5 research outputs found

    Getting to CODESA: an analysis on why multiparty negotiations in South Africa began, 1984-1991

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    Includes bibliographical references.This dissertation examines the pre-negotiation stage of the negotiation process in South Africa leading to the first plenary session of the Convention for a Democratic of South Africa on 20 December 1991. The pre-negotiation stage was that period in the South African conflict when negotiated solutions were considered, and negotiation towards a political settlement was adopted as an option by the major parties, namely the National Party South African government and the African National Congress. The central question this dissertation asks is why did the South African multiparty negotiations begin? This question is important; De Klerk's seminal address to the Tricameral Parliament on 2 February 1990, and the subsequent release of Nelson Mandela on 11 February 1990, is often considered as the beginning of the negotiation process in South Africa. This however is not true. Negotiations did take place before this date and they were crucial in shaping the path towards multiparty negotiations. The important question therefore is what prepared the ground for 2 February 1990, and the resulting political process that l ed to multiparty negotiations. The dissertation thus has two sub-questions: (1) why negotiations in South Africa occurred at all; and (2) why the South African government ended up negotiating with the ANC. To answer these questions, the dissertation will use I. William Zartman's theory of ripeness as a guide, and Brian Tomlin's five-staged model of prenegotiation as an analytical framework. In this respect, the dissertation is a theoretical singlecase study. The dissertation argues that multiparty negotiations in South Africa began because the South African government and the African National Congress reached a shared understanding that the South African conflict could be solved through a negotiated solution, produced a commitment to a negotiated solution, and in the process, overcame the problem of preconditions as a barrier to the opening of multiparty negotiations

    Financing the ANC: Chancellor House, Eskom and the dilemmas of party finance reform

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    On 8 April 2010 the World Bank approved a US3.75billionloantohelpSouthAfricaachieveareliablesourceofelectricitysupply.Theloan,theWorldBankslargestlendingengagementwithSouthAfricasincetheendofapartheid,wasprovidedtoSouthAfricasstateownedpowerutility,Eskom,andwasbroughtaboutbythecircumstancessurroundingSouthAfricasenergycrisisof20078,andtheglobalfinancialcrisisthatexposedSouthAfricasvulnerabilitytoanenergyshockandaccompanyingsevereeconomicconsequences.NamedtheEskomInvestmentSupportProject(theEskomProject),theWorldBankloanwillcofinancethecompletionofthe4800MWMedupicoalfiredpowerstation(US3.75 billion loan to help South Africa achieve a reliable source of electricity supply. The loan, the World Bank’s largest lending engagement with South Africa since the end of apartheid, was provided to South Africa’s state-owned power utility, Eskom, and was brought about by the circumstances surrounding South Africa’s energy crisis of 2007–8, and the global financial crisis that exposed South Africa’s vulnerability to an energy shock and accompanying severe economic consequences. Named the Eskom Investment Support Project (the Eskom Project), the World Bank loan will co-finance the completion of the 4800MW Medupi coal-fired power station (US3.05 billion), the piloting for a utility-scale 100MW wind-power project in Sere and a 100MW concentrated solar-power project with storage in Upington (US$260 million), and low-energy efficient components, including a railway to transport coal with fewer greenhouse gas emissions
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