Links between securities settlement systems: An oligopoly theoretic approach

This paper presents a duopoly model of the securities settlement industry. Because pooling a large amount of payments can help in using liquidity efficiently, issuers prefer systems where a large number of securities are issued. If the central securities depositories establish a mutual link that enables investors to make transactions with foreign securities, cost savings can be achieved. However, these links may have unexpected effects on CSDs’ pricing, and the issuers’ share of the fee burden can increase substantially. It is not advisable to ban additional fees for using the link, as the CSDs might simply increase the fee for domestic transactions.oligopoly, securities settlement systems

The demand for money market mutual funds

This paper presents a model on the demand for money market funds (MMFs). These funds are a very close substitute for M1 deposits, except that MMFs do not satisfy immediate transaction requirements. The demand for MMFs strengthens when the intended volume of transactions is low. A high interest rate level makes it expensive to hold M1 deposits. High interest rate volatility, paradoxically, increases the risk of holding M1 deposits stronger than the risk of holding MMFs. The results are largely corroborated by Finnish data.money market mutual funds; money demand

Interlinking securities settlement systems: A strategic commitment?

Central securities depositories (CSDs) have opened mutual links, but most of them are seldom used. Why are idle links established? By allowing a foreign CSD to offer services through the link the domestic CSD invites competition. The domestic CSD can determine the cost efficiency of the rival by charging suitable fees, and prevent it from becoming more competitive than the domestic CSD. By inviting the competitor the domestic CSD can commit itself not to charge monopoly fees for secondary market services. This enables the domestic CSD to charge high fees in the primary market without violating investors’ participation constraints.securities settlement systems; central securities depositories; network industries; access pricing

The feasibility of through-the-cycle ratings

It has been proposed that the potential procyclicality of Basel II could be alleviated by using through-the-cycle (TTC) ratings in IRBA models. A TTC rating would be based on the structural component of the debtor’s credit risk ignoring cyclical fluctuations. This paper tests for the existence of such fluctuations in corporate sector credit risk and finds vietually no evidence for their existence at the company level. It is not possible to assign satisfactory TTC ratings to debtors if there are no cyclical variations to be filtered out.through-the-cycle rating; credit risk; procyclicality

Links between securities settlement systems: An oligopoly theoretic approach

This paper presents a duopoly model of the securities settlement industry. Because pooling a large amount of payments can help in using liquidity efficiently, issuers prefer systems where a large number of securities are issued. If the central securities depositories establish a mutual link that enables investors to make transactions with foreign securities, cost savings can be achieved. However, these links may have unexpected effects on CSDs’ pricing, and the issuers’ share of the fee burden can increase substantially. It is not advisable to ban additional fees for using the link, as the CSDs might simply increase the fee for domestic transactions.oligopoly; securities settlement systems

Interlinking securities settlement systems: a strategic commitment?

Central securities depositories (CSDs) have opened mutual links, but most of them are seldom used. Why are idle links established? By allowing a foreign CSD to offer services through the link the domestic CSD invites competition. The domestic CSD can determine the cost efficiency of the rival by charging suitable fees, and prevent it from becoming more competitive than the domestic CSD. By inviting the competitor the domestic CSD can commit itself not to charge monopoly fees for secondary market services. This enables the domestic CSD to charge high fees in the primary market without violating investors’ participation constraints. JEL Classification: G29, L13access pricing, central securities depositories, network industries, securities settlement systems

Managers and efficiency in banking

This paper presents evidence on the impact of managers on cost efficiency in banking. Stochastic frontier analysis is applied to a unique Finnish data set. The paper finds that manager age and education have strong yet complicated effects. University education enhances efficiency if the manager is running a large bank. Managing director changes are systematically followed by efficiency changes. Manager retirement typically causes an efficiency improvement, whereas other manager changes can either improve or weaken efficiency.efficiency; banking; managers

The mixed oligopoly of cross-border payment systems

This paper presents a model depicting cross-border payment systems as a mixed oligopoly. A private net settlement system that maximises profit competes with the central banks’ gross settlement system that maximises welfare. It may be optimal for the central bank system to encourage increased use of the private system by charging fees that exceed the marginal cost. The central bank system is not only a competitor but also an essential service provider, because central bank money is needed for net settlement of payments in the private system. In some cases the central bank system can paradoxically induce the private system to charge lower fees by making it expensive to use central bank money for settlement purposes.payment systems; network economics; mixed oligopolies

A Cross-Country Study of Market-Based Housing Finance

The possibilities to improve households' eligibility for long-term housing loans at fixed interest rates has been a current topic of public discussion. Yet, credit institutions have difficulties in granting such loans, unless they themselves can acquire fixed-rate funding. In many cases, the only feasible way for them to raise such funding is to issue bonds. In a number of countries, such arrangements are already in use. In this paper we present a cross-country study of housing finance by mortgage-backed bonds. The paper describes and analyses mortgage credit markets in Denmark, Sweden and the United States of America with respect to the institutional structure, loans and bonds characteristics, legal framework and the security underlying the system. We have found that all three markets differ and that these differences originate from the respective countries' national characteristics and financial histories. In Sweden and the United States in particular, the public sector has been involved in developing the system. Generally, long-term credit is offered in all three countries through relatively well-functioning, efficient markets. However, certain problems are common to all. First, the number of outstanding bond series is relatively large. Second, in many housing loans, the borrower has the option to repay the debt prematurely. In these cases, the credit institution may have to avoid maturity matching problems by issuing bonds with unknown maturity. We briefly review the history and present circumstances of Finnish bond issuing credit institutions to elucidate why such institutions play a marginal role. Long ago, bond-issuing mortgage institutions were an essential part of the Finnish financial market, but legislative obstacles to their operations almost killed the industry after World War II. The tax system favoured ordinary banks, and bond emissions were restricted by government regulations. Now, these legal obstacles have been abolished. In the light of both foreign and past domestic experience, such institutions have a market niche. Finally, we discuss some of the problems related to setting up a bond-financed mortgage credit market in Finland.housing loans; bonds; mortgage banks

The New Basel Accord: some potential implications of the new standards for credit risk

This paper discusses some potential implications – both intended and unintended – of The New Basel Accord, which is to be finalized by the end of 2001. Our focus is on the reforms of the rules for determining minimum capital requirements for credit risk. The discussion is divided into effects at the level of an individual bank, effects on the structure of the financial markets, and macroeconomic implications. We present a survey of potential effects rather than a profound analysis of any of them. Therefore conclusions are inevitably preliminary, and in many cases they are likely to be controversial. Although the new capital accord as a whole is a major improvement on many properties of the current framework, our aim is to find potential problems that might need to be considered in the implementation and application of the new rules. Overall, the new accord will be largely an experiment, of which many of the consequences remain to be seen.capital adequacy requirements; credit crisk; banking stability