Posted Pricing as a Plus Factor

This paper identifies conditions under which an industry-wide practice of posted (or list) pricing is a plus factor sufficient to conclude that firms violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. For certain classes of markets, it is shown that, under competition, all firms setting a list price with a policy of no discounting is contrary to equilibrium. Thus, if all firms choose posted pricing, it is to facilitate collusion by making it easier for them to coordinate their prices. It is then argued that the adoption of posted pricing communicates the necessary intent and reliance to conclude concerted action.

Corporate Leniency with Private Information: The Push of Prosecution and the Pull of Pre-emption

A corporate leniency program provides relief from government penalties to the first member of a cartel to come forward and cooperate with the authorities. This study explores the incentives to apply for leniency when each cartel member has private information as to the likelihood that the competition authority will be able to convict them without a cooperating firm. A firm may apply for leniency because it fears being convicted ("prosecution effect") or because it fears another firm will apply ("pre-emption effect"). Policies by the competition authority to magnify concerns about pre-emption - and thereby induce greater use of the leniency program - are also explored.

A Theory of Tacit Collusion

A theory of tacit collusion is developed based on coordination through price leadership and less than full mutual understanding of strategies. It is common knowledge that price increases are to be at least matched but who should lead and at what price is not common knowledge. The steady-state price is characterized and it falls short of the best collusive equilibrium price. Coordination through tacit means, rather than express communication, is then shown to constrain the extent of the price rise from collusion.

Collusion under Monitoring of Sales

Collusion under imperfect monitoring is explored when firms?prices are private information and their quantities are public information; an information structure consistent with several recent price-fixing cartels such as those in lysine and vitamins. For a class of symmetric duopoly games, it is shown that symmetric equilibrium punishments cannot sustain any collusion. An asymmetric punishment is characterized which does sustain collusion and it has the firm with sales exceeding its quota compensating the firm with sales below its quota. In practice, cartels have performed such transfers through sales among the cartel members.

Signaling and Tacit Collusion in an Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

In the context of an infinitely repeated Prisoners.Dilemma, we explore how cooperation is initiated when players signal and coordinate through their actions. There are two types of players - patient and impatient - and a player's type is private information. An impatient type is incapable of cooperative play, while if both players are patient types - and this is common knowledge - then they can cooperate with a grim trigger strategy. We find that the longer that players have gone without cooperating, the lower is the probability that they'll cooperate in the next period. While the probability of cooperation emerging is always positive, there is a positive probability that cooperation never occurs.

Signaling and Tacit Collusion in an Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

In the context of an infinitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, we explore how cooperation is initiated when players signal and coordinate through their actions. There are two types of players - patient and impatient - and a player's type is private information. An impatient type is incapable of cooperative play, while if both players are patient types - and this is common knowledge - then they can cooperate with a grim trigger strategy. We find that the longer that players have gone without cooperating, the lower is the probability that they'll cooperate in the next period. While the probability of cooperation emerging is always positive, there is a positive probability that cooperation never occurs.

Cartel Pricing Dynamics with Cost Variability and Endogenous Buyer Detection

This paper characterizes collusive pricing patterns when buyers may detect the presence of a cartel. Buyers are assumed to become suspicious when observed prices are anomalous. We find that the cartel price path is comprised of two phases. During the transitional phase, price is generally rising and relatively unresponsive to cost shocks. During the stationary phase, price responds to cost but is much less sensitive than under non-collusion or simple monopoly. The length of the transition phase is decreasing in the variance of cost shocks. It is also shown that the cartel price path may overshoot its long-run level so that price converges from above.

"Cartel Pricing Dynamics with Cost Variability and Endogenous Buyer Detection"

This paper characterizes collusive pricing patterns when buyers may detect the presence of a cartel. Buyers are assumed to become suspicious when observed prices are anomalous. We find that the cartel price path is comprised of two phases. During the transitional phase, price is generally rising and relatively unresponsive to cost shocks. During the stationary phase, price responds to cost but is much less sensitive than under non-collusion or simple monopoly; a low price variance may then be a collusive marker. Compared to when firms do not collude, cost shocks take a longer time to pass-through to price.

he Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path

Previous research exploring the effect of corporate leniency programs has modelled the oligopoly stage game as a Prisoners?Dilemma. Using numerical analysis, we consider the Bertrand price game and allow the probability of detection and penalties to be sensitive to firms?prices. Consistent with earlier results, a maximal leniency program necessarily makes collusion more difficult. However, we also find that partial leniency programs - such as in the U.S. - can make collusion easier compared to offering no leniency. We also show that even if cartel formation is not deterred, a leniency program can reduce the prices charged by firms.

Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices

Motivated by recent cartel practices, a stable collusive agreement is characterized when firms' prices and quantities are private information. Conditions are derived whereby an equilibrium exists in which firms truthfully report their sales and then make transfers within the cartel based on these reports. The properties of this equilibrium fit well with the cartel agreements used in a number of markets including citric acid, lysine, and vitamins.