictator and trust games. Positively and/or negatively other-regarding subjects are significantly less likely to report single-peaked rankings relative to self-regarding subjects. We delineate the potential reasons for violations of single-peakedness and discuss the implications of our findings for theoretical modeling of other-regarding preferences.Other-regarding preferences, social preferences, decision making under risk, single-peaked preferences, experiments

Ranking alternatives by a fair bidding rule: a theoretical and experimental analysis

We introduce a procedurally fair rule to study a situation where people disagree about the value of three alternatives in the way captured by the voting paradox. The rule allows people to select a final collective ranking by submitting a bid vector with six components (the six possible rankings of the three alternatives). In a laboratory experiment we test the robustness of the rule to the introduction of subsidies and taxes. We have two main results. First, in all treatments, the most frequently chosen ranking is the socially efficient one. Second, subsidies slightly enhance overbidding. Furthermore, an analysis of individual bid vectors reveals interesting behavioral regularities.Bidding behavior, Procedural fairness, Voting paradox

A voluntary contribution experiment with one-way communication and income heterogeneity

One-way communication has been found to substantially increase contributions in linear voluntary contribution mechanisms. We confirm the robustness of this result in the presence of income heterogeneity.Public goods experiment, Cheap talk, Heterogeneous en- dowments

(Over-)Stylizing Experimental Findings and Theorizing with Sweeping Generality

Human decision making is a process guided by different and partly competing motivations that can each dominate behavior and lead to different effects depending on strength and circumstances. 'Over-stylizing' neglects such competing concerns and context-dependence, although it facilitates the emergence of elaborate general theories. We illustrate by examples from social dilemma experiments and inequality aversion theories that sweeping empirical claims should be avoided.decision theory, social dilemmas, inequality aversion, behavioral economics, experimental economics

Does procedural fairness crowd out other-regarding concerns? A bidding experiment

Bidding rules that guarantee procedural fairness may induce more equilibrium bidding and moderate other-regarding concerns. In our experiment, we assume commonly known true values and only two bidders to implement a best-case scenario for other-regarding concerns. The two-by-two factorial design varies ownership of the single indivisible commodity (an outside seller versus collective ownership) and the price rule (first versus second price). Our results indicate more equilibrium behavior under the procedurally fair price rule, what, however, does not completely crowd out equality and efficiency seekinAuctions, Fair Division Games, Procedural fairness

Testing the Modigliani-Miller theorem directly in the lab

We present an experiment designed to test the Modigliani-Miller theorem. Applying a general equilibrium approach and not allowing for arbitrage among firms with different capital structures, we find that, in accordance with the theorem, participants well recognize changes in the systematic risk of equity associated with increasing leverage and, accordingly, demand higher rate of return. Yet, this adjustment is not perfect: subjects underestimate the systematic risk of low-leveraged equity whereas they overestimate the systematic risk of high-leveraged equity, resulting in a U-shaped cost of capital. A (control) individual decision-making experiment, eliciting several points on individual demand and supply curves for shares, provides some support for the theoreModigliani-Miller theorem, Experiments, Decision making under risk, General equilibrium

"One man's meat is another man's poison." An experimental study of voluntarily providing public projects that raise mixed feelings.

We compare, on the basis of a procedurally fair "provision point" mechanism, bids for a public project from which some gain and some lose with bids for a less efficient public project from which all gain. In the main treatment, participants independently decide which one, if any, of the public projects should be implemented. We also run control treatments where only one of the two projects can be implemented. We find that (a) mixed feelings per se do not affect bidding behavior, and (b) the provision frequency of the project that raises mixed feelings declines significantly when it faces competition from the public good.Public project, Bidding behavior, Procedural fairness

Crossing the Point of No Return: A Public Goods Experiment

Participants in a public goods experiment receive private or common signals regarding the so-called "point of no return", meaning that if the group's total contribution falls below this point, all payoffs are reduced. An individual faces the usual conflict between private and collective interests above the point of no return, while he incurs the risk of damaging everyone by not surpassing the point. Our data reveal that contributions are higher if the cost of not reaching the threshold is high. In particular if the signal is private, many subjects are not willing to provide the necessary contribution.Public goods, provision point mechanism, experiments, reduction factor, signal

Leading by Words: A Voluntary Contribution Experiment With One-Way Communication

In this paper, we study a voluntary contribution mechanism with one-way communication. The relevance of one person's words is assessed by assigning exogenously the role of the "communicator" to one group member. Contrary to the view that the mutual exchange of promises is necessary for the cooperation-enhancing effect of communication, we ï¬nd that, compared to a standard voluntary contribution mechanism with no communication, one-way communication signiï¬cantly increases contributions and renders them stable over time. Moreover, the positive effects of one-way communication persist even when communication is one-shot.Public goods experiment, Computer-mediated communication, Cheap-talk, Cooperation

Imperfect Recall and Time Inconsistencies: An experimental test of the absentminded driver "paradox"

Absentmindedness is a special case of imperfect recall which according to Piccione and Rubinstein (1997a) leads to time inconsistencies. Aumann, Hart and Perry (1997a) question their argument and show how dynamic inconsistencies can be resolved. The present paper explores this issue from a descriptive point of view by examining the behavior of absentminded individuals in a laboratory environment. Absentmindedness is manipulated in two ways. In one treatment, it is induced by cognitively overloading participants. In the other, it is imposed by randomly matching decisions with decision nodes in the information set. The results provide evidence for time inconsistencies in all treatments. We introduce a behavioral principal, which best explains the data.imperfect recall, absentmindedness, dynamic inconsistency, experiment