Privatization with Government Control: Evidence from the Russian Oil Sector

Governments that privatize state industries often retain control over key distribution assets. While there are many examples of this form of partial privatization, to our knowledge there are no substantial quantitative studies of how governments use their control under these circumstances. In this paper we argue that the Russian government privatization of the oil sector during 1994-2003 is a useful case study because the federal government privatized oil production but retained monopoly control rights over the transport of crude onto world markets. Based on a simple analysis of the costs and benefits of control and ownership, we argue that that in these circumstances the federal government would use its control over transport capacity to provide privileged access to those companies over which it has influence. We find that in 2003 this is indeed the case and that this system detracted from economic efficiency. In particular, private and regionally owned companies had to be much more productive than companies over which the federal government (the state) had influence to receive comparable access to world markets; state-influence companies had preferential access to routes with more capacity; and, the allocation of route capacity was sensitive to transport costs only in the state-influence sector.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/57206/1/wp826 .pd

Initial Conditions, Institutional Dynamics and Economic Performance: Evidence from the American States

Using state-level data from the United States, we find that differences in colonial legal institutions affect the current quality of state legal institutions. These differences in colonial legal institutions arose because some states were settled by Great Britain, a common law country, and other states were settled by France, Spain, and Mexico, all civil law countries. To explain these findings, we develop a transplant-civil law hypothesis that highlights the disruption associated with large-scale legal transplantation and the possible relative inefficiencies of colonial civil law. We find strong support for the transplant-civil law hypothesis. Our results are robust to inclusion of additional variables capturing climate, geography, initial population and resource endowments. Given the 150-200 year gap between the initial conditions and the measures of the current quality of legal institutions, we provide indirect evidence on the persistence of legal institutions. We then use initial legal systems and climate to quantify the substantial impact of current institutions on current economic performance.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40001/3/wp615.pd

Patterns of Singularity: The Motivations of Independent Jewish Funders in Times of Economic Distress

This study explores the motivations of independent Jewish funders, focusing on their support for "independent, innovative initiatives" in Jewish life. Both benefactors and beneficiaries ask: how can other Jewish philanthropists be persuaded to join in supporting new independent and innovative endeavors in Jewish life -- and how can we do so in the midst of an economic downturn

Policy Reform and Growth in Post-Soviet Russia

In pursuit of its transition from a command to a market economy, Russia has witnessed enormous regional differences in economic growth rates. Moreover, the implementation of economic reforms has also differed markedly across regions. We analyze whether regional differences in reform policies can account for regional differences in growth rates, and conclude that to a considerable degree, they can. Most notably, we find that regional differences in price liberalization policies exhibit a positive direct correspondence with growth. We also find that regional differences in large-scale privatization exhibit a positive correspondence with the regional formation of new legal enterprises, which in turn exhibits a strong positive correspondence with growth.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39789/3/wp405.pd

The Madoff paradox: American Jewish sage, savior, and thief

Bernie Madoff perpetrated a Ponzi scheme on a scale that was gargantuan even compared with the outrageously destructive Enron and Worldcom debacles. A major aspect of the Madoff story is his rise as a specifically American Jewish type, who self-consciously exploited stereotypes to inspire trust and confidence in his counsel. Styling himself as a benefactor and protector of Jews as individuals and institutional Jewish interests, and possibly in the guise of the Jewish historical trope of shtadlan (intercessor), he was willing to threaten the well-being of all those enmeshed in his empire. The license granted to Madoff stemmed in part from the extent to which he appeared to diverge from earlier Jewish financial titans, such as Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken, in that he epitomized an absolute “insider” – as opposed to an “outsider” or marginal figure. In reality he had none of the supposedly humane virtues attributed to Jewish crooks, at least in the realm of popular culture