Globalization of Corporate Covernance: The American Influence on Dismissal Performance Sensitivity of European CEOs

This study examines how globalization of corporate governance practices influence the risk of European CEOs being dismissed. We argue that the harsh monitoring of the American corporate governance system spills over to the rest of the world as a result of this globalization. We focus on direct and indirect American influence on the dismissal performance sensitivity among the 250 largest European publicly listed firms. The indirect influence is assumed to materialize via European firms cross-listing on U.S. exchanges, whereas the direct influence is assumed to appear as a result of European firms hiring of American independent board members. Both sources of influence are hypothesized to result in increased dismissal performance sensitivity. The empirical results show a significant increase in the dismissal sensitivity in poorly performing companies with American board membership whereas no significant increase is found from cross-listing in the U.S.CEO dismissal; Performance sensitivity; Globalization; Corporate governance; Foreign board membership; Institutional contagion

Operational characteristics of White's test for neglected nonlinearities

SIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-24105 Kiel W 60 (9321) / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekDEGerman

A comparative study of equity judgements in Lithuania and Norway

A questionnaire-type experiment was conducted in Lithuania and Norway in order to generate two samples suitable for a comparative examination of equity judgements.The results reveal large differences between the two countries. Norwegian probants had a much higher propensity to decide in accordance with Rawls' second principle than had Lithuanian probants. Equity judgements are also strongly dependent on the context of choice. The results are interpreted within a framework describing the formation of social preferences. More specifically, differences in observed equity judgements in the two countries are related to differences in history, past experience and future prospects.

Globalization of Corporate Governance: The American Influence on Dismissal Performance Sensitivity of European CEOs

This study examines how globalization of corporate governance practices influence the risk of European CEOs being dismissed. We argue that the harsh monitoring of the American corporate governance system spills over to the rest of the world as a result of this globalization. We focus on direct and indirect American influence on the dismissal performance sensitivity among the 250 largest European publicly listed firms. The indirect influence is assumed to materialize via European firms cross-listing on U.S. exchanges, whereas the direct influence is assumed to appear as a result of European firms hiring of American independent board members. Both sources of influence are hypothesized to result in increased dismissal performance sensitivity. The empirical results show a significant increase in the dismissal sensitivity in poorly performing companies with American board membership whereas no significant increase is found from cross-listing in the U.S

A Single-Blind Controlled Competition Among Tests for Nonlinearity and Chaos

Abstract: Interest has been growing in testing for nonlinearity or chaos in economic data, but much controversy has arisen about the available results. This paper explores the reasons for these empirical difficulties. We designed and ran a single-blind controlled competition among five highly regarded tests for nonlinearity or chaos with ten simulated data series. The data generating mechanisms include linear processes, chaotic recursions, and nonchaotic stochastic processes; and both large and small samples were included in the experiment. The data series were produced in a single blind manner by the competition manager and sent by e-mail, without identifying information, to the experiment participants. Each such participant is an acknowledged expert in one of the tests and has a possible vested interest in producing the best possible results with that one test. The results of this competition provide much surprising information about the power functions of some of the best regarded tests for nonlinearity or noisy chaos

A Single-Blind Controlled Competition among Tests for Nonlinearity and Chaos

This is the FINAL draft of this paper reporting the results of a long ongoing competition. The paper now is forthcoming in the Journal of Econometrics. This final version replaces the earlier draft that was also in this archive. Interest has been growing in testing for nonlinearity or chaos in economic data, but much controversy has arisen about the available results. This paper explores the reasons for these empirical difficulties. We apply five highly regarded tests for nonlinearity or chaos to ten simulated data series. The data generating mechanisms include linear processes, chaotic recursions, and nonchaotic stochastic processes; and both large and small samples were included in the experiment. The data series were produced in a single blind manner by the competition manager and sent by e-mail, without identifying information, to the experiment participants. Each such participant is an acknowledged expert in one of the tests and has a possible vested interest in producing the best possible results with that one test. The results of this competition provide much surprising information about the power functions of some of the best regarded tests for nonlinearity or noisy chaos. The simulated data and the code for some of the tests entered into this competition also are online in this archive.chaos nonlinearity competition experiment