Voting Power and Voting Blocs

We investigate the applicability of voting power indices, in particular the Penrose index (aka absolute Banzhaf index), in the analysis of voting blocs by means of a hypothetical voting body. We use the power of individual bloc members to study the implications of the formation of blocs and how voting power varies as bloc size varies. This technique of analysis has many real world applications to legislatures and international bodies. It can be generalised in many ways : the analysis is a priori (assuming formal voting and ignoring actual voting behaviour) but can be made empirical with voting data ; it examines the consequences of two blocs but can easily be extended to more.

Reforming IMF and World Bank governance : in search of simplicity, transparency and democratic legitimacy in the voting rules

We discuss the reform of the voting rules at the heart of the governance of the IMF and World Bank (the BWIs) in terms of three principles that we suggest ought to be fundamental: simplicity, transparency and democratic legitimacy. By simplicity we mean that the rules should make sense in terms of the purposes of the BWI and be easy to understand. By transparency we mean that the rules mean what they appear to mean in the sense of leading to the same distribution of voting power as the institution's designers intended. We show using voting power analysis that the inequality in the distribution of voting power among countries is greater than that of their voting weight. By democratic legitimacy, we consider whether we can reconcile weighted voting with democracy. Our conclusion is that the voting rules as they currently exist are far from satisfying any of these criteria and that recent reform proposals do not lead us to change this conclusion.

Testing for spatial heterogeneity in functional MRI using the multivariate general linear model

Much current research in functional MRI employs multivariate machine learning approaches (e.g., support vector machines) to detect fine-scale spatial patterns from the temporal fluctuations of the neural signal. The aim of many studies is not classification, however, but investigation of multivariate spatial patterns, which pattern classifiers detect only indirectly. Here we propose a direct statistical measure for the existence of fine-scale spatial patterns (or spatial heterogeneity) applicable for fMRI datasets. We extend the univariate general linear model (typically used in fMRI analysis) to a multivariate case. We demonstrate that contrasting maximum likelihood estimations of different restrictions on this multivariate model can be used to estimate the extent of spatial heterogeneity in fMRI data. Under asymptotic assumptions inference can be made with reference to the X2 distribution. The test statistic is then assessed using simulated timecourses derived from real fMRI data. This demonstrates the utility of the proposed measure of heterogeneity as well as considerations in its application. Measuring spatial heterogeneity in fMRI has important theoretical implications in its own right and has potential uses for better characterising neurological conditions such as stroke and Alzheimer’s disease.wordsNeuroimaging ; Multivariate pattern analysis ; Maximum likelihood estimation ; Seemingly unrelated regression

A new analysis of a priori voting power in the IMF : recent quota reforms give little cause for celebration

The weighted voting system used by the International Monetary Fund creates problems of democratic legitimacy since each member's influence or voting power is not in general equal to its voting weight. Using voting power analysis to analyse both the Board of Governors and the Executive Board, we show that it tends to enhance the power of the United States at the expense of all other members. We investigate the constituency system as a form of representative democracy, idealizing it as a compound voting body, and find that it gives disproportionately large power to some smaller European countries, particularly Belgium and Netherlands. We also find that many countries are effectively disenfranchised. Separate analyses are done for 2006 and 2012, before and after recent reforms, which have been billed as being radical, enhancing the voice of the poor and emerging markets, but the effects are disappointingly small

Voting Power Implications of a Unified European Representation at the IMF

We consider some of the implications of a proposed reform of the voting system of the IMF in which EU countries cease to be separately represented and are replaced by a single combined representative of the European bloc. The voting weight of the EU bloc is reduced accordingly. We analyse two cases: the Eurozone of 12 countries and the European Union of 25. Using voting power analysis we show that the reform could be very beneficial for the governance of the IMF, enhancing the voting power of individual member countries as a consequence of two large countervailing voting blocs. Specifically we analyse a range of EU voting weights and find the following for ordinary decisions requiring a simple majority: (1) All countries other than those of the EU and USA unambiguously gain power (measured absolutely or relatively); (2) The sum of powers of the EU bloc and USA is minimized when they have voting parity ; (3) The power of every other non-EU member is maximized when the EU and USA have parity ; (4) Each EU member could gain power - despite losing its seat and the reduction in EU voting weight - depending on the EU voting system that is adopted ; (5) The USA loses voting power (both absolutely and relatively) over ordinary decisions but retains its unilateral veto over special majority (85%) decisions (as does the EU bloc).IMF ; European Union ; Voting Power Indices ; Penrose Index ; Banzhaf Index

Fair reweighting of the votes in the EU Council of Ministers and the choice of majority requirement for qualified majority voting during successive enlargements

This paper examines the system of Qualified Majority Voting, used by the Council of Ministers of the European Union, from the perspective of enlargement of the Union. It uses an approach based on power indices due to Penrose, Banzhaf and Coleman to make two analyses: (1) the question of the voting power of member countries from the point of view of fairness, and (2) the question of how the majority quota required for QMV should be determined. It studies two scenarios for change from 2005 onwards envisaged by the Nice Treaty: (1) no enlargement, the EU comprising 15 member countries, and (2) full enlargement to 27 members by the accession of all the present twelve candidates. The proposal is made that fair weights be determined algorithmically as a technical or routine matter as the membership changes. The analysis of how the quota affects power shows the trade-offs that countries face between their blocking power and the power of the Council to act. The main findings are: (1) that the weights laid down in the Nice Treaty are close to being fair, the only significant discrepancies being the under representation of Germany and Romania, and the over representation of Spain and Poland; (2) the majority quota required for a decision is set too high for the Council of Ministers to be an effective decision making body

Hilary Putnam (1926-2016): A Lifetime Quest to Understand the Relationship between Mind, Language, and Reality

This is an extended intellectual obituary for Hilary Putna

The Role of Valence in Intentionality

Functional intentionality is the dominant theory about how mental states come to have the content that they do. Phenomenal intentionality is an increasingly popular alternative to that orthodoxy, claiming that intentionality cannot be functionalized and that nothing is a mental state with intentional content unless it is phenomenally conscious. There is a consensus among defenders of phenomenal intentionality that the kind of phenomenology that is both necessary and sufficient for having a belief that "there is a tree in the quad" is that the agent be consciously aware of the meaning of "tree" and "quad". On this theory, experiences with a valence -- experiences like happiness and sadness, satisfaction and frustration -- are irrelevant to intentionality. This paper challenges that assumption and considers several versions of "valent phenomenal intentionality" according to which a capacity for valent conscious experiences is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for intentionality (or both)

Incentives to Corporate Governance Activism

This paper considers incentives faced by investors (financial institutions) to become actively involved in the governance of under-performing companies in their portfolio as recently proposed. By considering the private benefits and the costs of investor activism separately, it questions the conventional wisdom -based on simplistic agency theory - that share ownership is so widely held in the UK that such incentives are too weak for shareholder activism to be a rational basis of a system of corporate governance. It finds that in many cases, by contrast, these incentives would be very strong indeed if conflicts of interest could be avoided.Corporate governance, shareholder activism, incentives, free-rider problem, agency

Power Indices in Large Voting Bodies

There is no consensus on the properties of voting power indices when there are a large number of voters in a weighted voting body. On the one hand, in some real-world cases that have been studied the power indices have been found to be nearly proportional to the weights (eg the EUCM, US Electoral College). This is true for both the PenroseBanzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik indices. It has been suggested that this is a manifestation of a conjecture by Penrose (known subsequently as the Penrose limit theorem, that has been shown to hold under certain conditions). On the other hand, we have the older literature from cooperative game theory, due to Shapley and his collaborators, showing that, where there are a nite number of voters whose weights remain constant in relative terms, and where the quota remains constant in relative terms, while the total number of voters increases without limit - so called oceanic games - the powers of the voters with nite weight tend to limiting values that are, in general, not proportional to the weights. These results, too, are supported by empirical studies of large voting bodies (eg. the IMF/WB boards, corporate shareholder control). This paper proposes a restatement of the Penrose Limit theorem and shows that, for both the power indices, convergence occurs in general, in the limit as the Laakso-Taagepera index of political fragmentation increases. This new version reconciles the di erent theoretical and empirical results that have been found for large voting bodies