A note on US excess bank reserves and the credit contraction

This paper reports aggregate bank excess liquidity preference curves for the pre-crisis and crisis periods. It is argued that the flat curve reflects a threshold lending rate at which point banks accumulate reserves passively. Moreover, the expansion of reserves – when the lending rate threshold is binding – does not lead to credit expansion. The latter would require policies that directly increase the demand for loans, particularly by the business sector.bank reserves, minimum loan interest rate, credit crunch

The simple analytics of oligopoly banking in developing economies

Previous studies have documented the tendency for the commercial banking sector of many developing economies to be highly liquid and be characterised by a persistently high interest rate spread. This paper embeds these stylised facts in an oligopoly model of the banking firm. The paper derives both the loan and deposit rates as a mark up rate over a relatively safe foreign interest rate. Then, using a diagrammatic framework, the paper provides an analysis of: (i) the distribution of financial surplus among savers, business borrowers and banks; (ii) exogenous deposit shocks; (iii) exogenous loan demand shocks; and (iv) the impact of interest rate control on financial intermediation.Oligopoly, commercial banks, developing economies, distribution

Elected Oligarchy and Economic Underdevelopment: The Case of Guyana

This study proposes the idea that Guyana’s present government can be categorized as an elected oligarchy. It highlights the existence of several binding constraints (or structural bottlenecks) and demonstrates how these constraints are exacerbated by the elected oligarchy to impair the economic development of the country. Using stylized data on economic trends, the paper illustrates the direct and indirect channels through which the elected oligarchy stifles the private sector and consequently economic progress. As such, the paper presents the elected oligarchy as an alternative channel through which private investments are crowded out by the political strategy of the state.Private sector crowding out; Elected oligarchy

Excess liquidity, oligopolistic loan markets and monetary policy in LDCs

Evidence about commercial banks’ liquidity preference says the following about the loan market in LDCs: (i) the loan interest rate is a minimum mark-up rate; (ii) the loan market is characterized by oligopoly power; and (iii) indirect monetary policy, a cornerstone of financial liberalization, can only be effective at very high interest rates that are likely to be deflationary. The minimum rate is a mark-up over an exogenous foreign interest rate, marginal transaction costs and a risk premium. The paper utilizes and extends the oligopoly model of the banking firm. A calibration exercise tends to replicate the observed stylized facts.excess bank liquidity, oligopoly loan market, monetary policy

What does excess bank liquidity say about the loan market in Less Developed Countries?

Evidence about developing countries’ commercial banks’ liquidity preference suggests the following about their loan markets: (i) the loan interest rate is a minimum mark-up rate; (ii) the loan market is characterized by oligopoly power; and (iii) indirect monetary policy, a cornerstone of financial liberalization, can only be effective at very high interest rates that are likely to be deflationary. The minimum rate is a mark-up over a foreign interest rate, marginal transaction costs and a risk premium. A calibration exercise demonstrates that the hypothesis of a minimum mark-up loan rate is consistent with the observed stylized facts.Excess bank liquidity, oligopoly banking, loan market, monetary policy

Monetary sterilization and dual nominal anchors: some Caribbean examples

This paper notes that a high sterilization coefficient plus a de facto pegged exchange rate indicates the existence of dual nominal anchors. The econometric evidence presented shows that several Caribbean economies with fixed exchange rate regimes also possess high sterilization coefficients. Given open capital accounts in the various economies, the paper argues that this finding contravenes the money neutrality thesis, which holds that only one nominal anchor can prevail in the long-term. The paper presents a simple theoretical model to explain this phenomenon. The model combines the liquidity preference of commercial banks with an augmented uncovered interest parity equation.sterilization coefficient, dual nominal anchors, foreign exchange regime

Monetary policy and excess liquidity: the case of Guyana

This paper examines the monetary policy framework of Guyana. Guyana’s monetary Policy is motivated by the IMF’s financial programming model. The quantity of excess reserves in the banking system is seen as critical in determining bank credit and ultimately the external balance and inflationary pressures. Therefore, the central bank is always willing to mop up excess liquidity by selling Treasury bills. The paper examines the potential sources of persistent excess reserves. It then tests using the VAR methodology whether excess reserves exert the postulated effect on the price level and exchange rate

Bi-communalism and the economic origins of democracy: a case study

The paper shows how democratic elections in a bi-communal society with entrenched ethnic voting results in an elected oligarchy in which elites of one ethnic group control the allocation of scarce economic resources. Using a simple strategic game, the paper shows that the control of resources results in the Nash equilibrium of uneven development. Heterogeneous agents are included in the model, which is solved for the conditions under which democratic consolidation might occur. Token resource transfers from elites to other groups will tend not to guarantee consolidation. Remittances to the masses tend to prevent democratic consolidation, while bi-lateral grants to an elite dominated government prevent consolidation under some restricted conditions. Constitutional institutions might be necessary to incentivize explicit cooperation – the anti-Nash equilibrium

A note on US excess bank reserves and the credit contraction

This paper reports aggregate bank excess liquidity preference curves for the pre-crisis and crisis periods. It is argued that the flat curve reflects a threshold lending rate at which point banks accumulate reserves passively. Moreover, the expansion of reserves – when the lending rate threshold is binding – does not lead to credit expansion. The latter would require policies that directly increase the demand for loans, particularly by the business sector

The simple analytics of oligopoly banking in developing economies

Previous studies have documented the tendency for the commercial banking sector of many developing economies to be highly liquid and be characterised by a persistently high interest rate spread. This paper embeds these stylised facts in an oligopoly model of the banking firm. The paper derives both the loan and deposit rates as a mark up rate over a relatively safe foreign interest rate. Then, using a diagrammatic framework, the paper provides an analysis of: (i) the distribution of financial surplus among savers, business borrowers and banks; (ii) exogenous deposit shocks; (iii) exogenous loan demand shocks; and (iv) the impact of interest rate control on financial intermediation