Optimal Effort Incentives in Dynamic Tournaments

This paper analyzes two-stage rank-order tournaments. A principal decides (i) how to spread prize money across the two periods, (ii) how to weigh performance in the two periods when awarding the second-period prize, and (iii) whether to reveal performance after the rst period. The information revelation policy depends exclusively on properties of the e ort cost function. The principal always puts a positive weight on rst-period performance in the second period. The size of the weight and the optimal prizes depend on properties of the observation error distribution; they should be chosen so as to strike a balance between the competitiveness of rst- and second-period tour- naments. In particular, the principal sets no rst-period prize unless the observations in period one are considerably more precise than in period tw

DCXNET: E-Transformation at DaimlerChrysler

The teaching case covers the story of DCXNET, the e-business initiative of DaimlerChrysler from 2000 to 2002. It focuses on the challenges for the automotive industry due to the evolution of e-business technology and how these challenges have been dealt with at DaimlerChrysler. The case is embedded in the context of todayís the e-business hype and describes the management approach, results, and success factors of the initiative as well as lessons learned

A Matter of Perspective: How Experience Shapes Preferences for Redistribution

We investigate in a laboratory experiment if the experience of economic failure or success shapes people’s preferences for redistribution beyond self-interest. Subjects generated a high or a low income either through a lottery or through an effort-based tournament. A sub-set of subjects could then redistribute the income of another sub-set of subjects. We find that individuals who lost the tournament (lottery) redistribute significantly more than all the other types of distributors when the inequality is generated by the tournament (lottery). The effect still holds when controlling for self-selection into different outcomes of the tournament and can be explained by in- or out-group bias and a self-serving bias in responsibility attribution. These findings have implications for public policies and for the design of compensation schemes in organizations

Optimal effort incentives in dynamic tournaments

This paper analyzes two-stage rank-order tournaments. A principal decides (i) how to spread prize money across the two periods, (ii) how to weigh performance in the two periods when awarding the second-period prize, and (iii) whether to reveal performance after the first period. The information revelation policy depends exclusively on properties of the effort cost function. The principal always puts a positive weight on first-period performance in the second period. The size of the weight and the optimal prizes depend on properties of the observation error distribution; they should be chosen so as to strike a balance between the competitiveness of first- and second-period tournaments. In particular, the principal sets no first-period prize unless the observations in period one are considerably more precise than in period two

Intertemporal Effort Provision in Sequential Tournaments

This paper analyzes intertemporal effort provision in two-stage tournaments. A principal with a fixed budget for prizes faces two risk-neutral agents. He observes noisy signals of effort in both periods. His goal is to maximize either total efforts (perfect substitutes) or the product of first- and second-period efforts (imperfect substitutes). He decides (i) how to weigh performance in the two periods when awarding the second period prize, (ii) how to spread prize money across the two periods, and (iii) whether to reveal performance after the first period. Under very general conditions, the principal puts positive weight on both periods in period two. Furthermore, he sets no first-period prize provided the observations in period one are too noisy. The information revelation policy depends on the third derivative of the effort cost function

Optimal effort incentives in dynamic tournaments

This paper analyzes two-stage rank-order tournaments. To influence efforts in the two periods, a principal can use the intertemporal prize structure and the weight of first-period performance in the second-period prize. These two instruments implement different sets of effort vectors. We characterize the optimal combination of prizes and weights as a function of parameters. For large parameter regions, the principal should only give a second-period prize, but use positive first-period performance weights. This holds no matter whether efforts in different periods are perfect or imperfect substitutes and whether the principal gives feedback on performance or not. We also generalize existing results on whether giving feedback is beneficial for the principal

Wildlife genetics and disease: allozyme evolution in the wild boar (Sus scrofa) caused by a swine fever epidemy

Enzyme polymorphism at 42 loci was compared before and after a major epidemy of swine fever in wild boars from northern Vosges (France). No change was observed in the 38 monomorphic loci, but allele frequencies at the phosphoglucomutase locus PGM-2* changed significantly. Possible causes for this observation are discussed, and it appears that PGM-2 locus could be a genetic marker of resistance to this viral disease

Forward pi^0 Production and Associated Transverse Energy Flow in Deep-Inelastic Scattering at HERA

Deep-inelastic positron-proton interactions at low values of Bjorken-x down to x \approx 4.10^-5 which give rise to high transverse momentum pi^0 mesons are studied with the H1 experiment at HERA. The inclusive cross section for pi^0 mesons produced at small angles with respect to the proton remnant (the forward region) is presented as a function of the transverse momentum and energy of the pi^0 and of the four-momentum transfer Q^2 and Bjorken-x. Measurements are also presented of the transverse energy flow in events containing a forward pi^0 meson. Hadronic final state calculations based on QCD models implementing different parton evolution schemes are confronted with the data.Comment: 27 pages, 8 figures and 3 table