2 research outputs found
ECDH Key-Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Electromagnetic Attacks on PCs
We present the first physical side-channel attack on elliptic curve cryptography running on a PC. The attack targets the ECDH public-key encryption algorithm, as implemented in the latest version of GnuPG\u27s Libgcrypt.
By measuring the target\u27s electromagnetic emanations, the attack extracts the secret decryption key within seconds, from a target located in an adjacent room across a wall. The attack utilizes a single carefully chosen ciphertext, and tailored time-frequency signal analysis techniques, to achieve full key extraction
Stealing Keys from PCs using a Radio: Cheap Electromagnetic Attacks on Windowed Exponentiation
We present new side-channel attacks on RSA and ElGamal implementations that use the popular sliding-window or fixed-window (m-ary) modular exponentiation algorithms. The attacks can extract decryption keys using a very low measurement bandwidth (a frequency band of less than 100 kHz around a carrier under 2 MHz) even when attacking multi-GHz CPUs.
We demonstrate the attacks\u27 feasibility by extracting keys from GnuPG, in a few seconds, using a nonintrusive measurement of electromagnetic emanations from laptop computers. The measurement equipment is cheap and compact, uses readily-available components (a Software Defined Radio USB dongle or a consumer-grade radio receiver), and can operate untethered while concealed, e.g., inside pita bread.
The attacks use a few non-adaptive chosen ciphertexts,
crafted so that whenever the decryption routine encounters particular bit patterns in the secret key, intermediate values occur with a special structure that causes observable fluctuations in the electromagnetic field. Through suitable signal processing and cryptanalysis, the bit patterns and eventually the whole secret key are recovered