Local Permit Ownership in Alaska Salmon Fisheries

Changes in ownership of limited entry permits by “local” residents of the region where a fishery occurs may have significant economic and social implications for fishery-dependent regions. This paper examines changes in local permit ownership in Alaska salmon fisheries, for which a long-term decline in rural local permit ownership is an important policy concern. Theoretically, permit market allocate permits over time to the individuals who are willing to pay the most for them. Any factors that differentially affect what local and non-local residents are willing to pay for permits may affect the equilibrium share of permits held by local residents. For remote rural fisheries in particular, these may include differences between local and non-local residents with respect to access to and costs of financing permits and boats, costs of travel to the fishery, opportunity costs of participation in the fishery, and many other factors. As a fishery increases in profitability, differences between local and non-local residents in access to financing matter more while differences in costs of travel and opportunity costs matter less in the relative ranking of what local and non-local residents are willing to pay for permits. This tends to increase the share of non-local residents among buyers willing to pay the market price for permits, reducing the equilibrium share of permits held by local residents. This leads to a conflict between two important policy goals: increasing fishery profitability and maintaining rural local permit ownership. Consistent with predictions of this theory, the local share of permit ownership in Alaska salmon fisheries is negatively related to permit prices (an indicator of fishery profitability).Alaska salmon, Limited entry, Permits, Transfers, Local ownership, Local participation

INITIAL EFFECTS OF THE ALASKA HALIBUT IFQ PROGRAM: SURVEY COMMENTS OF ALASKA FISHERMEN.

Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

ALASKA HALIBUT CAPTAINS' ATTITUDES TOWARDS IFQS

Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Alaska Employer Health-Care Benefits: A Survey of Alaska Employers

The majority of Alaskans and Americans who have health insurance coverage get it through an employer—either their own employer or the employer of a family member. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that 55.4% of all Alaskans got health insurance through an employer in 2012—and 68.4% of those with health insurance got it through an employer. But those census estimates also suggest that the share of Alaskans and other Americans who get health insurance from their employers has been gradually declining (Figures I-1a and I-1b). Figure I-1a. Figure I-1b. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Health Insurance Historical Tables-HIB Series, Table HIB-4: Health Insurance Coverage Status and Type of Coverage by State--All Persons: 1999 to 2012, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/data/historical/HIB_tables.html. Because employer-sponsored insurance is so important to Alaskans, the Alaska Health Care Commission sponsored a survey of businesses, local governments, and school districts statewide, asking whether they offer employees insurance or other health benefits, which employees are eligible, and what types of plans and rates they offer.Alaska Health Care Commission.Introduction / Study Methodology / Employers and Employees Covered by Survey / Alaska Firms and Health-Care Benefits / Employee Coverage, Eligibility, and Participation / Cost of Health Insurance and Funding / Wellness Programs and Consumer Information / Comparing 2006 and 2013 Surveys / Conclusions / References / Appendix A. Survey Questionnaire / Appendix B. Open-Ended Survey Response

Short-Run Economic Impacts of Alaska Fiscal Options

Today Alaskans are talking about how to close the huge budget deficit the state government is facing, with the oil revenues it has depended on for decades now a small fraction of what they once were. Alaska has had budget deficits for several years, and it has made budget cuts—but it has mainly relied on billions of dollars in savings from the Constitutional Budget Reserve and other funds to cover the deficit. Those savings are dwindling, and the state needs to take measures to close the deficit. An important consideration is how various ways of reducing the deficit might affect Alaska’s economy. This study compares potential short-run economic effects of 11 options the state might take in the next few years to reduce the deficit and that are sustainable over the long term. We looked at economic effects of several types of spending cuts and taxes, as well as reducing the Permanent Fund dividend— the annual cash payment the state makes to all residents—and saving less of Permanent Fund earnings. We’re not advocating or opposing any option: our purpose is to estimate and compare the magnitude of the short-run economic effects of different ways of reducing the deficit. Broadly speaking: • Different ways of collecting money from Alaskans affect those with lower and higher incomes in significantly different ways. • Anything the state does to reduce the deficit will cost the economy jobs and money. But spending some of the Permanent Fund earnings the state currently saves would not have short-run economic effects. Saving less would, however, slow Permanent Fund growth and reduce future earnings. • Because the deficit is so big, the overall economic effects of closing the deficit will also be big.Executive Summary / Table of Contents / Introduction / Revenue Impacts of Taxes and Dividend Cuts / Short-Run Economic Impacts of Fiscal Options / Regional Differences in Impacts of Fiscal Options / Total Economic Impact of Reducing the Deficit / Other Economic Impacts of Fiscal Options / Estimation of Revenue Impacts of Fiscal Options /Expenditure Equations Estimated From the Consumer Expenditure Survey / IMPLAN Model / Estimation of Short-Run Economic Impact

Voluntary Approaches to Transitioning from Competitive Fisheries to Rights-Based Management: Bringing the Field into the Lab

This paper describes a novel experiment designed to examine how rent dissipation may occur in fisheries in which the right to participate in the fishery is limited and fishermen compete amongst themselves for shares of an exogenous total allowable catch. We demonstrate that rent dissipation may occur through multiple mechanisms, and that the heterogeneity of fishermen has important implications for how rent dissipation occurs and the extent to which different individuals may benefit from the implementation of rights-based management. We apply this approach to investigate the concept of voluntary rights-based management under which managers divide the total allowable catch between two separate fisheries, and fishermen may choose between fishing for a guaranteed individual harvest quota or competing for a share of the total catch in a competitive fishery.

Voluntary Approaches to Transitioning from Competitive Fisheries to Rights-Based Management: Bringing the Field into the Lab

This paper describes a novel experiment designed to examine how rent dissipation may occur in fisheries in which the right to participate is limited and fishermen compete amongst themselves for shares of an exogenous total allowable catch. We demonstrate that rent dissipation may occur through multiple mechanisms, and that the heterogeneity of fishermen has important implications for how rent dissipation occurs and the extent to which different individuals may benefit from the implementation of rights-based management. We apply this approach to investigate the concept of voluntary rights-based management under which managers divide the total allowable catch between two separate fisheries, and fishermen may choose between fishing for a guaranteed individual harvest quota and competing for a share of the total catch in a competitive fishery.experimental economics, fisheries, rights-based management, IHQ, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Alaska's Experience with Arctic Oil and Gas Development: History, Policy Issues, and Lessons

presented at Energies of the High North - Arctic Frontiers 2012 Tromsø, Norway January 25, 201