Existential laughter

Postprint deposited with the permission of the Philosophy Documentation Center.Each of the previous three articles in this series has examined one of the three main traditions of humour theory; those based around incongruity, superiority and the release of energy. We have seen that each of these theoretical traditions sheds some light upon humour and laughter, but also that all fail in their overly ambitious task of offering a fully comprehensive theory. This has not deterred some scholars from wanting to develop such a theory; perhaps by incorporating the best features of each of the main three theoretical traditions into one 'super-theory'. But while it is true that such a synthesis of theories might be superior, as a theory, to each by itself, such a technique would still not give us an adequate general theory. Why? Because we have seen that the inadequacies of the theoretical traditions are not merely those of omission; inadequacies which could be resolved by supplementing any given theory with insights from alternative perspectives. Rather, some of the most important problems are intrinsic to the theories themselves; most notably, the need to stretch terminology, to a sometimes ludicrous degree, which we observed in both the incongruity and superiority traditions. [opening paragraph]Peer reviewe

Humour and incongruity

Article postprint deposited with the permission of the Philosophy Documentation CenterThe first in a series of articles on the philosophy of humour and laughter looks at attempts made to explain humour in terms of incongruity.Peer reviewe

Humour and release

Article postprint deposited with the permission of the Philosophy Documentation Center.The third article in this series looks at Freud's attempt to explain humour and laughter in terms of the release of 'psychic energy'.Peer reviewe

Self-forgiveness and the moral perspective of humility: Ian McEwan's Atonement

Reflection on Briony Tallis in Ian McEwan’s Atonement can help us understand two key aspects of self-forgiveness. First, she illustrates an unorthodox conception of humility that aids the process of responsible self-forgiveness. Second, she fleshes out a self-forgiveness that includes continued self-reproach. While Briony illustrates elements of the self-absorption about which critics of continued self-reproach (such as Margaret Holmgren) are rightly concerned, she also shows a way of getting beyond this, such that the delicate balance between self-forgiveness and self-condemnation is upheld. Atonement also shows the significance for the task of self-forgiveness of a particular kind of narrative continuity.Peer reviewe

Self-knowledge in Kierkegaard

This document is a draft of a chapter that has been published by Oxford University Press in Ursula Renz, ed., Self-Knowledge: a history, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), ISBN 9780190226428, eISBN 9780190630553.Throughout his authorship, Kierkegaard shows an intense fascination with Socrates and Socratic self-knowledge. This chapter traces, in roughly chronological order: (1) the young Kierkegaard’s autobiographical reflections on self-knowledge, when first coming to understand his task as an author; (2) Socrates as a negative figure in The Concept of Irony - where self-knowledge is understood in terms of separation from others and the surrounding society - and the contrast with the Concluding Unscientific Postscript’s treatment of Socrates as an exemplary “subjective thinker”; (3) in Either/Or, the connection between self-knowledge and self-transparency, and the link between self-knowledge and “choosing oneself”, understood as willing receptivity; (4) in writings such as The Concept of Anxiety and The Sickness Unto Death, the importance of sin and our utter dependence upon God for the question of whether self-knowledge is ever really possible; and (5) in Judge for Yourself! and related journal entries, a more precise specification of what Christian self-knowledge might amount to. I aim to show that, in his account of self-knowledge as much as elsewhere, treatments of Kierkegaard as a proto-existentialist risk misleadingly downplaying the deeply and explicitly Christian nature of his thought.Peer reviewedSubmitted Versio

Humour and superiority

Postprint deposited with permission of the Philosophy Documentation Center.This is the second in a series of articles on the philosophy of humour and laughter. This article looks at the attempts which are made to explain humour in terms of superiority.Peer reviewe

Wot U @ Uni 4? : expectations and actuality of studying philosophy at university

Original article can be found at: http://prs.heacademy.ac.uk/publications/In a project funded by the Subject Centre, we used focus groups to explore students' answers to six questions, including their reasons for going to university and their views of the purpose of higher education. Particular surprises were the invisibility of research to students and the depth of disagreement about the value of seminars. But most significant was the consequence of the dramatic decline in contact hours on arrival at university. Students found it difficult to form supportive study relationships. They also seem unclear about the distinc tion between collaboration and collusion. We end, therefore, by suggesting that learning and teaching practice needs to be illuminated by reflections on critical friendship.Peer reviewe

What Neither Abraham nor Johannes de Silentio Could Say

("The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com") Copyright Aristotelian Society. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2008.00163.xThough there are significant points of overlap between Michelle Kosch’s reading of Fear and Trembling and my own, this paper focuses primarily on a significant difference: the legitimacy or otherwise of looking to paradigmatic exemplars of faith in order to understand faith. I argue that Kosch’s reading threatens to underplay the importance of exemplarity in Kierkegaard’s thought, and that there is good reason to resist her use of Philosophical Fragments as the key to interpreting the ‘hidden message’ of Fear and Trembling. Key to both claims is the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. I also briefly sketch an alternative reading of the ‘hidden message’, one in which Kierkegaard’s Christian commitments play a notably different role.Peer reviewe

Learning to hope: : the role of hope in Fear and Trembling

This material has been published in Daniel Conway, ed., Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling: A Critical Guide. This version is free to view and download for personal use only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © 2015 John Lippitt. All rights reserved.Peer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio