Institutional Investment in Central and Eastern Europe: Investment Criteria of Western Portfolio Managers

This study provides detailed evidence on the recent transition state of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries. It draws on data from a survey conducted among portfolio managers of Western investment funds thereby making use of the knowledge of experts in CEE markets. The approach of the study is two-fold: First, criteria for portfolio investment and current barriers to higher investment in CEE coumtries are identified. Second, the CEE portfolio structure is explained making use of detailed grading data from the survey. The results suggest that a reduction in general and macroeconomic risk temds to increase investment and that the potential of high returns and low risk from the setting of financial markets contributes to significantly higher investment in some countries

Determinants of acquisition and failure: Stylized facts and lessons for empirical studies

This study provides new stylized facts on the determinants of corporate failure and acquisition in Germany. It also offers important lessons for the design of empirical studies. We show that firms experiencing failure or acquisition are significantly different from surviving firms on a number of firm-specific characteristics, however the characteristics are similar for failing and acquired firms. This implies that firm failure and acquisition should be analyzed in combination. Second, we find that the industry distribution is significantly different for failure and acquisitions. This calls for some kind of industry-adjustment in empirical analyses. Third, the differences between surviving and failing (acquired) firms are similar, irrespective whether the respective firm characteristic is observed one or up to four or more years before failure (acquisition). This validates the findings of studies that use lags of only one year for explanatory variables

Control transfers in corporate Germany: Their frequency, causes, and consequences

This study examines changes in block ownership for a large sample of listed and non-listed German firms. The frequency of block trading is similar to other countries, and the vast majority of block trades leads to changes in ultimate ownership (control transfers). Such changes are more likely for firms with high leverage, while they are less likely for larger firms and firms with high ownership concentration. Only for listed firms poor performance is related to more frequent control transfers. Control transfers are followed by increased management turnover, and for listed firms also by asset divestitures and employee layoffs

New Evidence on Ownership Structures in Germany

Ownership structures are an important element of the theory explaining corporate governance. This study presents detailed descriptive evidence on the ownership structures of German manufacturing firms. It addresses several shortcomings of the previous German empirical literature: First, we study all legal forms of a Kapitalgesellschaft, firms that generally have a separation of ownership and control. We do not focus exclusively on the listed Aktiengesellschaft (AG) but include many non-listed firms. Second, we examine changes in the ownership structure. This is a new and important approach because these changes are frequently related to corporate performance. Third, we analyze the higher levels of ownership structures, i.e. ownership structures of the direct owners. Thereby we address an issue quant itatively which only recently became subject of empirical studies. Finally, we find that crossownership is of minor relevance in the German manufacturing sector. However, our measure of cross-ownership represents only a lower bound

The Prospects of Capital Markets in Central and Eastern Europe

The picture of the securities exchanges and financial sectors in CEE countries is still relatively unfavorable. The CEE securities exchanges – with the only exception of the Warsaw Stock Exchange – are, in comparison with their western counterparts, underdeveloped and less important for the domestic economies in general and for corporate finance in particular. The CEE securities exchanges are under pressure for several reasons and should change their form of (international) organization to ensure future success. Stronger international integration of the exchanges could also improve the integration of CEE companies into international capital markets

Corporate Finance and Restructuring: Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe

After the end of communism enterprises in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) were marked by low levels of labor productivity, mainly because of too high employment levels. According to economic theory, the corporate capital structure can be an important element in the restructuring process. But both, empirical evidence on corporate finance in CEE countries and its relation to employment is still sparse. This study describes the patterns of the corporate capital structure for ten CEE countries over the years 1993-1998, taking two major Western economies as a benchmark. An impressive rise in total indebtedness suggests that there is room for creditors to fulfill their role in corporate governance. On the other hand, investment is predominantly financed internally in CEE firms, making creditor and shareholder governance more difficult. But a regression analysis shows that inefficient CEE firms are forced to downsize employment when they finance themselves largely externally, but less so for those firms with high levels of debt. However, downsizing is limited by soft budget constraints

An applied econometricians' view of empirical corporate governance studies

The economic analysis of corporate governance is en vogue. In addition to a host of theoretical papers, an increasing number of empirical studies analyze how ownership structure, capital structure, the structure of the board and the market for corporate control influence firm performance. This is not an easy task, and indeed, for reasons explained in this survey, empirical studies on corporate governance have more than the usual share of econometric problems. Aim of this paper is a critical survey of the recent empirical literature on corporate governance - in order to show which methodological lessons can be learned for future empirical research in the field of corporate governance, paying particular attention to German institutions and data availability

Corporate Governance, Market Discipline, and Productivity Growth

Using a large panel of German manufacturing firms over the years 1986– 1996, this study examines the impact of corporate governance and market discipline on productivity growth. We find that firms under concentrated ownership tend to show significantly higher productivity growth. Financial pressure from creditors influences productivity growth positively, particularly for firms in financial distress. Regarding market discipline, productivity grows faster when competition on product markets is intense, but only when owner concentration is high. We do not find evidence that the type of the owner, ownership complexity, or the size of the supervisory board is significantly related to productivity growth

Corporate monitoring by blockholders in Europe : Empirical evidence of managerial disciplining in Belgium, France, Germany and the UK

This study examines managerial disciplining in poorly performing firms using large panels for Belgian, French, German and UK firms. We consider the monitoring role of large blockholders, the market for share blocks, creditors, and non-executive directors. Board restructuring is correlated to poor performance, but not for France. Neither existing blockholders nor creditors play an active role in disciplining. Block purchases have a monitoring role in Belgium and Germany, but not in France and the UK. Large boards facilitate disciplining, but the role of non-executives is ambiguous

Product market competition, corporate governance and firm performance: An empirical analysis for Germany

Productivity growth has been slow in many continental European countries over the last few decades, especially in comparison with the United States. It has been argued that lack of product market competition and poor corporate governance are two of the main reasons for this phenomenon. However, predictions from theoretical models are far from unambiguous, and empirical evidence is sparse, in particular at the level of individual firms. In this paper, we aim to close this gap with an econometric analysis of firm performance in Germany. Based on a unique panel data set with detailed information on almost 400 manufacturing firms over the 1986-94 period, we find that firms operating in industries which are characterized by more intensive product market competition experience higher rates of productivity growth. We also find weak evidence for the notion that in Germany’s bank-based system of internal control, ownership concentration is harmful for productivity growth