16 research outputs found

    Genocide and Land Scarcity: Can Rwandan Rural Households Manage?

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    During the nineties, Rwandan households had to cope with severe shocks of war and genocide. In addition, two major structural problems in Rwanda, land scarcity and declining soil fertility, remain unsolved. How do Rwandan households manage? This is an important question from a development perspective, but also from a security perspective, because uneven development increases the risk of peace collapse. To find an answer to our question, we study welfare gains and losses of a sample of 189 Rwandan rural households over the period 1990-2002. In our sample, many households were severely affected by the genocide. In addition, poverty and inequality increased. Moreover, we observe a lot of income mobility. Only one quarter of the households remained in the same income quintile over time. Especially the households headed by widows and prisoner's wives moved downward in the income distribution. Households who reduced their dependence on subsistence agriculture moved upward.

    Dictatorship in a Single Export Crop Economy

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    Is it a matter of pure altruism or shortsightedness when a dictator spends an increasing amount of his revenues for the population, while cutting on own consumption? In order to be able to consume, the dictator first has to stay in power. We present a formal model of a power maximizing dictator. His revenues depend on the exports of a single crop. With the export earnings the dictator buys loyalty from the producers of the export crop by setting the domestic producer price. Revenues resulting from the di®erence between the international and the domestic price of the crop are used to finance a repressive apparatus. We characterize the optimal trade-o® between buying more loyalty and adapting the level of repression. The model is illustrated with a case study of Rwanda under president Habyarimana (1973-94).dictatorship, political economy, co®ee, Rwanda.

    Dictatorship in a single export crop economy

    Get PDF
    Is it a matter of pure altruism or short-sightedness when a dictator spends an increasing amount of his revenues for the population, while cutting on own consumption? In order to be able to consume, the dictator first has to stay in power. We present a formal model of a power maximizing dictator. His revenues depend on the exports of a single crop. With the export earnings the dictator buys loyalty from the producers of the export crop by setting the domestic producer price. Revenues resulting from the difference between the international and the domestic price of the crop are used to finance a repressive apparatus. We characterize the optimal trade-off between buying more loyalty and adapting the level of repression. The model is illustrated with a case study of Rwanda under president Habyarimana (1973-94).dictatorship, political economy, coffee, Rwanda.

    Genocide and land scarcity: Can Rwandan rural households manage?

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    During the nineties, Rwandan households had to cope with severe shocks of war and genocide. In addition, two major structural problems in Rwanda, land scarcity and declining soil fertility, remain unsolved. How do Rwandan households manage? This is an important question from a development perspective, but also from a security perspective, because uneven development increases the risk of peace collapse. To find an answer to our question, we study welfare gains and losses of a sample of 189 Rwandan rural households over the period 1990-2002. In our sample, many households were severely affected by the genocide. In addition, poverty and inequality increased. Moreover, we observe a lot of income mobility. Only one quarter of the households remained in the same income quintile over time. Especially the households headed by widows and prisoner’s wives moved downward in the income distribution. Households who reduced their dependence on subsistence agriculture moved upward

    Economic Mobility in Rural Rwanda: A Study of the Effects of War and Genocide at the Household Level

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    We study welfare gains and losses in a sample of 188 rural households in two Rwandan provinces over the time span 1990--2002. Our sample is unique because it covers a period of extreme and widespread violence. Using an economic mobility analysis, we seek to identify the impact of the shocks of the war, the genocide and their aftermath on long-term household welfare. To measure economic mobility between 1990 and 2002, we use both net income per adult equivalent and an asset index. We find that households experiencing the murder or imprisonment of one of their members moved considerably downwards in the income distribution. However, households affected by other war-related shocks such as the number of months taken refuge and the loss of physical capital were not worse off in 2002 compared with other households. Copyright 2007 The author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Centre for the Study of African Economies. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: [email protected], Oxford University Press.

    Prospective Aid and Indebtedness Relief: A proposal., mimeo

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    1. Human development and debt overhang 2. Three premises 3. Prospective ai
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