Understanding happiness: the distinction between living - and thinking about it

Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman discusses happiness as an indicator of social progress.

Maps of Bounded Rationality

The work cited by the Nobel committee was done jointly with the late Amos Tversky (1937-1996) during a long and unusually close collaboration. Together, we explored the psychology of intuitive beliefs and choices and examined their bounded rationality. This essay presents a current perspective on the three major topics of our joint work: heuristics of judgment, risky choice, and framing effects. In all three domains we studied intuitions - thoughts and preferences that come to mind quickly and without much reflection. I review the older research and some recent developments in light of two ideas that have become central to social-cognitive psychology in the intervening decades: the notion that thoughts differ in a dimension of accessibility - some come to mind much more easily than others - and the distinction between intuitive and deliberate thought processes.behavioral economics; experimental economics

Unpacking estimates of task duration: The role of typicality and temporality

Research in task duration judgment has shown that unpacking a multifaceted task into components prior to estimating its duration increases estimates. In three studies, we find that unpacking a complex task can increase, decrease, or leave unaffected task duration estimates depending on the typicality of the unpacked components and their temporal position in the task sequence. Unpacking atypical long components increases task duration estimates, while unpacking atypical short components decreases estimates (Study 1). Unpacking atypical early components increases task duration estimates, while unpacking atypical late components decreases estimates (Study 2). Unpacking typical early or late components leaves estimates unaffected (Study 3). We explain these results based on the idea that task duration estimation involves a mental simulation process, and by drawing on theories of unpacking in probability judgment that emphasize the role of the typicality of the unpacked components. These findings hint at a deep conceptual link between probability judgment and task duration estimation but also show differences, such as the influence that temporality exerts on estimated duration. © 2013 Elsevier Inc

Preference purification and the inner rational agent:A critique of the conventional wisdom of behavioural welfare economics

Neoclassical economics assumes that individuals have stable and context-independent preferences, and uses preference-satisfaction as a normative criterion. By calling this assumption into question, behavioural findings cause fundamental problems for normative economics. A common response to these problems is to treat deviations from conventional rational-choice theory as mistakes, and to try to reconstruct the preferences that individuals would have acted on, had they reasoned correctly. We argue that this preference purification approach implicitly uses a dualistic model of the human being, in which an inner rational agent is trapped in an outer psychological shell. This model is psychologically and philosophically problematic

"So, Tell Me What Users Want, What They Really, Really Want!"

Equating users' true needs and desires with behavioural measures of 'engagement' is problematic. However, good metrics of 'true preferences' are difficult to define, as cognitive biases make people's preferences change with context and exhibit inconsistencies over time. Yet, HCI research often glosses over the philosophical and theoretical depth of what it means to infer what users really want. In this paper, we present an alternative yet very real discussion of this issue, via a fictive dialogue between senior executives in a tech company aimed at helping people live the life they `really' want to live. How will the designers settle on a metric for their product to optimise

Indignation: Psychology, Politics, Law

Moral intuitions operate in much the same way as other intuitions do; what makes the moral domain is distinctive is its foundations in the emotions, beliefs, and response tendencies that define indignation. The intuitive system of cognition, System I, is typically responsible for indignation; the more reflective system, System II, may or may not provide an override. Moral dumbfounding and moral numbness are often a product of moral intuitions that people are unable to justify. An understanding of indignation helps to explain the operation of the many phenomena of interest to law and politics: the outrage heuristic, the centrality of harm, the role of reference states, moral framing, and the act-omission distinction. Because of the operation of indignation, it is extremely difficult for people to achieve coherence in their moral intuitions. Legal and political institutions usually aspire to be deliberative, and to pay close attention to System II; but even in deliberative institutions, System I can make some compelling demands

Pleasure, Utility, and Choice

When making most choices, people imagine how they will feel about the consequences. This chapter provides an account of the anticipation process and uses it to predict choice. Decisions from several experiments are consistent with a theory in which people are assumed to evaluate alternatives by making trade-offs between predicted pleasure and pain. Then they choose the alternative with greater expected pleasure. The field of decision making has long benefited from the interdisciplinary contributions of philosophers, economists, and statisticians, among others. These interdisciplinary contibutions can be categorized into two camps. One camp specifies how people should make choices if they wish to obey fundamental rules of logic and probability. The other camp focuses on what people actually do when making choices. While rational theories rely on beliefs and utilities, descriptive theories look to psychological processes including cognitive limitations, social norms, and cultural constraints to explain actual choices and the reasons behind alleged deviations from rationality. Both camps are well aware that emotions influence choice. Rational theorists have addressed the question of whether emotions should influence choice, and descriptive theorists have explored how emotions influence choice. This chapter presents a descriptive account of decision making that focuses on anticipated pleasure. We propose that, when making a choice, people imagine how they will feel about future consequences. Comparisons of qualitatively different feelings are made in terms of pleasure and pain. That is, people evaluate each alternative by balancing imagined pleasure against imagined pain and select the alternative with greater average pleasure