Market structure and hospital–insurer bargaining in the Netherlands

In 2005, competition was introduced in part of the hospital market in the Netherlands. Using a unique dataset of transactions and list prices between hospitals and insurers in the years 2005 and 2006, we estimate the influence of buyer and seller concentration on the negotiated prices. First, we use a traditional structure–conduct–performance model (SCP-model) along the lines of Melnick et al. (J Health Econ 11(3): 217–233, 1992) to estimate the effects of buyer and seller concentration on price–cost margins. Second, we model the interaction between hospitals and insurers in the context of a generalized bargaining model similar to Brooks et al. (J Health Econ 16: 417–434, 1997). In the SCP-model, we find that the market shares of hospitals (insurers) have a significantly positive (negative) impact on the hospital price–cost margin. In the bargaining model, we find a significant negative effect of insurer concentration, but no significant effect of hospital concentration. In both models, we find a significant impact of idiosyncratic effects on the market outcomes. This is consistent with the fact that the Dutch hospital sector is not yet in a long-run equilibrium

Competition between non-profit and for-profit health insurers.

This study investigates the effects of tax, regulatory, and reimbursement policies and other factors exogenous to the health insurance market on the relative price (to commercial insurers) paid by Blue Cross plans for hospital care, their administrative expense and accounting profits, premiums, and ultimately Blue Cross market share. We specify and estimate a simultaneous equation model to assess interrelationships among these variables. We conclude that premium tax advantages enjoyed by the Blues have virtually no effect on the Blues' premiums or their market shares. A Blue Cross plans' market share has a positive effect on the discount it obtains from hospitals as does coverage of Blue Shield charges by a state-mandated rate-setting plan. An upper bound on the effect on the Blue Cross market share of covering Blue Cross under rate-setting but excluding the commercials from such coverage is seven percentage points. Tests for administrative slack in the operation of Blue Cross plans yield mixed results

Estimation of seemingly unrelated tobit regressions via the em algorithm

An expectation-maximum (EM) likelihood algorithm is used to estimate two seemingly unrelated Tobit regressions in which the dependent variables are truncated normal. An illustrative example on the determination of the life-health insurance and pension benefits is also given. © 1987 American Statistical Association

Diffusion of surgical technology. An exploratory study.

The study presents an empirical analysis of the diffusion patterns of five surgical procedures. Roles of payer mix, regulatory policies, physician diffusion, competition among hospitals, and various hospital characteristics such as size and the spread of technologies are examined. The principal data base is a time series cross-section of 521 hospitals based on discharge abstracts sent to the Commission on Professional and Hospital Activities. Results on the whole are consistent with a framework used to study innovations in other contexts in which the decisions of whether to innovate and timing depend on anticipated streams of returns and cost. Innovation tends to be more likely to occur in markets in which the more generous payers predominate. But the marginal effects of payer mix are small compared to effects of location and hospital characteristics, such as size and teaching status. Hospital rate-setting sometimes retarded diffusion. Certificate of need programs did not