How Different is Japanese Corporate Finance? An Investigation of the Information Content of New Security Issues

This paper studies the shareholder wealth effects associated with 875 new security issues in Japan from January 1, 1985 to May 31, 1991. The sample includes public equity, private equity, rights offerings, straight debt, warrant debt and convertible debt issues. Contrary to the U.S., the announcement of convertible debt issues is accompanied by a significant positive abnormal return of 1.05%. The announcement of equity issues has a positive abnormal return of 0.45%, significant at the 0.10 level, but this positive abnormal return can be attributed to one year in our sample and is offset by a negative issue date abnormal return of -1.01%. The abnormal returns are negatively related to firm size, so that for equity issues (but not for convertible debt issues), large Japanese firms have significant negative announcement abnormal returns. Our evidence is consistent with the view that Japanese managers decide to issue shares based on different considerations than American managers.

Business Groups and Tunneling: Evidence from Private Securities Offerings by Korean Chaebols

Using a comprehensive sample of equity-linked private securities offerings by Korean firms from 1989 to 2000, we examine whether such offerings can be used as a mechanism for wealth transfer between issuers and acquirers. For deals involving issuers and acquirers in the same business group (chaebol), the announcement returns for chaebol-affiliated issuers with good past performance are lower than those for other types of issuers if the price discount is larger. In contrast, this deal leads to more value creation for chaebol-affiliated acquirers than other types of acquirers. Furthermore, well-performing chaebol-affiliated acquirers experience a larger wealth loss than other types of acquirers if they buy securities from poorly performing issuers in the same chaebol. We also find that chaebol firms with good past performance tend to sell private securities at a low price to their member firms. This evidence is consistent with tunneling within business groups.

The Japanese market for corporate control and managerial incentives

We examine bidder returns in Japanese mergers from 1976 to 1990. Using a comprehensive sample of 104 Japanese acquiring firms, we find that shareholders of Japanese bidders experience a significant positive abnormal return of 1.41%. Bidder returns are higher when firms acquire targets in the same industry, when their managers performed well before the merger, and when their managers acquire relatively large targets. We also find that bidder returns increase with the bidder's leverage and the bidder's ties to financial institutions through borrowings. Our evidence is consistent with the view that managerial incentives affect a firm's investment decisions and therefore firm value, and that these incentives are affected by the internal governance mechanisms that control managerial discretion

Why is there a home bias? An analysis of foreign portfolio equity ownership in Japan

This paper uses data on foreign stock ownership in Japan from 1975 to 1991 to examine the determinants of the home bias in portfolio holdings. Existing models of international portfolio choice predicting that foreign investors hold national market portfolios or portfolios tilted towards nigh expected return stocks are inconsistent with the evidence provided in this paper. We document that foreign investors overweight shares of firms in manufacturing industries, large firms, firms with good accounting performance, firms with low unsystematic risk, and firms with low leverage. Controlling for size, there is evidence that small firms that export more have greater foreign owner-snip. Foreign investors do not perform significantly worse than if they held the Japanese market portfolio, however. After controlling for firm size, there is no evidence that foreign ownership is related to expected returns of shares. We show that a model with size-based informational asymmetries and deadweight costs can yield asset allocations consistent with our evidence

How University Endowments Respond to Financial Market Shocks: Evidence and Implications

Endowment payouts have become an increasingly important component of universities’ revenues in recent decades. We test two leading theories of endowment payouts: (1) universities smooth endowment payouts, or (2) universities use endowments as self-insurance against financial shocks. In contrast to both theories, endowments actively reduce payouts relative to their stated payout policies following negative, but not positive, shocks. This asymmetric behavior is consistent with “endowment hoarding,” especially among endowments with values close to the benchmark value at the start of the university president’s tenure. We also document the effect of negative endowment shocks on university operations, including personnel cuts.

Why Is There a Home Bias? An Analysis of Foreign Portfolio Equity Ownership in Japan

This paper uses data on foreign stock ownership in Japan from 1975 to 1991 to examine the determinants of the home bias in portfolio holdings. Existing models of international portfolio choice predicting that foreign investors hold national market portfolios or portfolios tilted towards high expected return stocks are inconsistent with the evidence provided in this paper. We document that foreign investors overweight shares of firms in manufacturing industries, large firms, firms with good accounting performance, firms with low unsystematic risk, and firms with low leverage. Controlling for size, there is evidence that small firms that export more have greater foreign ownership. Foreign investors do not perform significantly worse than if they held the Japanese market portfolio, however. After controlling for firm size, there is no evidence that foreign ownership is related to expected returns of shares. We show that a model with size-based informational asymmetries and deadweight costs can yield asset allocations consistent with our evidence.

Bank Monitoring Incentives and Borrower Earnings Management: Evidence from the Japanese Banking Crisis of 1993-2002

We examine banks' disincentives to monitor borrower earnings management activity during the Japanese banking crisis of 1993-2002. We show that during this period, a period characterized by significant deterioration in the financial health of the Japanese banking sector, firms that borrow a large amount of short-term loans from their main bank manage earnings more aggressively around public equity offerings. This result derives largely from the subsample of offerings by poorly performing firms that maintain lending relationships with main banks that are in weak financial health. We also find a significant decrease in post-offering short-term lending by the main banks for firms that manage earnings upward prior to the offerings. In contrast, we do not find such results during the boom period of 1983-1992. Our results suggest that, when they are under great pressure for survival, Japanese main banks have few incentives to monitor corporate managers, and act primarily in the interests of short-term creditors

Sources of Value Gains in Minority Equity Investments by Private Equity Funds: Evidence from Block Share Acquisitions

Using a large sample of block share acquisitions made by private equity (PE) funds over the 1990 to 2006 period, we examine the sources of value gains in PE minority equity investments. We find that compared to non-PE acquirers, PE acquirers are more likely to place representatives with finance experience on a target’s board, particularly when the target performs poorly or when it has more pronounced agency problems. PE acquirers are also more likely to place representatives with experience in the target’s industry on the target’s board when the target has more complex operations (e.g., multiple segments or higher R&D intensity). The targets in PE acquisitions, particularly those whose boards have representatives from PE acquirers, realize both higher abnormal announcement returns and better post-acquisition operating performance than do targets in other types of acquisitions. Target announcement abnormal returns and post-acquisition operating performance are also higher when PE-appointed directors have expertise in the target’s industry, when they sit on the boards of poorly performing targets, or when they sit on the boards of targets with higher R&D intensity. Thes

The Underreaction Hypothesis and the New Issue Puzzle: Evidence from Japan

This paper investigates the long-term performance of Japanese firms issuing convertible debt or equity. We find that these firms perform poorly even though the stock-price reaction to convertible debt and equity issue announcements is not significantly negative for Japanese firms and Japanese firms do not issue equity or convertible debt following strong positive abnormal returns. Whereas in the U.S. underperformance appears to be concentrated in the smaller firms and in the firms with a high market-to-book ratio, this is not the case in Japan. The underperformance of Japanese issuing firms cannot be understood in terms of the underreaction hypothesis that some have advanced as an explanation for the poor returns of U.S. issuing firms.