Towards construction of analog solver of Schroedinger and Ginzburg-Landau equation based on Long Line

The analog electronic computers are a type of circuitry used to calculate specific problems using the physical relationships between the voltages and currents following classical laws of physics. One specific class of these circuits are computers based on the interactions between passive circuit elements. Models presented by G.Kron in 1945 are the example of using such passive elements to construct a solver for the problem of free quantum particles confined by rectangular potential. Numerical validation of Kron second model is conducted for different shapes of particle confining potential. Model introduced by Kron is generalized by introduction of non-linear resistive elements what implies deformation of Schr\"odinger equation solution into Ginzburg-Landau form.Comment: 11 pages, 6 figure

Bogomolny approach in description of superconducting structures

Bogomolny approach in the context of strong necessary conditions is formulated for the case of various superconducting and semiconductor structures. Certain results were obtained for a constant magnetic field, which experimentally corresponds to spiral-like superconducting cable placed inside solenoid.Comment: 12 pages, 1 figur

Decoding Inside Information

Using a simple empirical strategy, we decode the information in insider trades. Exploiting the fact that insiders trade for a variety of reasons, we show that there is predictable, identifiable “routine” insider trading that is not informative for the future of firms. Stripping away these routine trades, which comprise over half the entire universe of insider trades, leaves a set of information-rich “opportunistic” trades that contains all the predictive power in the insider trading universe. A portfolio strategy that focuses solely on opportunistic insider trades yields value-weight abnormal returns of 82 basis points per month, while the abnormal returns associated with routine traders are essentially zero. Further, opportunistic trades predict future news and events at a firm level, while routine trades do not.

Decoding Inside Information

Using a simple empirical strategy, we decode the information in insider trading. Exploiting the fact that insiders trade for a variety of reasons, we show that there is predictable, identifiable "routine" insider trading that is not informative for the future of firms. Stripping away the trades of routine insiders leaves a set of information-rich trades by "opportunistic" insiders that contain all the predictive power in the insider trading universe. A portfolio strategy that focuses solely on opportunistic traders yields value-weighted abnormal returns of 82 basis points per month, while the abnormal returns associated with routine traders are essentially zero. Further, opportunistic insiders predict future firm-specific news, as well as announcement returns around future analyst forecasts, management forecasts, and earnings announcements, while routine traders do not. The most informed opportunistic traders are local non-senior insiders, who come from geographically concentrated, poorly governed firms. Lastly, opportunistic traders are significantly more likely to have SEC enforcement action taken against them and reduce their trading following waves of SEC insider trading enforcement

When is Bargaining Successful? Negotiated Division of Tournament Prizes

We study bargaining at the end of high-stakes poker tournaments, in which participants often negotiate a division of the prize money rather than bear the risk of playing the game until the end. This setting is ideal for studying bargaining: the stakes are substantial, there are no restrictions on the negotiations or the terms of a deal, outside options are clearly defined, there are no agency conflicts, and there is little private information. Even in this setting, we find that risk-reducing deals often are not completed or even proposed. As expected, we find that players are more likely to negotiate when the gains to trade are large and when the coordination costs are lower. Surprisingly, although the likelihood of a successful deal is increasing in the stakes, this relation is driven only by the tournaments with the very largest prizes. It is also puzzling that the success of a proposal depends on who makes it, but initiating a proposal does not affect the proposing player's payoff in a completed deal. Divisions of prizes are closely related to players' outside options, while at the same time one of two focal points are often chosen. We also find intriguing differences between two-player deals and deals with three or more players.Bargaining; Negotiations; Poker