Quantum-gravity-induced dual lensing and IceCube neutrinos

Momentum-space curvature, which is expected in some approaches to the quantum-gravity problem, can produce dual redshift, a feature which introduces energy dependence of the travel times of ultrarelativistic particles, and dual lensing, a feature which mainly affects the direction of observation of particles. In our recent arXiv:1605.00496 we explored the possibility that dual redshift might be relevant in the analysis of IceCube neutrinos, obtaining results which are preliminarily encouraging. Here we explore the possibility that also dual lensing might play a role in the analysis of IceCube neutrinos. In doing so we also investigate issues which are of broader interest, such as the possibility of estimating the contribution by background neutrinos and some noteworthy differences between candidate "early neutrinos" and candidate "late neutrinos".Comment: In this version V2 we give a definition of variation probability which could be considered in alternative to the notion of variation probability already introduced in version V1; both notions of variation probability are contemplated in the data analysis. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1605.0049

The Sources of Happiness: Evidence from the Investment Game

The present paper draws on data collected in an investment game plus a questionnaire to investigate whether happiness is affected by circumstances and/or outcomes of the game and to evaluate which motivations or preference structures (self-interested preferences, inequity aversion, altruism, warm glow, social-welfare preferences, trust or reciprocity) may explain such effect. Our result shows that the amount sent has significant and positive effect on trustors’ self-declared happiness. We interpret this finding by arguing that the happiness effect can be explained by the enactment of the “generating” (social welfare enhancing) power of the trustor’s decision. Characteristics of the investment game are such that the trustor has a value creating while the trustee only a redistributive power. This difference may explain why only trustors and not trustees are significantly and positively affected by their giving decision.Happiness, Investment Game, Social-welfare Preferences

Low-discrepancy sequences for piecewise smooth functions on the two-dimensional torus

We produce explicit low-discrepancy infinite sequences which can be used to approximate the integral of a smooth periodic function restricted to a convex domain with positive curvature in R^2. The proof depends on simultaneous diophantine approximation and a general version of the Erdos-Turan inequality.Comment: 14 pages, 2 figure

LpL^{p} and Weak-LpL^{p} estimates for the number of integer points in translated domains

Revisiting and extending a recent result of M.Huxley, we estimate the $L^{p}\left( \mathbb{T}^{d}\right)$ and Weak-$L^{p}\left( \mathbb{T}^{d}\right)$ norms of the discrepancy between the volume and the number of integer points in translated domains

Public disclosure of players? conduct and Common Resources Harvesting: Experimental Evidence from a Nairobi Slum

We evaluate the effect of information disclosure on players? behaviour in a multiperiod common pool resource game experiment run in an area of notably scarce social capital such as the Nairobi slum of Kibera. We document divergence of average withdrawal rates across time with an increasingly lower cooperation in the non anonimous setting. We demonstrate that information induced asymmetric conformity contributes to explain what we observe, that is, players who withdraw less than the average of the group in the previous round react more negatively when individual payoffs are disclosed than when they are not, and their reaction is less than compensated by the mean reversion of those who withdrew more. Our results are consistent with the (Ostrom, 2000) hypothesis that, in absence of punishment, disclosure of information about individual (cooperative or non cooperative) behaviour makes common resource management more difficult and tragedy of the commons easier.common pool resource game, conformism, information disclosure field experiments, tragedy of commons

Shedding Light into Preference Heterogeneity: Why Players of Traveller’s Dilemma Depart from Individual Rationality?

We analyse the experimental outcome of the Traveller's Dilemma under three different treatments - baseline (BT), compulsory ex post players' meeting (CET) and voluntary ex post players' meeting (VET) - to evaluate the effects of removal of anonymity (without preplay communication) in a typical one shot game in which there is a dilemma between individual rationality and aggregate outcome. We show that deviations from the Nash equilibrium outcome are compatible with the joint presence in the sample of individually rational, team-rational, (gift giving), "irrational" and (opportunistic) "one-shot-cooperator" types. The two main factors affecting deviations from the standard individually rational behaviour are male gender and the interaction of generalised trust with the decision of meeting the counterpart in the VET design.Traveller’s Dilemma, Team Preferences, Social Distance, Generalised Trust, Relational Goods

Common reason to believe and framing effect in the team reasoning theory: an experimental approach

The present paper is aimed at empirically verifying the role of the “common reason to believe” (Sugden 2003) and of framing (Bacharach 1999 and 2006) within the theory of team reasoning. The analysis draws on data collected trough a Traveler’s Dilemma experiment. To study the role of the common reason to believe, players’ belief in their counterpart’s choice are elicited and the correlation between the endorsement of team reasoning and beliefs is considered. With respect to the idea of frame proposed by Bacharach, we study the effect of the reduction of social distance on the probability that the “we-frame” comes to players’ mind. Social distance is decreased by introducing a meeting between the two players after the game. It is shown that the common reason to believe appropriately explains the internal logic of team reasoning and that the reduction of social distance makes the “we-frame” more likely.Team Reasoning, Common Reason to Believe, Framing, Traveler’s Dilemma; Social Distance